

From: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)

Bcc: S.31(1)

[REDACTED]

[NPCC Media ** DO NOT REMOVE FROM FORCE CONTACTS **](#);

S.31(1)

Subject: FW: CRU 01/CRF/25/005143/B - Human Trafficking - Further Advice included

Date: 02 October 2025 11:27:00

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox

Sent: 26 September 2025 15:40

Subject: RE: CRU 01/CRF/25/005143/B - Human Trafficking - Further Advice included

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU. Advice is at the end of this message.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005143/B

Applicant's request:

I am writing an article for spark news that is attached to our university highlighting the world of Human Trafficking and all that it reveals in the UK. Additionally for my final assignment an investigation on Human Trafficking in the UK.

I would like to know where the people who have been involved in Human Trafficking are from originally (That have been arrested and charged in the UK) Under the Modern Slavery Act 2015 Period 2020-2025.

Secondly victims, where is their original country and their ages Period 2020-2025.

I do realise that this is sensitive data, and I do not want to know their address, just the country they are from, as I am compiling a list of countries that these crimes originate and the question has never been answered.

As I am sure this is a very delicate topic and I appreciate your views and discretion but would like comments on the current situation please in the UK, additionally what are the thoughts as a force in the UK.

15/08/25 - Clarified request from Warwickshire:

Q1. The number of suspects arrested and charged with the below crimes between 2020 and 2024, for the below offences (linked to the Modern Slavery Act 2015), broken down by ethnicity

036/06 Hold person in slavery or servitude Modern Slavery Act 2015

036/07 Require person to perform forced or compulsory labour Modern Slavery Act 2015

036/08 Arrange or facilitate travel of another person with a view to exploitation Modern Slavery Act 2015

036/10 Commit offence other than kidnapping or false imprisonment with intention of arranging travel with view to exploitation Modern Slavery Act 2015

036/11 Commit offence of kidnapping or false imprisonment with intention of arranging travel with view to exploitation Modern Slavery Act 2015

036/12 Do act prohibited by slavery and trafficking risk or prevention order Modern Slavery Act 2015

036/13 Fail to comply with requirement to surrender passport under Modern Slavery Act 2015 Modern Slavery Act 2015

036/14 Fail to comply with requirement to provide name and address under Modern Slavery Act 2015 Modern Slavery Act 2015

Q2. The number of victims recorded in the above crimes (linked to the Modern Slavery Act 2015) recorded in the period 2020 to 2024, broken down by victim ethnicity and age group

CRU Advice:

Thank you for holding back on your responses while we just added a few things to this advice for you.

Firstly, a reminder that unless your force is in receipt of the same clarification, the refined request to Warwickshire is only relevant to that force.

Secondly, for this section of the request 'As I am sure this is a very delicate topic and I appreciate your views and discretion but would like comments on the current situation please in the UK, additionally what are the thoughts as a force in the UK', we would say that this is not a valid FOI question.

Dealing with the original request

The applicant first asks to know where people who have been **arrested and charged** for HT

from 2015 onwards, have come from (as in their country of origin or nationality). The request does not seek any greater detail than that, and it only relates to those who were **both arrested and charged**. As such (and putting Cost to one side), practitioners could end up with a simple list of countries, which is harmless I would say.

The applicant then asks the same about victims of HT and their ages between 2020-2025. If information is held it would require local assessment s31(1) and s40(2). Our advice with these types of crime stats is for each force to do its own assessment as to whether an individual could be identified, or there is a risk to law enforcement if revealing the nationalities and ages undermines an investigation, for example, because it shows that the police are involved which would alert outstanding offenders. However, when you consider that it relates to the first question where persons would have been arrested and charged, the likelihood of s31 is greatly diminished. But s40(2) is still a consideration.

Dealing with the clarified request to Warwickshire

Q1 – The question concerns persons arrested and charged, but now focuses on their **ethnicity**, which is likely to be a self-identification category and might not correlate with their country of origin. This changes the data entirely from the original request as ethnicity refers to characteristics that are different to the geographical location of where an individual was born.

But all they seek is ethnicity data, and nothing more. Again, subject primarily to s40(2) we see no immediate issue with this data.

Q2 – This question is slightly odd. The applicant has provided a list of crime types, but the question concerns the number victims per crime, not criminals. For example, the request asks that research is done in to code 036/06 for all crimes between 2020-2024, to identify the number of victims, their age at the time, and their ethnicity. Putting Cost to one side, the results across all the crimes listed could reveal information that is relevant to the same victim or victims. In other words, a person could be a victim of one of more of those listed crimes.

The risk here is that raw data could present a false narrative that there are more victims than is true. As such, practitioners should be alert to this and add an explanation accordingly. However, disclosure should only be given once you are satisfied that no one can be identified as a result, and that it would not impact law enforcement by a) undermining any live investigation, or b) damage your forces ability to engage with victims of crime who would otherwise fear that they could be identified. In brief, the weight of public interest sits in favour of protecting the identities of victims of crime.

The likelihood of low numbers will likely be concerning.

What if No Information Is Held? We don't see an immediate reason to state NCND, and the older the data is, the less likelihood of harm. In the unlikely event that your force holds a ZERO as recorded information, then No Information Held is the response.

But where the total is less than 5, practitioners may wish to consider using the Less than 5 rule in concert with exempting the information under s40. This is entirely subject to local assessment as each force is going to have their own local factors to consider.

Finally...

S.31(1)

We welcome sight of draft responses accordingly.

If you need any further advice, please let us know.

Kind regards

S.40(2)

NPFDU FOI Referral Officer

National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit | National Police Chiefs Council

,NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

***S.31(1)**

' Via MS Teams

Advanced notification of leave:

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox

Sent: 25 September 2025 09:29

Subject: RE: CRU 01/CRF/25/005143/B - Human Trafficking - Advice included

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Good morning all,

We have just been re-assessing this case that was sent out first thing this morning and although the information will in essence be the same and locally assess s31 and s40 and a partial NCND

s23, we would like to add some further information to this. Please hold fire on your responses and an updated reply from us will be with you later today.

Thank you

Kind regards

S.40(2)

[Redacted]
[Redacted]

NPFDU FOI Referral Officer

National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit | National Police Chiefs Council

,NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

***S.31(1)**

' Via MS Teams

Advanced notification of leave:

From: NPCC CRU Mailbox

Sent: 25 September 2025 06:54

Subject: CRU 01/CRF/25/005143/B - Human Trafficking - Advice included

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU. Advice is at the end of this message.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005143/B

Referred by: Staffordshire Police, Greater Manchester Police, Devon and Cornwall Constabulary, Warwickshire Police

Applicant's request:

I am writing an article for spark news that is attached to our university highlighting the world of Human Trafficking and all that it reveals in the UK. Additionally for my final assignment an investigation on Human Trafficking in the UK.

I would like to know where the people who have been involved in Human Trafficking are from originally (That have been arrested and charged in the UK) Under the Modern Slavery Act 2015 Period 2020-2025.

Secondly victims, where is their original country and their ages Period 2020-2025.

I do realise that this is sensitive data, and I do not want to know their address, just the country they are from, as I am compiling a list of countries that these crimes originate and the question has never been answered.

As I am sure this is a very delicate topic and I appreciate your views and discretion but would like comments on the current situation please in the UK, additionally what are the thoughts as a force in the UK.

15/08/25 - Clarified request from Warwickshire:

Q1. The number of suspects arrested and charged with the below crimes between 2020 and 2024, for the below offences (linked to the Modern Slavery Act 2015), broken down by ethnicity

036/06 Hold person in slavery or servitude Modern Slavery Act 2015

036/07 Require person to perform forced or compulsory labour Modern Slavery Act 2015

036/08 Arrange or facilitate travel of another person with a view to exploitation Modern Slavery Act 2015

036/10 Commit offence other than kidnapping or false imprisonment with intention of arranging travel with view to exploitation Modern Slavery Act 2015

036/11 Commit offence of kidnapping or false imprisonment with intention of arranging travel with view to exploitation Modern Slavery Act 2015

036/12 Do act prohibited by slavery and trafficking risk or prevention order Modern Slavery Act 2015

036/13 Fail to comply with requirement to surrender passport under Modern Slavery Act 2015 Modern Slavery Act 2015

036/14 Fail to comply with requirement to provide name and address under Modern Slavery Act 2015 Modern Slavery Act 2015

Q2. The number of victims recorded in the above crimes (linked to the Modern Slavery Act 2015) recorded in the period 2020 to 2024, broken down by victim ethnicity and age group

CRU Advice:

Thank you for your patience **S.31(1)**

For this section of the request 'As I am sure this is a very delicate topic and I appreciate your views and discretion but would like comments on the current situation please in the UK, additionally what are the thoughts as a force in the UK', we would say that this is not a valid FOI question.

We do feel that disclosure could be considered with the country of origin and ages if the

information is locally assessed and placed into separate uncorrelated charts, such as one for ages but break it down in to age ranges such as 18-25, 25-35 and a separate chart for the country origins to avoid piecing together an age with a country of origin.

S.31(1)

If you need any further advice, please let us know.

Kind regards

S.40(2)

NPFDU FOI Referral Officer

National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit | National Police Chiefs Council

,NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

* **S.31(1)**

' Via MS Teams

Advanced notification of leave:

From: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)

Bcc: S.31(1)

FROM FORCE CONTACTS *** S.31(1)

[NPCC Media *** DO NOT REMOVE](#)

Subject: CRU ref: 25/5248/J - AI tools - Including Advice

Date: 02 October 2025 13:17:00

Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU. Advice is at the end of this message.

Our reference: 25/5248/J

Referred by: National

Applicant's request:

I am writing to request information under freedom of information legislation, regarding your organisation's use of artificial intelligence (AI) technology/technologies.

I would be grateful if you could provide the following detail:

1) AI Systems in use

A list of tools, platforms or systems currently deployed or being piloted/trialled.

The purpose and function of each of the above.

The departments or services where these are operational.

2) Procurement and development

Details of any contracts, tenders or partnerships with external providers for AI solutions.

Total expenditure on AI related technologies over the past three financial years, broken down by year.

3) Governance and Ethical Oversight

Copies of, or information relating to, any internal policies, frameworks or guidance documents relating to the use of AI.

Any ethical review processes or risk assessments conducted prior to deployment.

Details of any group responsible for the oversight of AI use within your organisation.

4) Impact on Workforce

Any assessments, reports or internal communications regarding the impact of AI on staffing levels, job roles or workforce planning (including recruitment, redundancy).

Information on any roles that have been automated, restructured or made redundant due to AI implementation.

Details of any training, redeployment or upskilling initiatives offered to staff in response to the adoption of AI.

Any consultations with trade unions or staff representatives regarding AI-related changes.

5) Performance and Evaluation

Evaluations, audits or performance reviews of AI systems, as referenced in section 1.

Evidence of how AI systems have affected service delivery, decision-making or operational efficiency.

6) Data protection and privacy

Types of data used to train or operate AI systems, including whether this data is synthetic or not. Measures in place to ensure compliance with data protection legislation, including the DPA 2018 and UK GDPR.

Procedures for handling bias, transparency and accountability in AI decision-making.

If any of the above information is already publicly accessible, please provide details as to where this information can be accessed and if any clarification is required, please contact me ASAP.

CRU Advice:

As with any request cost should be the first consideration. If to locate and retrieve all the requested information would exceed the cost threshold, then s12 is recommended to be used. When issuing your refusal notice we recommend you notify the applicant how best to refine the request, if feasible to do so.

For any information already in the public domain from an official source, s21 can be cited and the applicant directed to the relevant link.

Our interpretation is that the applicant requires details of tools or products that are solely AI solutions (such as generative AI products like ChatGPT or Co-pilot), and that the request is not intended to capture products, tools or systems used force wide that only have an element of AI functionality within part of their wider capability. However, you may wish to clarify this with the applicant before answering or, if you are interpreting the question the same way as us, you could include a caveat to explain the information being provided.

The current national position regarding requests that generally ask about AI is that forces can confirm or deny information is held in respect of them. From a national perspective, we see no harm in forces being transparent about where they are or are not using or considering use of AI technologies broadly.

This means that for forces who have had no AI systems deployed or trailed, a NIH response can

be provided.

For forces who are confirming information is held local assessment is advised, firstly from a s31(1) perspective to determine if disclosure of any details such as the field in which the AI is used or the tactic it relates to, the name of the system (where it would otherwise be exempt from disclosure such as digital forensic tools) etc would risk harm from an operational viewpoint.

Whilst we don't know what is held by each force, as a general guide, details of some areas in which AI systems are utilised would appear fairly innocuous to disclose - the use of a Chabot on the website or use of Chat GPT or Co-Pilot for example, albeit specifics of the system and any other low level data such as algorithms may need to be withheld where it is felt disclosure would increase the risk of threat by cyber-attack.

Other AI systems may be less suitable to disclose anything about, for example where to do so would reveal sensitive or covert tactical capabilities of the force. In such cases it may be that all details of the product and the project require exemption s31(1).

Your response is ultimately going to be dependent on exactly what you hold and your local assessment, in consultation with the projects team/relevant business areas, and this will differ from force to force. However, regarding s31, our advice is that key areas of focus will be on exemption of any material which would:

- a) Undermine the tactical capabilities of the force or reveal information about sensitive or covert capabilities which are otherwise not publicly shared, including when requested under FOI (s31(1)).
- b) Place the force at an increased risk of cyber-attack through provision of low-level system information, algorithms, or other such code – you may need to consult with your IT teams on this to establish the level of harm where this is applicable (s24(1) and s31(1)) are engaged.

The request also asks for procurement and contract information. If not already in the public domain from an official source, we recommend forces locally assess what is held and the specifics of each procurement to establish any prejudice to the commercial interests of the force or to any 3rd party company with which the force has an agreement as part of the project, for example where an agreement is in place that details of a specific product/software will not be made public due in order to protect competitiveness in the suppliers given market. It is possible that there could also be confidentiality clauses within any agreements so where the project team highlight anything of this nature, your legal teams should be consulted.

Finally, in terms of guidance documents, local assessment in line with the above and additionally review for any personal data, is recommended. There is a possibility of material from national policing sources such as the HO, CoP or NPCC to be captured and if so we ask that where identified and confirmed by yourselves to not already be in the public domain from an official source, you send across the document and we will consult with the relevant 3rd party for guidance on disclosure. So far, of the forces who have provided us with details of what is held only information already in the PD has been sourced.

Kind regards

S.40(2)

National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)
National Police Chiefs' Council

NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

S.31(1)



From: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)
Bcc: S.31(1)
[Redacted]
[NPCC Media ** DO NOT REMOVE FROM FORCE](#)
CONTACTS **;S.31(1)
[Redacted]
Subject: CRU 01/CRF/25/005269/O - Missing Children Incidents - National Advice Included
Date: 07 October 2025 08:11:00

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

We are re-circulating this advice as we believe a few forces may not have received it.

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU on. Advice is at the end of this message.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005269/O

Referred by: NATIONAL

Applicant's request:

Please provide the following information for the period 1 January 2024 - 31 December 2024.

1. How many individual children (those aged 0 - 17) were reported missing in your policing area?
2. How many missing incidents were reported in relation to those missing children (those aged 0 - 17)?
3. How many of those missing incidents had a:
 - a. Sexual exploitation marker
 - b. Mental health marker

c. Criminal exploitation marker

d. Trafficking marker

4. In how many incidents was there evidence of harm having occurred?

5. In how many of those incidents in question 4 was the harm:

a. Physical

b. Sexual

c. Self-harm

d. Suicide

e. Emotional / psychological

6. If you routinely record another type of risk marker / type of harm that is not listed here, please also include that information and the number of incidents in which it was recorded.

CRU Advice:

Although the questions are statistical in nature, **S.31(1)**

We would advise to clarify with the applicant question 4, regarding the definition of 'Incidents' as this could be a very wide area from cutting themselves climbing a tree to an argument with someone, to trafficking. In addition, what are they are looking for in 'Harm' as again this can be from stubbing a toe to self-harm. We will base our advice around the subsections of the questions asked for these categories, but this could be much wider.

Q1, Q2, Q4 – Although we consider the risk low, we would advise to thoroughly locally access the data to ensure that no individual can be identified (S40 Personal information). As a reminder, should any ongoing investigations be captured within your figures, s31 will be applicable and not s30 due to the statistics being involved here.

Q3, Q5, Q6 – disclosure can be considered as above, **S.31(1)**

If you are happy to include the s23(5) please send us your final response to the applicant for our records.

Should you require any further advice please let us know.

Kind Regards

S.40(2)

S.40(2)

[REDACTED]
NPFDU FOI Referral Officer

National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit | National Police Chiefs
Council

,NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

S.31(1)

' Via MS Teams

Advanced notification of leave:

From: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)

Bcc: S.31(1)

FORCE CONTACTS ** (press.office@npcc.police.uk); S.31(1)

[NPCC Media ** DO NOT REMOVE FROM](#)

Subject: CRU reference: 01/CRF/25/005359/P - Police Drone Pilot Training - Request logged - Advice to Follow

Date: 07 October 2025 10:24:00

Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)

Dear All,

The below FOI request has now been logged in the CRU and will be treated as a national request. Advice will be sent to all forces in due course.

Please note we do not require confirmation that it has been received by your force.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005359/P

Referred by: Norfolk Constabulary (Ref: FOI2025/03998)

Sent from: S.40(2)

The Applicant name is included in the acknowledgement email as a reference for forces only, any future correspondence will only quote the CRU reference number. Please do not duplicate the applicant name in any future correspondence and use only the CRU reference number

Applicant's request:

I am seeking the following information in relation to the training of police officers operating drones (Unmanned Aircraft Systems) in the United Kingdom:

1. A copy of the current syllabus, training material, or curriculum used for the training and assessment of police drone pilots within your force.
2. Details of any nationally agreed standards, frameworks, or minimum competencies that your force requires police drone pilots to meet, including any guidance or direction received from the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC), the College of Policing, or the Civil Aviation Authority.
3. If your force does not hold a syllabus or training programme, please confirm how drone pilot training is delivered, and identify which external provider or body is responsible.

Kind regards,

S.40(2)

Management Assistant

National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit

National Police Chiefs' Council

 NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

 **S.31(1)** 
 



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From: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)

Bcc: S.31(1)

[Redacted]

[NPCC Media ** DO NOT REMOVE](#)

FROM FORCE CONTACTS ** (press.office@npcc.police.uk) S.31(1)

[Redacted]

Subject: FW: CRU reference: 01/CRF/25/005349/N - Raids on barber/hair salons and nail/beauty salons - Request

logged - Advice to Follow

Date: 07 October 2025 11:23:00

Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)

Dear Charlotte,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU 03/10/25 and will be treated as a national request.
Advice will be sent to all forces in due course.

Please note we do not require confirmation that it has been received by your force.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005349/N

Referred by: Devon & Cornwall Police (25/8911), Dorset Constabulary (25/3790),

Northumbria Police (FOI/1593), Staffordshire Police (FOI 21916)

Sent from: **S.40(2)**

The Applicant name is included in the acknowledgement email as a reference for forces only, any future correspondence will only quote the CRU reference number. Please do not duplicate the applicant name in any future correspondence and use only the CRU reference number

Applicant's request:

I am requesting the following aggregated statistical information for your police force area, covering the period 1 January 2019 - present.

For businesses described as "barbers", "hairdressers", "hair salons", "nail bars/salons", or "beauty salons" (keyword search acceptable), please provide:

The total number of raids, operations, or enforcement actions involving these business types.

The total number of arrests made.

The total number of charges brought.

The total value of cash or assets seized (if recorded in aggregated form).

The total number of referrals made to HMRC, **S.23(1)**, or Immigration Enforcement.

Notes to reduce burden:

I am requesting aggregated totals only. No case files, personal data, or detailed reports are sought.

Please provide this information only where already held in recorded form (e.g. management statistics, keyword-coded returns, annual reports).

If providing the full period (2019-present) is likely to exceed the Section 12 cost limit, please provide figures for 2022-present in the first instance and indicate whether earlier data can be retrieved within cost.

Kind regards,

S.31(1)

Management Assistant

National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit

National Police Chiefs' Council

 NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

S.31(1)

S.31(1)



From: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)

Bcc: S.31(1)

FROM FORCE CONTACTS ***;S.31(1)

[NPCC Media ** DO NOT REMOVE](#)

Subject: CRU ref: 25/5394 - Comms with CRU - Preliminary Advice

Date: 07 November 2025 13:23:00

Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE
POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU. Advice is at the end of this message.

Our reference: 25/5394

Referred by: All Forces

Applicant's request:

I am writing to request all written digital correspondence between (1) your force's team responsible for addressing and responding to freedom of information requests and (2) the National Police Chiefs' Council's (NPCC) central referral unit (CRU) in September 2025.

I appreciate that parts of the correspondence will need to be redacted but would remind that redaction does not count towards the time/cost limits under s12 of the FOIA. The possibility that parts of the correspondence will need to be redacted also does not justify withholding the correspondence in its entirety.

CRU Advice:

It is our view that the request is quite broad, and in its current form, captures digital correspondence (emails in essence) which are related to FOI referrals as well as a multitude of other topics which are not (statistics, conference, general information circulars etc). As such, we feel it would benefit from some informal liaison with the applicant to try and narrow down the parameters of the correspondence they seek i.e. Are they seeking ALL digital correspondence irrespective of topic, or only looking for correspondence back and forth relating only to FOI referrals made by the force? We propose therefore in the first instance; you may wish to seek clarity on this point. Whilst you don't have to use our form of words to do this, as guidance we offer:

"Our force FOI teams contact the NPCC Central Referral Unit (CRU) for a wide variety of reasons in the course of their work. In aiming to ensure we provide the most accurate response to your request, please can you confirm whether you seek digital correspondence to and from the CRU in relation only to FOI requests the force FOI team have referred to the CRU, or if you are requesting every piece of digital correspondence between the force and the CRU, including wider emails?"

Once clarified, please can you let us know the outcome?

Next Steps

We have had some queries about how forces can maintain a consistent approach to redaction of material, specifically regarding nationally circulated CRU emails, which will be captured here regardless of how the applicant clarifies. Therefore, in due course the CRU will, as part of the caseworker review of the referral:

1. locate all **advice emails** that were circulated **nationally** by us in September 2025 for FOI referrals.
2. We will highlight sensitive information we believe requires redaction and circulate this to all forces. Please be advised that, as with any request, the final decision on redactions is that of the force – we provide our views as guidance only.

In respect of any other emails held by forces i.e. initial referral forms, acknowledgment emails, general correspondence, and any follow up ad hoc queries/advice if the applicant clarifies FOI focussed only, or *all* other emails if they want everything, we ask that practitioners:

1. Independently review these at source in line with the general guidance given in blue below.

The CRU are content that **force practitioners** complete the review and redaction of these more general emails without further input or review from the CRU.

S40(2) redactions for names, including NPFDU staff and the applicants of any FOI request correspondence. Also, any personal emails and mobile phone numbers.

S31(1) in respect of the CRU mailbox. Also, any emails which show in the “to” “from” “cc” or “Bcc” will also require redaction under s31

S23(1) where information is in relation to a security body.

The intention of this middle ground approach is to reduce delays as much as possible by reducing the volume of material the CRU is asked to review on behalf of forces, whilst ensuring that a consistent approach is still maintained for emails which we know have gone to all forces.

In summary:

1. CRU will locate, redact, and circulate copies of National CRU advice emails only as part of the referral.
2. Force practitioners will review and redact all other emails captured in line with the standard redaction guidance given above.

Anything exceptional outside of this should be discussed with the CRU on an ad hoc basis.

We will provide forces with the national CRU advice emails we have identified, with redactions highlighted, in due course.

Kind regards


S.40(2)

National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)
National Police Chiefs' Council

📧 NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

S.31(1)

[Redacted]



From:

S.31(1)

["NPCC Media ** DO NOT REMOVE FROM FORCE CONTACTS ** \(press.office@npcc.police.uk\)"](#); S.31(1)

Subject:

OS - Data in relation to specific makes of ammunition - CRU/25/5374

Date:

07 November 2025 14:08:00

Attachments:

[image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

For awareness, please see below advice in relation to a request about ammunition manufactured by a specific company.

Our reference: 25/5374

Referred by: Merseyside Police, Lancashire Police

Applicant's request

Please could you provide the number of investigations in which 9mm ammunition bearing the headstamp "MXT" or "MaxxTech" has been recovered within your force area during 1st January 2019- 30th September 2025

if it is not possible to isolate this specifically bearing the headstamp within cost or time limits, please could you any available statistics your force holds on the recovery of 9mm ammunition during the same period, broken down by headstamp or manufacturer markings where possible.

For clarity, i am not requesting details of specific cases, suspects or ongoing investigations only information already recorded,

Under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, I am requesting access to information held by your organisation regarding M-90 (Croatia) 9x19 mm (9 mm Luger) ammunition, manufactured by M-90 d.o.o., Duga Resa, Croatia.

Please provide the following information for the period 1 January 2020 to present:

- 1. Whether any M-90-stamped 9 mm cartridges or cases have been recovered, seized, or recorded in any investigations, exhibits, or forensic submissions within your jurisdiction.*
- 2. Any information or intelligence relating to the importation, distribution, or known presence of M-90 (Croatia) ammunition within the UK or specifically the Merseyside region.*
- 3. Whether M-90 is referenced or logged within your ballistic or ammunition reference databases*

(such as NABIS, NIBIN, or internal catalogues), and if so, the nature of that entry (e.g. manufacturer profile, headstamp reference, ballistic signature).
4. Any technical documentation, classification details, or manufacturer data your agency holds regarding M-90 d.o.o. or its ammunition products.

CRU Advice

Question 1 and 2 – **S.31(1)**

As such, regardless as to whether your force holds information or not, the national position is that force responses are NCND s23(5), 24(2) and 31(3).

Question 3 – It is the view of a relevant policing lead that forces won't have access to [NIBIN](#) (which is US based) nor the database at NABIS. Forces are also unlikely to hold any information that corresponds with the nature of the question being asked. As such, a direct response of No Information Held can be given and does not undermine the NCND for Q1 and Q2.

Question 4 – **S.31(1)**

In summary – We advise NCND s23(5), 24(2) and 31(3) for Q1, 2 and 4.

Finally, unless further assistance is required we do not need sight of draft responses on this occasion.

A form of words is below to assist with the s24 and s31 elements of the NCND:

[START]

Harm in complying with Section 1(1)(a) – to confirm or nor whether information is held

Disclosure of information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) is considered to be a release to the world and not only to the person requesting the information. Once information has been released, it is often published on the Disclosure Log pages of the Constabularies' external websites and therefore is available to anyone. Whilst not questioning an applicant's motives for requesting information, due to the information being accessible to all, consideration must be given to the information being seen by individuals who are involved in criminal activity including terrorism related offences.

Firstly, the public expect police forces to use all powers and tactics available to prevent and detect crime or disorder and maintain public safety.

In this case, the applicant is trying to determine whether **[FORCE NAME]** holds any information in relation to crimes involving ammunition of a specific make and manufacturer, as well as any information held more broadly about the importation, distribution, and prevalence of such within the area of operations for **[FORCE NAME]**. Confirmation or denial force by force would also reveal what is known, or not known, about the origin of ammunition used in serious and organised crime throughout the UK, as well as any patterns in criminal cases involving specific types of ammunition.

The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It should be recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. The UK faces a sustained threat from violent terrorists and extremists. Since 2006, the UK Government have published the threat level, based upon current intelligence and that threat has remained at the second highest level,

'severe', except for two short periods during August 2006 and June and July 2007, when it was raised to the highest threat, 'critical', and in July 2009, when it was reduced to 'substantial'. The current threat level to the UK is 'substantial'.

[Threat Levels](#) **S.23(1)**

Confirming or denying information is held relevant to this request would ultimately prejudice the effectiveness of the national counter terrorism effort and would allow inferences to be drawn about force level counter-terrorism activity and identify vulnerability around the country.

Accordingly, and irrespective of what information may or may not be held, if [FORCE NAME] were to confirm information is held by citing a substantive exemption or, conversely, state 'no information held', it would undermine the effective delivery of operational law enforcement by compromising potentially ongoing investigations into serious and organised crime as well as Counter Terrorism investigations, some of which may be covert.

Public Interest Considerations

Section 24(2) National Security

Factors favouring complying with Section 1(1)(a) confirming that information is held

The public are entitled to know how public funds are spent and to disclose the requested information would allow the public to see where money is being spent and know that forces are doing as much as possible to combat terrorism.

Factors against complying with Section 1(1)(a)

To confirm or deny whether the information requested exists would render security measures less effective. The risk of harm to the public would be elevated if areas of the UK which appear vulnerable were identified, which would also provide the opportunity for terrorist planning. Ongoing or future operations to protect the security and infrastructure of the UK would be compromised as terrorists could map the level of counter-terrorist activity across the country, providing them with the knowledge of individual force capability as well as valuable knowledge concerning the vulnerability of individual force areas.

Section 30(3) Investigations

Factors favouring complying with Section 1(1)(a) confirming that information is held

Confirming or denying that information exists relevant to this request would lead to a better-informed general public about criminal activity involving firearms and the forces investigative focus on such matters.

Factors against complying with Section 1(1)(a)

Modern-day policing is intelligence led and [FORCE NAME] where appropriate shares information with other forces and law enforcement agencies as part of their investigative process. To confirm or not whether [FORCE NAME] has, or is conducting criminal investigations involving specific make and manufactured ammunition, some of which may be covert, would hinder the prevention and detection of crime as well as undermine the partnership approach to investigations and law enforcement.

Section 31(3) Law Enforcement

Factors favouring complying with Section 1(1)(a)

There is media reporting on the smuggling of firearms and ammunition into the UK, for example: [Illegal gun smuggler caught red handed at UK border as police find weapons taped to car bumper](#)

[Polish national jailed for smuggling 61 firearms into the UK - National Crime Agency](#)

As such, there is public interest in understanding the extent of firearms crimes within the UK generally.

Factors against complying with Section 1(1)(a)

Confirmation or denial would be useful intelligence to the criminal fraternity by indicating

whether [FORCE NAME] (and more so all forces at a national level) are investigating firearms crimes involving specific ammunition, which may include crimes committed in neighbouring counties, or other force areas. This may serve only to embolden criminals if the information is such that it indicates which forces hold information, against those which do not. Such action would hinder the prevention and detection of crime.

Balancing Test

The points above highlight the merits of confirming or denying that information pertinent to this request exists. The Police Service proactively uses all tactics available to them, particularly when trying to reach a successful conclusion to investigations and solve crime.

The effective delivery of operational law enforcement takes priority and is at the forefront of [FORCE NAME] to ensure the prevention and detection of crime is carried out and the effective apprehension or prosecution of offenders is maintained.

The security of the country is of paramount importance, and the Police service will not divulge information if to do so would place the safety of an individual at risk or undermine National Security or compromise law enforcement. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and in this case providing assurance that the police are appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by terrorist activity, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both national security and law enforcement in the highly sensitive subject of terrorism.

As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced in matters of national security this will be overridden in exceptional circumstances.

Police force's capabilities of combating serious and organised crime, as well as terrorism are sensitive issues of intelligence value to the criminal and terrorist alike. Therefore it is our opinion that for these issues the balancing test for disclosing the requested information would not be in the public interest.

No inference can be taken from this refusal that information does or does not exist.

[END]

Kind regards,

S.40(2)

Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs Council
NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

S.31(1)



From: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)

Bcc: S.31(1)

DO NOT REMOVE FROM FORCE CONTACTS ***S.31(1)

[NPCC Media](#) **

Subject: OS - CRU 25/5329 - Firearms Certificates and Police Misconduct

Date: 09 October 2025 14:11:00

Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)

OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE
POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The request below **may** have been sent to all forces. The advice that follows is relevant should you be in receipt of it.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005329/J

Applicant: S.40(2)

The Applicant name is included in the acknowledgement email as a reference for forces only, any future correspondence will only quote the CRU reference number. Please do not duplicate the applicant name in any future correspondence and use only the CRU reference number

Applicant's request

I am writing to request information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 regarding Police Officers who hold personal firearms and shotgun certificates. Specifically, I would be grateful if you could provide the following:

Since January 2021, how many police officers at your force, who are or have been holders of a personal firearms or shotgun certificate, have also been the subject of a misconduct investigation regarding alleged police perpetrated domestic abuse (regardless of outcome or if there was a case to answer)?

Please break down the numbers as outlined below:

- *The total number of police officers who had a personal firearms or shotgun certificate at the time their PPDA misconduct investigation was initiated and*
 - o *Of these, the number where the eventual result of the initial investigation was that*
 - § *a) there was a case to answer*
 - § *b) there was no case to answer,*
 - § *c) the officer was referred to RPRP*
- *The total number of police officers who remained holders of personal firearms or shotgun certificate throughout their misconduct investigation and*
 - o *Of these, the number where the eventual result of the initial investigation was that*
 - § *a) there was a case to answer*
 - § *b) there was no case to answer,*

- § c) the officer was referred to RPRP
- The total number of police officers who gained a personal firearms or shotgun certificate having previously been the subject of a PPDA misconduct investigation (where this information is known)
 - o Of these, the number where the eventual result of the initial investigation was that
 - § a) there was a case to answer
 - § b) there was no case to answer,
 - § c) the officer was referred to RPRP

CRU Advice

Please note – Centurion FIS are unable to assist on this occasion, and no report is forthcoming.

The request is for information about police officers who:

A) held a personal firearms or shotgun certificate at any time from January 2021 onwards up to the date the request was received, and,

B) who were also a suspect within a misconduct investigation concerning PPDA at the time of holding the FA certificate, or...

C) since a misconduct investigation for PPDA was completed, have been licensed for a personal firearm.

For A and B:

We don't know but suspect that the only way of achieving this is to canvass your Firearms Licensing teams for the information at (A) and then marry it up with PSD at (B).

We also feel that numbers held (if at all) will be very low, and that it is possible to identify the officers captured by this request. This is because a response confirming information is held (under the broad terms that FOI is a broadcast to the world) is information about officers subject to misconduct for domestic abuse, which is likely not something the personnel in FA Licensing might be aware of.

Unfortunately, we don't know how forces operate in respect of these circumstances and whether a FA certificate would be revoked in any case where misconduct because of PPDA was alleged. But if a certificate is not automatically revoked and the details shared between the respective departments, it would mean that disclosing that information is held for this request would marry up the data provided by FA licensing with the officers concerned. In short, it is not simply about the risk of identifying an individual within the public arena, but to any person including colleagues.

The result would therefore need to be NCND s31(3) (by virtue of 1(g)2(b)) and s40(5).

For C:

The process to obtain the data is the reverse for A/B, but it remains the case that confirmation risks identifying an individual.

As always, please refer to the CRU if you have questions or concerns.

Kind regards,

S.40(2)

Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs Council
NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

S.31(1)



From: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)
Bcc: S.31(1) [Redacted]
S.31(1) [Redacted]
[NPCC Media ** DO NOT REMOVE FROM FORCE CONTACTS **](#); [Redacted]
S.31(1) [Redacted]
Subject: CRU 01/CRF/25/005266/L - Data Extraction Kiosks - National Advice Included
Date: 09 October 2025 15:58:00

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU. Advice is at the end of this message.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005266/L
Referred by: National

Applicant's request:

I am writing to ask that you provide me with the following information on your use of mobile phone data extraction:

1. Does your police force currently carry out mobile phone data extraction in low level crime cases using self-service / downloading kiosks? Please provide your definition of low-level crime.
2. Does your police force currently carry out mobile phone data extraction in serious crimes using self-service / downloading kiosks?
3. If your police force is not currently using mobile phone extraction kiosks, have you trialled this in the past/do you have plans to in the future?
4. Does your police force currently use Hubs to carry out mobile phone data extraction in (a) low-level crimes? (b) serious crimes?
5. Do you centrally record mobile phone data extracted from kiosks?
6. If you have a mobile phone extraction kiosk, please provide the name of the company(ies) which currently provide(s) the hardware / software / to whom you pay a license for the relevant tools. If contracts for these tools exist, please also provide the beginning and end dates of these.
7. Does your police force use analytics software to process, analyse or evaluate data extracted from mobile phones? If so, please provide the name of the software or provider.
8. How many officers currently carry mobile phone examination kits on patrol and/or in vehicles and/or for other operational use in (a) low level crimes? (b) serious crimes?

9. Please confirm whether or not a review has been conducted into the use of self-service kiosks.

10. Please provide copies of the current relevant force level and/or national level guidance for the use of downloading kiosks.

11. Please provide copies of the current relevant force level and/or national level policy for the use of downloading kiosks.

CRU Advice:

Thank you for your patience with this request.

Advice is provided on the assumption that all the requested information can be located and retrieved within the cost threshold. Where this is not relevant, s12 is recommended to be used. When issuing your refusal notice we recommend that you advise the applicant how best to refine their request to fit within the cost threshold, if feasible to do so.

Downloading Kiosks are used for extracting data 'digital forensics' from mobile phones and other digital devices. They are secure and officer operated and allow download data, such as calls, messages and social media activity for investigations.

Q1 – Disclosure can be considered as a yes/no response. Many forces the use of the kiosk is not according to a crime type and is in relation to be able to access the phones data. Should your force not hold this information then a NIH held response can be given.

Q2 – This will be the same as Q1

Q3 – For this question as they are not asking about 'which' software might be used we see no harm in confirming if your force has trialled or plan to trial the extraction Kiosks, which is a yes/no response.

Q4 – Forces can confirm yes or no to this question. Equally should your force not hold the information then a NIH response can be given

Q5 – Again, forces can confirm yes or no to this question. Equally should your force not hold the information then a NIH response can be given

Q6 – For the first part of this question forces can confirm that they use a Kiosk, however for the name of the company(ies) these will need to be considered for exemption by the virtue of S31(1)(a)(b) - Law Enforcement

Q7 – As the applicant is asking about which specific software is being used on the second part of this question, the information should be withheld. We would advise to consider for exemption s24 National Security and S31 Law enforcement. The rationale for using s24 here is that by disclosing the software name it opens up to cyber attacks and impacts force capabilities, of which both will impact national security.

Q8 – This information is likely to not be held or the number zero due to police officers not carrying the phone examination kits while on patrol, and if this is the case we are content for your reply to be as such. Should your force however have officers who carry these kits please let us know and we can advise further for you.

Q9 – If your force uses the kiosks then it is highly likely you have regular reviews on the kiosks and those trained to use them, therefore we are content for you to confirm yes or no to this. Again, should your force not hold the information then a NIH response can be given.

Q10 & Q11 - The college of policing have information on this and the applicant can be directed to the website - [Extraction of material from digital devices | College of Policing](#)

If you are content to include s24 and s31 then CRU will not need to see your drafts.

I have included below a form of words to help.

HARM

Any disclosure under FOI is a release to the public at large. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, disclosure of a particular policing tool of this type is used by **FORCE NAME** as part of an investigative process would reveal operational tactics linked to policing, compromise police investigations and/or adversely affect the ability of **FORCE NAME** and others to safeguard national security.

It is well established that police forces utilise Digital Forensic techniques in order to counteract criminal behaviour, detect crime, and assist in the apprehension and prosecution of offenders. Modern day policing is intelligence led and law enforcement depends upon the development of intelligence and the gathering and security of evidence in order to disrupt criminal behaviour and bring offenders to justice. As criminals adapt and exploit new technology, the police need to respond by overcoming hi-tech barriers in order to meet their responsibilities. In this case the information relates to a service provider and by extension their products for the extraction of data from devices to their Kiosks.

By disclosing if **FORCE NAME** use named software to process, analyse or evaluate data extracted from mobile phones such as requested within this request, it would undermine the process of preventing or detecting crime and the apprehension of prosecution of offenders. When considered on a Force by Force basis, a malign individual could identify those most critical to the Law-and-Order sector and specifically target those proving the most assistance. This would have a huge impact on the effective delivery of operational law enforcement as it would leave companies open to further cyberattacks which could have devastating consequences for law enforcement.

Equally, given the sensitive areas in which tools of this type may be used, such as counter-terror investigations, to disclose if any particular tools are used would allow criminals and other adversaries to focus on evaluating the particular capabilities of its use. With this knowledge it would allow criminals and other adversaries to take steps to counteract a specific tool – be it adjusting how they interact and present themselves to take advantage of any weaknesses or gaps in capability they identify. For example, at a simple level, if a policing tool doesn't search 'X' social media site or was unable to identify 'Y' format of images and criminals can establish this, they will exploit this position. **FORCE NAMES** more sophisticated adversaries may be able to go further and take more proactive measures to undermine the tool and/or its provider, and a specific confirmation allows efforts to be focused accordingly.

This detrimental effect is increased if the request is made to several different law enforcement bodies such as this request has. In addition to the local criminal fraternity now being better informed, those intent on organised crime throughout the UK will be able to 'map' where the use of certain tools are or are not used. This can be useful information to those committing crimes. It would have the likelihood of identifying location-specific operations which would ultimately compromise police tactics, operations and future prosecutions as criminals could counteract the measures used against them.

Any information identifying the focus of policing activity could be used to the advantage of terrorists or criminal organisations. Information that undermines the operational integrity of these activities will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on both National Security and Law Enforcement.

PUBLIC INTEREST TEST

Factors favouring disclosure for section 24 National Security:

Disclosing would provide the public with information about technologies and **FORCE NAME** capabilities. This would reinforce the wider commitment to openness and transparency with the general public and facilitate public debate. Furthermore, owing to the inherent link between transparency and public confidence, Disclosing the software name and how it works would be likely to improve the general public's confidence in **FORCE NAME**. Over time, an increase in public confidence would be likely to improve public engagement with the police. This would, in turn, lead to an improvement in our ability to both prevent and detect crime, and apprehend and prosecute offenders.

Factors favouring non-disclosure for section 24 National Security:

Security measures are put in place to protect the community that we serve. To disclose the software name and its uses would be useful intelligence to terrorists and individuals intent on carrying out criminal activity. The public entrust the Police Service to make appropriate decisions with regard to their safety and protection and the only way of reducing risk is to be cautious with what is placed into the public domain.

The cumulative effect of those with ill-intent gathering information about force capabilities, would have greater impact when linked to other information gathered from various sources. The more information that is disclosed over time will provide a detailed account of the tactical infrastructure, not only at force level but across the country as a whole. Any incident that results from confirming that any information is held would by default affect National Security.

Factors favouring disclosure for section 31 Law Enforcement:

The public have a genuine interest in what the police do and how they do it. Their interest is legitimate and to be encouraged within a democratic society where policing is by consent. Public accountability for the use of resources and taxpayers' money, and a willingness to be transparent and open are desirable characteristics in all public authorities.

The interest on which software packages are being used and how is therefore to be expected, especially when there is some concern as to whether such expenditure is appropriate and justified.

Factors favouring non- disclosure for section 31 Law Enforcement:

To disclose the particular software used and how it is used by policing would compromise the forces' ability to protect the public. Disclosing **FORCE NAME** capabilities would provide persons intent on disrupting their work, with information that would assist them to do so. In this case, for the reasons outlined in the evidenced harm, the effectiveness of current and future strategies when carrying out investigations and gathering evidence may be compromised. The safety of the public is of paramount importance to policing purposes, and any increase in crime would place the public at risk of harm. When the current or future law enforcement role of the force may be compromised by the release of information, the effectiveness of the force will be reduced.

The personal safety of individuals is of paramount importance to the Police Service and must be considered in response of every release. A disclosure under Freedom of Information is a release to the world and, in this case, disclosing tactical information relating to the extraction of data from mobile devices, would undermine the evidence gathering process of any investigative inquiry relating to offences, some of which may be serious cases such as murder or rape.

Balance Test

The points above highlight the merits of disclosure and also non -disclosure. Having considered the reasons why **FORCE NAME** should opt to not disclose the software name and its uses, although openness and transparency is at the forefront when considering the public interest, in this case disclosing the software used and how it is analysed, evaluated and used by the police for investigative purposes would not be in the public interest.

Whilst there is a public interest in appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat from criminals, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding National Security. As much as there is a public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced in matters of National Security, this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances.

The public entrust the Police Service to make appropriate decisions with regard to their safety and protection and the only way of reducing risk is to be cautious with any information that is released. Disclosing the software would reveal specific policing activity in the digital sphere of investigations and would assist those intent on causing harm. Any incident that results from disclosure would, as a result, affect National Security.

I have found that disclosing the software used would directly harm the ability of **FORCE NAME** to investigate crime. This could also reveal police capabilities, compromise police investigations and/or otherwise, adversely affect the ability of **FORCE NAME** to safeguard national security. I have attached considerable weight to these interests as the primary role of the Police Service is to both prevent and detect crime and apprehend those responsible for committing criminal offences.

Therefore, at this moment in time, there is no public interest in disclosing information that would increase the risk to public safety and harm policing capabilities.

If you need any further advice, please let us know

Kind regards

S.40(2)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

NPFDU FOI Referral Officer

National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit | National Police Chiefs
Council

,NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

S.31(1)

' Via MS Teams

Advanced notification of leave:

From: [NPCC Press Office](#)
To: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)
Subject: Morning Media Summary
Date: 13 October 2025 08:47:58



13 Oct 2025

Morning Media Summary

How Cheshire Police is leading the way in its crackdown on indecent exposure ([Times](#))

Universities must do more to tackle "unacceptable increase in antisemitism" ([BBC](#))

Voluntary organisations warn toxic immigration rhetoric is fuelling rise in threats against staff ([Guardian](#))

Compassion is stronger than division - Glasgow's battle of Scotland's national flag ([Guardian](#))

Dozens of mass cycle rides set for across the country to highlight the lack of safe cycle routes for women ([ITV](#))

Weekend round-up

Public sector spending £70m a year on diversity officers ([Daily Mail](#))

Chief Constable Rachel Swann, chair of the NPCC diversity equality and inclusion committee, said: "A recent BBC Panorama documentary has once again shone a spotlight on standards and culture in policing, with shortcomings previously highlighted in several high-profile independent reviews."

“This money is a small fraction of the overall multi-billion pound police budget and it is vital that policing continues to focus on improving culture and making our service inclusive for every community.

“I also want to ensure that everything we do is evidence led and data driven, so any investment that is made in this area represents value for money and has the best possible chance of delivering results and tangible progress.”

Migrant guilty of threatening to kill Nigel Farage in TikTok video ([Independent](#), [Sky News](#), [BBC](#), [Daily Mail](#), widespread coverage)

Man with life-changing injuries after being shot by Met Police ([BBC](#), [ITV](#))

Unison general secretary tells conference chief constables should stop sacrificing police staff roles to meet officer uplift targets ([Police Oracle](#))

Hate crime figures reveal record numbers of religiously-motivated offences ([Police Oracle](#))

Rape crisis services in Scotland under threat by funding pressures, country's largest centre warns ([Radio News Hub](#))

Stark rise in tech-enabled domestic abuse, with charity Refuge warning disabled people are particularly vulnerable ([Independent](#))

Inquest rules woman's suicide an unlawful killing by her abusive partner ([Guardian](#))

Public Order Act used to keep rival protestors apart at London demo ([Sky News](#), [ITV](#))

Arrests made after Lostprophets singer killed in prison attack ([Guardian](#), [BBC](#), [Independent](#), [Telegraph](#), [Sky News](#), [ITV](#), [Daily Mail](#))

Opinion

London mayor Sadiq Khan writes in the [Guardian](#) that all beliefs are welcome in the capital

Factors including home working and the rise of social media have made it too easy for

minorities to remain apart, **S.40(2)** says in the [Times](#).

The fight against antisemitism in the UK is far from won, **S.40(2)** writes in the [Telegraph](#).

Writing in the [Independent](#), **S.40(2)** says she is proof women should 'report the small things' after a man who walked in to her changing room was convicted.

S.40(2) writes in the [Telegraph](#) that she is 'truly afraid of what trans activists will do next' and calls on policing to 'stop enabling protestors'.

S.40(2) write in the [Daily Mail](#) that society is quick to call out misogyny - unless it's Islamic misogyny.

This summary collates those items of significant coverage and public interest, national issues and major crime. It is not a complete round-up of police coverage.

Any comments or queries about this bulletin or to be added to the mailing list please contact press.office@npcc.police.uk

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[Journalist Privacy Policy](#)



From: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)
Bcc: S.31(1) [Redacted]
S.31(1) [Redacted]
[NPCC Media ** DO NOT REMOVE FROM FORCE CONTACTS **](#);
S.31(1) [Redacted]
Subject: CRU 01/CRF/25/005387/T - Sex liaison officer roles - Advice to follow in due course
Date: 13 October 2025 15:05:00

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request has now been logged in the CRU and will be treated as a national request. Advice will be sent to all forces in due course.

Please note we do not require confirmation that it has been received by your force.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005387/T

Referred by: Staffordshire Police

The Applicant name is included in the acknowledgement email as a reference for forces only, any future correspondence will only quote the CRU reference number. Please do not duplicate the applicant name in any future correspondence and use only the CRU reference number

Applicant's request:

I am following up on the 2023 FOI request your force responded to regarding sex work liaison officer roles, submitted by S.40(2) [Redacted]

We are contacting police forces to request an update on involvement with sex work liaison officer roles since our previous FOI request. We would be grateful for any updates.

Q1: Do you have an individual officer/team/unit dedicated to sex worker liaison work - that is aimed at supporting sex workers who are victims of crime/vulnerable?

Q1a: If yes, what is the role/team/unit called?

Q1b: Under what strategic or operational unit does the officer/team/unit sit?

Q1c: Is the role operational across the whole force or only in specific areas?

Q1d: If only in specific areas which?

Q2: How many officers (FTE equivalent) work in these roles/teams/units?

Q2a: Is this role/s fulfilled by a police officer or civilian?

Q2b: Are these officers/teams/units exclusively dedicated to Sex Worker Liaison work or do they have other responsibilities?

Q2c: If they have other responsibilities please list them here.

Q2d: How many sex workers do these roles/teams/units work with across a year? (1-50; 50-100; 100-200; 200+; we don't keep a record)

Q2e: Which sex work populations do they mainly work with? (on-street/indoor/online/migrant/across all sex work populations)

Q3: Do you have a role profile/job description for this role?

Q3a: If yes, is this the JD published by the NPCC, College of Policing or the University of York or was it produced locally?

Q3b: If locally produced, could you please attach a copy of the JD?

Q3c: At what grade is the role positioned?

Q4: With which partner agencies do these officers/teams/units work most closely? [Please list top 5]

Q5: With which other police units/teams do these officers/teams/units work most closely? [Please list top 5]

Q5a: Have you liaised with any other forces about your involvement with SWLOs?

Kind Regards

S.40(2)

NPFDU FOI Referral Officer

National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit | National Police Chiefs Council

,NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

S.31(1)

' Via MS Teams

Advanced notification of leave:

From: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)

Bcc: S.31(1)

S.31(1)

[NPCC Media ** DO NOT REMOVE FROM FORCE CONTACTS **](#);

Subject: OS - Reminder to all forces FOI - Requests concerning Covert Communications Data Capture

Date: 14 October 2025 11:01:00

Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

A reminder that requests concerning **Covert Communications Data Capture (CCDC)** is mandatory CRU referral criteria (Covert/S23/S24)

CCDC refers to the acquisition of communications data by public authorities without the knowledge of the individual concerned, typically for investigative or intelligence purposes.

As always, if you are unsure whether a request is a mandatory referral, please contact the CRU for further assistance.

Kind regards,

S.40(2)

Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs Council
NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

S.31(1)



From: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)
Bcc: S.31(1) [Redacted]
S.31(1) [Redacted]
[NPCC Media ** DO NOT REMOVE FROM FORCE CONTACTS **](#);
[Redacted]
[.police.uk](#); [Freedom of Information](#); [Wiltshire FOI](#); [South Yorkshire](#);
[Jamie.Corner@cityoflondon.police.uk](#)
Subject: CRU 01/CRF/25/005391/P - Open Murder Investigations - Advice to follow in due course
Date: 14 October 2025 15:17:00

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request has now been logged in the CRU and will be treated as a national request following the CRU drop in session and multiple forces having received the request. Advice will be sent to all forces in due course.

Please note we do not require confirmation that it has been received by your force.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005391/P

Referred by: City Of London Police

The Applicant name is included in the acknowledgement email as a reference for forces only, any future correspondence will only quote the CRU reference number. Please do not duplicate the applicant name in any future correspondence and use only the CRU reference number

Applicant's request:

A list of all open murder investigations (unsolved murders) within City of London Police authority, for murder committed between 1985 and 2000.

Please include the name of the victim, and the location and date of the crime.

Kind Regards

S.40(2)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

NPFDU FOI Referral Officer

National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit | National Police Chiefs

Council

,NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

S.31(1)

' Via MS Teams

Advanced notification of leave:

From: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)

Bcc: S.31(1)

NPCC Media **** DO NOT REMOVE FROM FORCE CONTACTS **** (press.office@npcc.police.uk); S.31(1)

Subject: CRU reference: 01/CRF/25/005394/S - Correspondence between your force and the NPCC CRU - Request

logged - Advice to Follow

Date: 15 October 2025 14:34:00

Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)

Dear All,

The below FOI request has now been logged in the CRU and will be treated as a national request.

Advice will be sent to all forces in due course.

Please note we do not require confirmation that it has been received by your force.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005394/S

Referred by: Bedfordshire Police, Cambridgeshire Constabulary, Cleveland Police, Derbyshire Constabulary

Sent from: S.40(2)

The Applicant name is included in the acknowledgement email as a reference for forces only, any future correspondence will only quote the CRU reference number. Please do not duplicate the applicant name in any future correspondence and use only the CRU reference number.

Applicant's request:

I am writing to request all written digital correspondence between (1) your force's team responsible for addressing and responding to freedom of information requests and (2) the National Police Chiefs' Council's (NPCC) central referral unit (CRU) in September 2025.

I appreciate that parts of the correspondence will need to be redacted, but would remind that redaction does not count towards the time/cost limits under s12 of the FOIA. The possibility that parts of the correspondence will need to be redacted also does not justify withholding the correspondence in its entirety.

Clarification Requested from Cambs:

Can you please confirm if you are requesting copies of correspondence between the FOI Team and the NPCC CRU in relation to FOI requests received by Bedfordshire Police between the 1st September to 30th September 2025 as this is unclear

Clarification Received from Cambs:

Yes, that is what I am requesting.

Kind regards,

S.40(2)


Management Assistant

National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit

National Police Chiefs' Council

 NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

S.31(1)





From: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)

Bcc: S.31(1)

[REDACTED]

REMOVE FROM FORCE CONTACTS ** (press.office@npcc.police.uk) S.31(1) NPCC Media ** DO NOT

[REDACTED]

- Money Laundering

Date: 15 October 2025 15:19:00

Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

Please see below advice in relation to the following:

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005303/Z

Referred by: National

Applicant's request:

1. How many money mules/money laundering cases have been investigated by your force in the last 5 years involving children or young people (under 30 years of age)? If known, how many of these children/young people were students?
2. What is the average value of money transferred in money mules/money laundering cases you have investigated in the last 5 years involving children/young people?
3. What are the most common methods used by criminals to recruit money mules that you have identified in the last 5 years involving children/young people?
4. How many money mule/money laundering investigations have you referred to the Crown Prosecution Service in the last 5 years involving children/young people?

5. *What is the approximately the average length of time it takes for a money laundering case to be investigated by your force in the last 5 years involving children/young people?*
6. *What is the average age and gender of money mules targeted under your jurisdiction in the last 5 years?*
7. *Are there any particular demographics or groups that are disproportionately targeted by money laundering/money mule schemes in your jurisdiction?*
8. *Do you participate in any international, national or regional initiatives or programmes to combat money muling?*
9. *Do you participate in any educational sessions/training for students in schools, colleges or universities?*

SWP - clarification received from the applicant:

I can confirm that it is just financial crime data that we are interested in receiving (money laundering offences).

CRU Advice:

About money mules - [Money Mules - National Crime Agency](#)

We are not aware of any formal publication of force level data relevant to this request . But estimates about the use of money mules is talked about here - [Biggest ever crackdown on money mules in the UK - GOV.UK](#)

[Money mule and financial exploitation action plan \(accessible\) - GOV.UK](#)

As always, the following is given on the proviso that complying with the request can be achieved within the Cost parameters. But our understanding is that forces are unlikely to centrally record whether a money mule is used within the process of money laundering, and that s12 is likely.

Alternatively, if your force receives clarification in respect of money laundering offences only, involving people under 30, it isn't clear what context the questions would then be framed. For example, are they seeking criminal or victim data? What specific money laundering offences are seeking information about?

In conclusion, our initial assessment is that Cost is likely.

But where s12 is not relevant, the following is a handrail on how to respond. Please refer to the CRU should you require further assistance.

Q1 – The applicant requests a total number of money mule investigations over the last 5 years. As can be read, a money mule can be a victim of exploitation, or a willing and complicit participant often for reward. But however the money mule is recruited, their purpose is to aid the disguise of criminal proceeds through legal business structures. Money laundering is therefore a central pillar of organised crime. As such, care should be taken not to reveal information, or the lack thereof, in respect of organised crime investigations if the result would negatively impact operational policing.

Our assessment is that the older the information is the likelihood of it being harmful is likely to diminish. Conversely, giving away the most recent data is a window into policing activity and focus, which may in turn serve only to alert criminals whether the police are, or aren't aware and investigating these matters connected to organised crime.

As such, our advice would be to first look at the oldest years – 2020, 2021 and so on and determine if there is harm in providing a total for the period up to the end of 2024. That could

result in “no information held” (NIH), or a positive number.

In the event it is a NIH result up to the end of 2024, we don’t see immediate harm as it doesn’t include things as they are today. Also, it won’t consider any work being done at ROCU level for those forces not holding ROCU information. A NIH will also render some further questions Not Applicable.

In the event it is a positive number spanning the period of 2020 – 2024, we don’t see harm as it doesn’t appear to reveal anything further.

But regardless as to what is or isn’t held for the period 2020-2024, we would advise NCND s23(5), 24(2), 30(3) and 31(3) for 2025. This removes the risk of undermining how things stand today and what the effect would be if the same request for 2025 data was repeated and things had changed.

Q2 – The applicant requests an average total value of money laundered. Firstly, an average might not be held, and there is no requirement to create information to answer the request. However, when it comes to providing raw data to allow the applicant to do their own sums, we doubt that this is information that forces would want to give out during an active investigation. However, this is subject to local assessment under s30(1) considerations.

Q3 – If held, revealing methodology is subject to s31 Law Enforcement considerations.

Q4 – This question links back to the advice given at Q1 and should be straightforward.

Q5 – This information is likely not held. There is no requirement to create information to answer the question.

Q6 and Q7 – Again, an average may not be held. However, whether any information about age, gender, victim demographics can be given is entirely local assessment. Each force will have its own factors subject to s31(1) and s40(2) considerations.

Q8 and Q9 – These are a Yes or No response. Our interpretation of initiatives and programmes would be entirely public facing. As such, a generic response seems harmless.

Please let us know if we can assist further.

Kind regards,

S.40(2)

Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs Council

📧 NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

S.31(1)



From: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)

Bcc: S.31(1)

DO NOT REMOVE FROM FORCE CONTACTS ***S.31(1)

[NPCC Media](#) **

Subject: CRU 01/CRF/25/005391/P - Open murder investigations (unsolved murders) - National advice included

Date: 16 October 2025 13:07:00

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU. Advice is at the end of this message.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005391/P

Referred by: National

Applicant's request:

A list of all open murder investigations (unsolved murders) within City of London Police authority, for murder committed between 1985 and 2000.

Please include the name of the victim, and the location and date of the crime.

CRU Advice:

Advice is provided on the assumption that all the requested information can be located and retrieved within the cost threshold. Where this is not relevant, s12 is recommended to be used. When issuing your refusal notice we recommend that you advise the applicant how best to refine their request to fit within the cost threshold, if feasible to do so.

We appreciate that the information that may be held by each force will vary with this question. For this reason, we would advise you to thoroughly locally assess, s31 Law Enforcement and S40 Personal Details. If cases are in the PD from an official source, then these can be linked with s21.

For those that are not in the PD, we would advise to speak with your SIO's on the cases and ask them for their views on harm associated that they may see on a disclosure, bearing in mind that the applicant is asking for 'all OPEN murder investigations (unsolved murders)' therefore we would imagine there will be a minimum of s30 and s40 considerations.

S38 may also be a consideration based on your SIO's views.

S.31(1)

If you need any further advice, please let us know.

Kind Regards

S.40(2)

NPFDU FOI Referral Officer

National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit | National Police Chiefs Council

,NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

S.31(1)

' Via MS Teams

Advanced notification of leave:

From: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)

Bcc: S.31(1)

NPCC Media **** DO NOT REMOVE FROM FORCE CONTACTS **** (press.office@npcc.police.uk) S.31(1)

Subject: CRU reference: 01/CRF/25/005405/E - Online Harms - Request logged - Advice to Follow

Date: 17 October 2025 09:22:00

Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)

Dear All,

The below FOI request has now been logged in the CRU and will be treated as a national request.
Advice will be sent to all forces in due course.

Please note we do not require confirmation that it has been received by your force.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005405/E

Referred by: Humberside Police

Sent from: S.40(2)

The Applicant name is included in the acknowledgement email as a reference for forces only, any future correspondence will only quote the CRU reference number. Please do not duplicate the applicant name in any future correspondence and use only the CRU reference number

Applicant's request:

1. How many specialized officers do you have investigating Online Harms?
2. How many reports of online sexual crimes have you received directly from the S.23(1)

Please note, we have gone to the requester for the following clarification - please define what is meant by 'Online Harms' and also provide a timeframe for question 2.

Kind regards,

S.40(2)


Management Assistant

National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit

National Police Chiefs' Council

 NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

S.31(1)

 S.31(1)

From: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)
Bcc: S.31(1)
[Redacted]
freedomofinformation@notts.police.uk; NPCC Media **** DO NOT REMOVE FROM FORCE CONTACTS ****;
S.31(1)
[Redacted]

Subject: OS - CRU reference: 01/CRF/25/005374/O - 9mm Ammunition - Request logged - Advice to Follow
Date: 20 October 2025 08:24:00
Attachments: [image003.png](#)
[image004.png](#)

Dear all

The below FOI request has now been logged in the CRU. **Please let us know if you have received it.**

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005374/O

Referred by: Merseyside Police

Sent from: S.40(2)

The Applicant name is included in the acknowledgement email as a reference for forces only, any future correspondence will only quote the CRU reference number. Please do not duplicate the applicant name in any future correspondence and use only the CRU reference number

Applicant's request:

Please could you provide the number of investigations in which 9mm ammunition bearing the headstamp "MXT" or "MaxxTech" has been recovered within your force area during 1st January 2019- 30th September 2025

if it is not possible to isolate this specifically bearing the headstamp within cost or time limits, please could you any available statistics your force holds on the recovery of 9mm ammunition during the same period, broken down by headstamp or manufacturer markings where possible.

For clarity, i am not requesting details of specific cases, suspects or ongoing investigations only information already recorded,

I am requesting access to information held by your organisation regarding M-90 (Croatia) 9×19 mm (9 mm Luger) ammunition, manufactured by M-90 d.o.o., Duga Resa, Croatia.

Please provide the following information for the period 1 January 2020 to present:

1. Whether any M-90-stamped 9 mm cartridges or cases have been recovered, seized, or recorded in any investigations, exhibits, or forensic submissions within your jurisdiction.
2. Any information or intelligence relating to the importation, distribution, or known presence of M-90 (Croatia) ammunition within the UK or specifically the Merseyside region.
3. Whether M-90 is referenced or logged within your ballistic or ammunition reference databases (such as NABIS, NIBIN, or internal catalogues), and if so, the nature of that entry (e.g.

manufacturer profile, headstamp reference, ballistic signature).

4. Any technical documentation, classification details, or manufacturer data your agency holds regarding M-90 d.o.o. or its ammunition products.

I am requesting access to information held by your organisation regarding M-90 (Croatia) 9*19 mm (9 mm Luger) ammunition, manufactured by M-90 d.o.o., Duga Resa, Croatia.

Please provide the following information for the period 1 January 2020 to present:

1. Whether any M-90-stamped 9 mm cartridges or cases have been recovered, seized, or recorded in any investigations, exhibits, or forensic submissions within your jurisdiction.
2. Any information or intelligence relating to the importation, distribution, or known presence of M-90 (Croatia) ammunition within the UK or specifically the Merseyside region.
3. Whether M-90 is referenced or logged within your ballistic or ammunition reference databases (such as NABIS, NIBIN, or internal catalogues), and if so, the nature of that entry (e.g. manufacturer profile, headstamp reference, ballistic signature).
4. Any technical documentation, classification details, or manufacturer data your agency holds regarding M-90 d.o.o. or its ammunition products.

Kind regards,

S.40(2)

Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs Council
✉ NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

S.31(1)



From: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)

Bcc: S.31(1)

DO NOT REMOVE FROM FORCE CONTACTS ***S.31(1)

[NPCC Media](#) **

Subject: OS - 25/5394 - Request for correspondence with NPFDU

Date: 20 October 2025 09:55:00

Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)
[referral form.docx](#)

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

Please see the below request which we believe is doing the rounds. Our thoughts are included below:

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005394/S

Referred by: National

Applicant's request

I am writing to request all written digital correspondence between (1) your force's team responsible for addressing and responding to freedom of information requests and (2) the National Police Chiefs' Council's (NPCC) central referral unit (CRU) in September 2025.

I appreciate that parts of the correspondence will need to be redacted but would remind that redaction does not count towards the time/cost limits under s12 of the FOIA. The possibility that parts of the correspondence will need to be redacted also does not justify withholding the correspondence in its entirety.

Clarification Requested from Cambs:

Can you please confirm if you are requesting copies of correspondence between the FOI Team and the NPCC CRU in relation to FOI requests received by Bedfordshire Police between the 1st September to 30th September 2025 as this is unclear

Clarification Received from Cambs:

Yes, that is what I am requesting.

CRU Advice

As always, Cost is the first consideration. But apologies, we do not have the capacity to determine from our end what correspondence has gone to and from each force.

If Cost is not relevant to your force, please review the information held on the following points:

S40(2) redactions for names, including NPFDU staff and the applicants of any FOI request correspondence. Also any personal emails and mobile phone numbers.

S31(1) in respect of the CRU mailbox.

S23(1) where information is in relation to a security body.

I have attached an example referral form with areas highlighted in yellow which would require redactions using the exemptions mentioned.

Lastly, unless practitioners need specific advice, there is no immediate requirement to send draft responses and the material with redactions proposed. But if you are not sure, please contact us.

Kind regards,

S.40(2)

Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs Council

✉ NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

S.31(1)



In order for the NPFDU CRU to deliver its remit, forces and partners must refer certain requests centrally.

In addition to these mandatory referrals, any FOI/EIR request can be sent that requires specific disclosure and/or technical advice. To do so a completed referral form needs to be sent by e-mail to **S.31(1)**
Please note incomplete forms may have to be returned.

Advice on the referral process or a simple FOI/EIR technical query can also be made by via MS Teams or by telephoning the team on **S.31(1)** however, due to hybrid working this is not always manned.

Once a FOI referral has been received in the NPFDU CRU, we will generate an e-mail which will confirm its URN. This message may also contain further instructions which must be complied with before further guidance can be issued.

Any request referred must **not** be answered until a final response has been received from the NPFDU CRU. **If your force is considering making a disclosure prior to advice being issued or if it does not intend to follow national guidance, please make contact as soon as possible.**

Mandatory Referrals-By Subject Area	
Subject	Notes
Witness protection/protected persons.	Ultra high risk subject area which must be referred to CRU.
Requests which name and/or relate to information which MAY originate from any of the S23 bodies.	S.23(1)
Covert operations, use of informants or surveillance activities or tactics.	Ultra high risk subject area which must be referred to CRU.
Counter terrorism (incl Prevent, Pursue, Protect, Prepare) and/or national security material or operations.	Includes SB, CTU, CBRN, port or airport operations, Crowded Spaces and ANPR.
VIP/Royalty Protection.	To include high profile Royal events and visits.
Information received from or which relates to certain partner agencies. *	Includes NPCC, any government department, IOPC, CPS and College of Policing.
Major or complex incidents or investigations or operations.*	Examples such as extremist protests, large scale public disorder, multiple or high profile unexplained deaths, cross border incidents. Will also include national operations and Inquiries.
International Relations	Includes international training, visiting overseas dignitaries & FCO equities where s27 may be engaged.
National Security	Requests requiring s24 will need stakeholder consideration
Notification of ICO complaint, First Tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal activity	
Requests with potentially significant reputational implications, e.g. the storage of human tissue.	Where policing leads would welcome the opportunity to comment (if unsure please contact the CRU)
Requests for deceased persons criminal records/PNC record	Includes prolific/notorious deceased offenders as well as famous/non-famous deceased individuals.
Requests for information held for the purpose of a statutory Inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005	Examples – UCPI, Manchester Arena, Death of Dawn Sturgess, Grenfell

*If a request is captured by previous NPFDU guidance within the past 12 months, then no referral is required.

Temporary Mandatory Referrals	
Subject	Date added
Polygraph S.31(1), S.23(1)	09/06/23

*There is no requirement to refer if the information requested is already officially published 'Officially published' includes, MAPPA reports and websites such as OSC, The College of Policing, NPCC, Government, IOPC, PCC, Police.UK or Force websites, or documents already marked as suitable for publication under FOIA 2000.

****PLEASE COMPLETE ALL THE BELOW FIELDS TO ENSURE ACCURATE & TIMELY ADVICE****

Force reference number:	616/24
Date request received:	02/02/2024
Type of request:	Initial
All known applicant details:	S.40(2) [REDACTED]
Actual wording of request	In answer to a question from S.40(2) concerning facial recognition, S.40(2) said: 'Where it has not been possible to identify a suspect on PND, forces can submit requests to the Home Office for checks against the passport and immigration databases.' UIN 11044, tabled on 23 January 2024 https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2024-01-23/11044 Please provide the number of requests you made to the Home Office for checks against the passport and immigration databases in the year 2022/23.
Person dealing with request and contact number:	S.40(2)
Reason for referral:	Request concerning requests for facial recognition checks via HO databases.
Do you know what information you hold? Please provide as much detail as possible.	Not at this time.
If a technical query and/or request for disclosure advice specifically what is the issue: (For S14 queries please enter as much detail as possible)	Consideration of full NCND via Section 23(5) Information supplied by, or concerning, certain Security Bodies Section 24(2) National Security Section 31(3) Law Enforcement

	As this has been utilised with previous facial recognition based requests ??
--	--

act. I will also expect you to release all non-exempt material. I reserve the right to appeal your decision to withhold information or to charge excessive fees.

- I would be grateful if you could confirm in writing that you have received this request. I look forward to your response within 20 working days, as outlined by the statute.

CRU Advice:

As with most bodycam recording requests they could capture a multitude of things. The applicant's questions are vague in the sense that they are asking for any and all antisocial behaviour footage/recordings/files etc over the two-year period. S12 could be relevant with regards retrieval of the information or S14 with regards volume of redactions. This could encompass anything from a rowdy person/group outside of a pub, to a protest march, to a neighbour complaining about the noise volume from a private party next door after 11pm. In all cases, including the questions on 999 calls however there is the very real aspect that to disclose footage could be likely to prejudice law enforcement functions of preventing and detecting crime and identify individuals. There is also the possibility that the footage/recording could be from a live investigation that is still on going.

With this in mind we would advise to thoroughly locally assess s31 Law Enforcement and s40 Personal Details. Should any live investigations be found within your search, then s30 in terms of footage relevant to offences and arrest should be applied.

If you need any further advice, please let us know.

Kind Regards

S.40(2)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

NPFDU FOI Referral Officer

National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit | National Police Chiefs Council

,NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

S.31(1)

' Via MS Teams

Advanced notification of leave:

S.40(2)

From: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)

Bcc: S.31(1)

DO NOT REMOVE FROM FORCE CONTACTS ***S.31(1)

[**NPCC Media**](#)

Subject: CRU 01/CRF/25/005287/Q - AI-enabled policing platforms - National Advice Included.

Date: 21 October 2025 15:21:00

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU. Advice is at the end of this message.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005287/Q

Referred by: National

Applicant's request:

I am writing to request information under the FOIA which relates to AI-enabled policing projects (including but not limited to machine learning, predictive analytics, or natural language processing) that have been in trial, development, or deployment at any point in 2025.

1) Copies of any portfolio, project listing, reports, presentations, or internal summaries relating to AI-enabled projects (including but not limited to machine learning, predictive analytics, natural language processing, or facial recognition technologies) that are currently in development, trial, or operation within this police force, or its associated ROCU.

2) Where available, details of:

- a) The name or description of each project
- b) The units or departments involved

- c) External collaborators (contractors, researchers, consultants, etc.)
- d) The intended purpose or application of the technology
- e) The status (e.g. research, pilot, deployment, discontinued)
- f) Any funding source (Home Office, NPCC, or other)

Amended request received by multiple forces

Apologies - please accept my amendment to my FOI request titled "AI-enabled policing platforms."

I had previously asked for information relating to "AI-enabled projects (including but not limited to machine learning, predictive analytics, natural language processing, or facial recognition technologies)" however, I would like to change the wording of this request to narrow down the scope.

Please instead consider the following as my refined request:

I am writing to request information under the FOIA which relates to predictive analytics, data intelligence or AI-enabled profiling that have been in trial, development, or deployment at any point in 2025.

1. Copies of any portfolio, project listing, reports, presentations, or internal summaries relating to the above that are currently, or have been, in development, trial, or operation within this police force, or its associated ROCU.
2. Where available, details of:
 - o The name or description of each project
 - o The units or departments involved
 - o External collaborators (contractors, researchers, consultants, etc.)
 - o The intended purpose or application of the technology
 - o The status (e.g. research, pilot, deployment, discontinued)
 - o Any funding source (Home Office, NPCC, or other)

Amended request:

I am writing to request information under the FOIA which relates to predictive analytics, data intelligence or AI-enabled profiling that have been in trial, development, or deployment at any point in 2025.

1. Copies of any portfolio, project listing, reports, presentations, or internal summaries relating to the above that are currently, or have been, in development, trial, or operation within this police force, or its associated ROCU.
2. Where available, details of:
 - o The name or description of each project
 - o The units or departments involved
 - o External collaborators (contractors, researchers, consultants, etc.)
 - o The intended purpose or application of the technology

- o The status (e.g. research, pilot, deployment, discontinued)
- o Any funding source (Home Office, NPCC, or other)

CRU Advice:

As with any request cost should be the first consideration. Noting that this request is very broad and includes every department and business area across the force and ROCU. If to locate and retrieve all the requested data would exceed the cost limits, then s12 is recommended to be used. If this is the case for your force, when issuing your refusal notice we recommend that that you advise the applicant on how best to refine their request if possible.

S14 could also be a consideration for burdensome. Our advice here if your force feels that s14 might be required is that we would advise to run the Vexatious test to be able to prove to the ICO if challenged, the reasoning for responding with s14, equally it will be helpful to the applicant to understand why this has been used. A sampling exercise should be carried out, for example review 20 cases and the steps required to establish if disclosure is suitable, and time how long this takes, including any engagements with stakeholders and suppliers. The ICO is supportive of the use of s14 if it can be articulated that the burden on the authority outweighs the public interest in the information.

Currently the national position on requests that deal with AI/Machine learning/data intelligence technologies is that forces can confirm or deny information is held in respect of them. From a national perspective, we see no harm in forces being transparent about where they are or are not using or even considering the use of AI technologies broadly. However, some requests which specify particular providers or systems in the wording of the request, NCND considerations sometimes may need to be made, but given the broadness of this request covering every department and business area of the force that is not the case here as no names of software are specifically mentioned on the request itself.

Harm does exist however and requires thorough assessment for disclosure of any details about the field in which the AI is being used, the tactics it relates to, and how the systems which are being used or trialled are specifically named.

Some areas are fairly harmless to disclose such as the use of a chatbot on a website for example, but specifics of the system and any other low level data may need to be withheld where it is felt that disclosure would increase the risk of threat by cyber threats or would risk prejudice to commercial interests for both force and the software companies involved.

There is of course some projects to which disclosure would reveal sensitive or covert tactical capabilities of the force. In such cases it may be that all details of any such project will require exemption.

Responses are going to be heavily dependent on the information that you hold and your local assessment of them, while also working in dialogue with the projects team/relevant business areas, and this will differ from force to force.

Factors to consider on any material exemptions which could capture the below:

Undermine the tactical capabilities of the force or reveal information about sensitive or covert capabilities which are otherwise not publicly shared, including when requested under FOI s31(1)

Place the force at an increased risk of cyber-attack through provision of low-level system information, algorithms etc. You will need to consult with your IT teams on this to establish the level of harm where this is applicable s24(1) and s31(1)

Prejudice the commercial interests of the force or any 3rd party companies with which the force has an agreement as part of the project. An example is where an agreement is in place that details of a specific product/software will not be made public in order to protect competitiveness in the suppliers given market. It is possible that there could also be confidentiality clauses within any agreements so where the project team highlight anything of this nature your legal teams should be consulted.

S.31(1)

Kind regards

S.40(2)

NPFDU FOI Referral Officer

National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit | National Police Chiefs Council

,NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

S.31(1)

' Via MS Teams

Advanced notification of leave:

S.40(2)

2. Please confirm whether any evidence or exhibits obtained by your police force, since 1st January 2025 to present, involves data originating from CTAs.
 - a. If so, please provide the number of such exhibits.

3. Please provide any policies, briefings, or guidance received by your force from national policing bodies (including NPCC, Home Office, College of Policing) concerning the potential use of menstrual or period-tracking app data in investigations.

Kind regards,

S.40(2)


Management Assistant

National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit

National Police Chiefs' Council

 NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

S.31(1)



Advice is provided on the assumption that all the requested information can be located and retrieved within the cost threshold. Where this is not relevant, s12 is recommended to be used. When issuing your refusal notice we recommend that you advise the applicant how best to refine their request to fit within the cost threshold, if feasible to do so.

Q1 - Assuming the request does not trigger a cost exemption, the total financial year costs at force level can be disclosed subject to the following consideration.

Figures must be provided in a consistent format to any previous disclosures i.e. if you have disclosed by financial year previously, you can do so again here. If you have disclosed only by calendar year previously then you should **not** now provide data by financial year in response to this request. Our advice in that case would be to liaise with the applicant and establish if figures by calendar year would be acceptable, providing any reasonable explanations as you see fit. If you have never previously disclosed costs, financial year figures can be provided, and this should be consistent for all requests going forward. The applicant also requests the figure for 25/26 so far, however, as this is a breakdown of a partial year, this should be withheld s23(1), S24(1), S30(2)(b) and s31(1). As always, any spikes should be removed and protected under the partial NCND.

Q2 – The ‘Authorisation’ process describes the purpose of the CHIS operation. These figures can be disclosed as full FY information as above “Spikes” in numbers should be removed and protected under the partial NCND.

Q3 – This question relates to the figures **spent** on CHIS related to Palestine protest groups, providing a breakdown for each FY. The national stance is that information is not released at this level, we would advise to exempt by virtue of a full NCND s23(5), s24(2), s30(3), s31(3), s40(5).

Partial NCND form of words below to assist:

Evidence of Harm:

There is considerable harm attributed to the confirmation or denial that any other information is held in relation to police confidential sources. Such information would not exist had Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) not been required to participate in the effective investigation of criminal matters. The information would only be held if it were obtained and recorded by the force for the purpose of its functions in relation to criminal investigations.

Any disclosure such as in this request that may reduce the flow of information to the Police Service and intelligence agencies would have a substantial prejudicial impact on the ability of such authorities to collect reliable and accurate intelligence. Furthermore, law enforcement bodies would become dependent on more costly and time consuming methods of collecting intelligence. Whilst it may not be seen by the public to be wholly

acceptable to offer payments to individuals who are close to criminal activity, CHIS are often the most valuable sources of information and enable the police and other agencies to secure evidence and subsequent prosecutions.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (regardless of their motivation) provide information at particular personal risk to themselves and their families. As previous cases have shown, where a CHIS is identified it can result in substantial physical harm, or mental trauma resulting from the threat of physical harm. This problem is particularly acute in cases relating to serious crime and terrorism where the threat against individuals is substantial.

The use of CHIS is regulated by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act which requires authorities to take into account the provisions of the Human Rights Act when using CHIS (and other covert techniques). Police forces are reminded of their obligation under Article 2 of the Human Rights Act which requires them to protect human life. This is further supported by a High Court hearing *Van Colle v Chief Constable Hertfordshire Police*. In this case the force concerned failed to provide adequate protection to an individual whose life was at risk because of the criminal acts of a third party. The witness was murdered by a person whom he was about to give evidence against in a criminal trial.

Those determined to identify informants have the ability to use small pieces of information in order to build a more complete picture and it is the cumulative effect of information disclosures that the Police Service feel will lead to this prejudice being realised.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (regardless of their motivation) provide information at particular personal risk to themselves and their families. As previous cases have shown, where a CHIS is identified it can result in substantial physical harm, or mental trauma resulting from the threat of physical harm. This problem is particularly acute in cases relating to serious crime and terrorism where the threat against individuals is substantial. To confirm or deny any additional information would place those individual(s), if any, at an increased risk from danger as detailed above.

It may be viewed by those not involved in the management of informants that a statistical number in itself is unlikely to cause any such adverse effects. However, the subject has to be viewed more holistically. Those determined to identify informants have the ability to use small pieces of information in order to build a more complete picture and it is the cumulative effect of information disclosures that the Police Service feel will lead to this prejudice being realised.

Confirming or denying any additional information exists could impact on the recruitment and retention of CHIS in general, due to the perception of (rather than the actual) risk of identification. In an Information Tribunal case relating to the payments made to CHIS in Croydon (EA/2010/0006), it was accepted that this argument applied as much to CHIS providing intelligence in relation to national security concerns as to CHIS engaged in countering more traditional criminal threats. In this way, the disclosure of payment

information would damage national security through discouraging current national security CHIS from co-operating with the Police Service in other geographical areas, or preventing the recruitment of national security CHIS in the future - regardless of whether the area in question actually currently runs CHIS reporting on serious crime, terrorist or other threats.

[FORCE] can Neither Confirm Nor Deny that it holds the information relevant to your requests as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 does not apply by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 23(5) – Information Supplied By Or Concerning Certain Security Bodies:

Section 24(2) - National Security

Section 30(3) - Investigations

Section 31(3) – Law Enforcement

Section 40(5) – Personal Information

Public Interest Test

Factors Favouring Confirmation or Denial – Section 24(2)

The public are entitled to know how public funds are spent and by confirming or denying that this information is held would allow them to see where money is being spent and know that [FORCE] is undertaking its duty to robustly tackle any form of activity relevant to this request. The information simply relates to national security and disclosure would not actually harm it.

Factors Against Confirmation or Denial - Section 24(2)

Confirmation of any policing arrangements of this nature would render security measures less effective. This would lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infrastructure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public. To counter this, a full review of security measures would be needed and additional costs would be incurred.

By confirming or denying any policing arrangements of this nature would render national security measures less effective. This would lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infra-structure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public.

Factors Favouring Confirmation or Denial - Section 30(3)

The confirmation or denial that information is held by [FORCE] would provide a greater insight into policing and how resources are allocated to investigate crimes. The

confirmation or denial that any other information is or is not held would identify how often [FORCE] utilise CHIS within this type of investigation.

Factors Against Confirmation or Denial - Section 30(3)

To confirm that [FORCE] have used informants with previous investigations and criminal convictions in specific investigations would provide sensitive information that would undermine policing and investigations.

Factors Favouring Confirmation or Denial - Section 31(3)

Confirming or denying whether [FORCE] holds information relevant to this request the public would see where public funds have been spent and allow the Police service to appear more open and transparent. [FORCE] is committed to openness and transparency with the general public. When a request for information is made, it is correct that the police make appropriate information available to the general public. The provision of information, through confirming or denying whether information relevant to this request is held would accordingly, reinforce our commitment to be an open and transparent organisation.

Factors Against Confirmation or Denial - Section 31(3)

By confirming or denying whether information is held could compromise law enforcement tactics which would hinder the prevention and detection of crime and impact on police resources which may need to be increased to reassure the public and protect the surrounding community. This would result in more risk to the public and consequently require the use of more police resources.

Overall Balance Test:

When balancing the Public Interest Test we have to consider whether the information, if held, should be released into the public domain. Arguments need to be weighed against each other.

The security of the country is of paramount importance and [FORCE] will not divulge whether information is or is not held if to do so would undermine National Security, our law enforcement functions or the investigative process. Whilst it is recognised that there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by various groups or individuals, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of police investigations and operations in this highly sensitive area.

As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and

balanced this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. Areas of interest to the police are sensitive to the extent that they reveal local intelligence. To confirm or deny the existence of the requested information, would allow interested parties to gain an upper hand and awareness of policing decisions used during investigations, leading to an increase of harm to either the investigation itself, and the subject of the investigation.

Whilst to confirm or deny that information is held, would reassure the public that any operation had been or was being properly conducted and allow for a greater understanding of how information has been gathered, this could undermine the role and effectiveness of any future operations. Any disclosure of information, if held, which has the potential to jeopardise an operation/investigation, is therefore likely to prejudice law enforcement.

Therefore, at this time [FORCE] have determined that confirmation or denial that any other information is held relating to CHIS and Palestine Protest groups would not be in the public interest.

However, this should not be taken as necessarily indicating that any information that would meet your request exists or does not exist.

If you need any further advice please let us know.

Kind Regards

S.40(2)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

NPFDU FOI Referral Officer

National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit | National Police Chiefs Council

,NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

S.31(1)

' Via MS Teams

Advanced notification of leave:

From: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)

Bcc: S.31(1)

DO NOT REMOVE FROM FORCE CONTACTS ***S.31(1)

[NPCC Media](#) **

Subject: CRU 01/CRF/25/005349/N - Barber/hair salons and nail/beauty salons - National advice included
Date: 22 October 2025 14:43:00

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU. Advice is at the end of this message.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005349/N

Referred by: National

Applicant's request:

I am requesting the following aggregated statistical information for your police force area, covering the period 1 January 2019 - present.

For businesses described as "barbers", "hairdressers", "hair salons", "nail bars/salons", or "beauty salons" (keyword search acceptable), please provide:

The total number of raids, operations, or enforcement actions involving these business types.

The total number of arrests made.

The total number of charges brought.

The total value of cash or assets seized (if recorded in aggregated form).

The total number of referrals made to HMRC, S.23(1) or Immigration Enforcement.

Notes to reduce burden:

I am requesting aggregated totals only. No case files, personal data, or detailed reports are sought.

Please provide this information only where already held in recorded form (e.g. management statistics, keyword-coded returns, annual reports).

If providing the full period (2019-present) is likely to exceed the Section 12 cost limit, please provide figures for 2022-present in the first instance and indicate whether earlier data can be retrieved within cost.

CRU Advice:

Depending on the systems your force uses to search for warrants that relate to the applicants questions, there may be no field or flag that will indicate immediately if the warrants are related to "barbers", "hairdressers", "hair salons", "nail bars/salons", or "beauty salons" and may need to examine manually for each warrant issued during all the years requested to determine if they contain the information requested, therefore taking it over the cost limit. We are aware that this may be the case for several forces and if so we are content with your s12 response and would recommend that you advise the applicant how best to refine their request to fit within the cost threshold, if feasible to do so.

Should your force be able to retrieve the information within the cost limit we would advise to locally assess s31 Law Enforcement and S40 Personal information to ensure that no individual may be identified or likely to prejudice the prevention and detection of crime. As the applicant is content for figures to be amalgamated since 2019 then we see no harm in these figures being disclosed in uncorrelated tables.

S.31(1)

Kind regards

S.40(2)

[Redacted]
[Redacted]
NPFDU FOI Referral Officer

National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit | National Police Chiefs Council

,NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

S.31(1)

' Via MS Teams

Advanced notification of leave:

From: [NPCC Press Office](#)
To: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)
Subject: Morning Media Summary
Date: 24 October 2025 09:03:16



24 Oct 2025

Morning Media Summary

Met launches Drone as First Responder in latest NPCC pilot ([BBC](#), [Evening Standard](#), [Telegraph](#), [Independent](#), [Daily Mail](#))

Misconduct threshold raised for 'honest' police using force ([Telegraph](#), [Police Professional](#))

Three Met Police officers secretly filmed in Panorama footage sacked for gross misconduct ([ITV](#), [BBC](#))

The debate: Are facial recognition cameras in Sainsbury's a step too far? ([BBC](#))

PCSO changes could leave communities exposed - MP ([BBC](#))

Grooming gang inquiry may not begin until next year ([The Times](#))

Opinion

S.40(2) writes in [The Guardian](#): Grooming gang survivors risk becoming pawns in a political game that is no place for vulnerable people

S.40(2) writes in [The Spectator](#): Goodbye and good riddance to 'non crime'

major crime. It is not a complete round-up of police coverage.

Any comments or queries about this bulletin or to be added to the mailing list please contact

press.office@npcc.police.uk

If you'd rather not receive these emails, please use the following unsubscribe link: [Unsubscribe](#) |

[Journalist Privacy Policy](#)



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From: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)

Bcc: S.31(1)

CONTACTS *** S.31(1)

~~PCC Media ** DO NOT REMOVE FROM FORCE~~

Subject: OS - FOI awareness - possible interest generated by a documentary - covert tactics and techniques

Date: 24 October 2025 09:12:00

Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear all,

Re – possible interest generated from a documentary

Aired on ITV, a 7-episode drama entitled “The HACK” has made direct reference to Covert Policing tactics and techniques that may generate further interest via FOI.

As practitioners know, requests that focus on Covert Policing engages NCND s24 National Security and s31 Law Enforcement considerations from the outset. Other exemptions may also be warranted dependent on the FOI request.

As a reminder, **Covert Policing is a mandatory referral to the CRU.**

If you are unsure whether to refer a request, please do not hesitate to contact us and ask.

Kind regards,

S.40(2)

Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs Council
NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

S.31(1)



From: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)

Bcc: S.31(1)

[NPCC Media ** DO NOT REMOVE FROM FORCE CONTACTS ** \(press.office@npcc.police.uk\)](#); S.31(1)

Subject: CRITICAL AMENDMENT TO - FW: CRU 01/CRF/25/005318/G - Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) - National Advice Included

Date: 27 October 2025 10:45:00

Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear all,

-

Re – risk of erroneous disclosure at O2 – CHIS authorisations – CRU 25/5318

An error on our behalf, but **the advice for Question 2 has been revised and practitioners are to exempt the information about the number of CHIS authorisations at force level.**

National CHIS authority data is published by [JPCO via their publications](#), but there is no police or LE agency breakdown by region/location.

Whilst a new response letter does not erase the initial response, it simply means the public authority (your force) has avowed that the disclosure was in error and that the correct response is the new version with exempt information. If challenged, the ICO would consider the revised response only. Making the response erroneous also removes any risk of future requests using the data as a precedent for further disclosure.

Accordingly, if you have already responded to the applicant with the figures for Q2, **please make**

the response erroneous and issue a new response citing s30(2)(b).

A form of words is provided below to assist you:

Public Interest Test:

Factors favouring disclosure:

There is information within the public domain confirming that police use covert human intelligence sources to assist them with investigations and the effective delivery of law enforcement. Disclosure would enhance the public's knowledge about how information relating to informants is used by XXX police and how the intelligence received assists in day-to-day investigations and operations to assist the prevention and detection of crime and the apprehension and prosecution of offenders. Disclosure would also assist in stopping any incorrect rumours or falsehoods relating to how the police store and manage how informants assist the police. It would also allow the public to determine whether the financial outlay by the force to informants is appropriate in comparison to the level of successful prosecutions.

Factors favouring non-disclosure:

Disclosure of the information requested could identify informant activity within a force area. Over a period of time if several disclosures were made, individuals could analyse the information and identify any sudden peaks or troughs in informant activity. This would hinder the prevention and detection of crime and also prejudice our ability to maintain confidential sources. Consequently, the force's future law enforcement capabilities would be affected. Similarly, the disclosure of the information would highlight when informants have been used which could place those persons, or those suspected of being an informant, in danger. The disclosure of this information would lead to informants losing confidence in the XXX Police and would impede the recruitment of informants in the future.

Balancing Test

There is information within the public domain confirming that police use covert human intelligence sources to assist them with investigations and the effective delivery of law enforcement. The Police Service is tasked with protecting the community we serve and solving crime and there is a public interest argument in ensuring we are open and transparent regarding policing investigations and operations. There is no doubt that for the issues outlined above any disclosure relating to sensitive informant information would jeopardise those important roles. Informants play a vital role in assisting the police and is based very much on relationships built on trust and the expectation of complete confidentiality XXX Police would never disclose information which would compromise our tactics. It is therefore our opinion that the balance lies in favour of non-disclosure of the information.

Our apologies for the additional work.

Kind regards,

S.40(2)

Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs Council

✉ NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

S.31(1)



From: NPCC CRU Mailbox

Sent: 22 October 2025 14:42

Subject: CRU 01/CRF/25/005318/G - Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) - National Advice Included

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request was logged in the CRU. Advice is at the end of this message.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005318/G

Referred by: National

Applicant's request:

Please provide me with the following information relating to payments made to Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS).

1. For the financial years 21/22, 22/23, 23/24, 24/25 and 25/26 (so far) please provide a value for how much the police force has spent on CHIS, providing a breakdown for each FY
2. For the financial years 21/22, 22/23, 23/24, 24/25 and 25/26 (so far) please state how many CHIS authorisations were granted to the police force, providing a breakdown for each FY
3. For the financial years 21/22, 22/23, 23/24, 24/25 and 25/26 (so far) please state how much the police force has spent on CHIS related to Palestine protest groups, providing a breakdown for each FY

CRU Advice:

Advice is provided on the assumption that all the requested information can be located and retrieved within the cost threshold. Where this is not relevant, s12 is recommended to

be used. When issuing your refusal notice we recommend that you advise the applicant how best to refine their request to fit within the cost threshold, if feasible to do so.

Q1 - Assuming the request does not trigger a cost exemption, the total financial year costs at force level can be disclosed subject to the following consideration.

Figures must be provided in a consistent format to any previous disclosures i.e. if you have disclosed by financial year previously, you can do so again here. If you have disclosed only by calendar year previously then you should **not** now provide data by financial year in response to this request. Our advice in that case would be to liaise with the applicant and establish if figures by calendar year would be acceptable, providing any reasonable explanations as you see fit. If you have never previously disclosed costs, financial year figures can be provided, and this should be consistent for all requests going forward. The applicant also requests the figure for 25/26 so far, however, as this is a breakdown of a partial year, this should be withheld s23(1), S24(1), S30(2)(b) and s31(1). As always, any spikes should be removed and protected under the partial NCND.

Q2 – The ‘Authorisation’ process describes the purpose of the CHIS operation. These figures can be disclosed as full FY information as above “Spikes” in numbers should be removed and protected under the partial NCND.

Q3 – This question relates to the figures **spent** on CHIS related to Palestine protest groups, providing a breakdown for each FY. The national stance is that information is not released at this level, we would advise to exempt by virtue of a full NCND s23(5), s24(2), s30(3), s31(3), s40(5).

Partial NCND form of words below to assist:

Evidence of Harm:

There is considerable harm attributed to the confirmation or denial that any other information is held in relation to police confidential sources. Such information would not exist had Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) not been required to participate in the effective investigation of criminal matters. The information would only be held if it were obtained and recorded by the force for the purpose of its functions in relation to criminal investigations.

Any disclosure such as in this request that may reduce the flow of information to the Police Service and intelligence agencies would have a substantial prejudicial impact on the ability of such authorities to collect reliable and accurate intelligence. Furthermore, law enforcement bodies would become dependent on more costly and time consuming methods of collecting intelligence. Whilst it may not be seen by the public to be wholly acceptable to offer payments to individuals who are close to criminal activity, CHIS are often the most valuable sources of information and enable the police and other agencies to secure evidence and subsequent prosecutions.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (regardless of their motivation) provide information at particular personal risk to themselves and their families. As previous cases have shown, where a CHIS is identified it can result in substantial physical harm, or mental trauma resulting from the threat of physical harm. This problem is particularly acute in cases relating to serious crime and terrorism where the threat against individuals is substantial.

The use of CHIS is regulated by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act which requires authorities to take into account the provisions of the Human Rights Act when using CHIS (and other covert techniques). Police forces are reminded of their obligation under Article 2 of the Human Rights Act which requires them to protect human life. This is further supported by a High Court hearing *Van Colle v Chief Constable Hertfordshire Police*. In this case the force concerned failed to provide adequate protection to an individual whose life was at risk because of the criminal acts of a third party. The witness was murdered by a person whom he was about to give evidence against in a criminal trial.

Those determined to identify informants have the ability to use small pieces of information in order to build a more complete picture and it is the cumulative effect of information disclosures that the Police Service feel will lead to this prejudice being realised.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (regardless of their motivation) provide information at particular personal risk to themselves and their families. As previous cases have shown, where a CHIS is identified it can result in substantial physical harm, or mental trauma resulting from the threat of physical harm. This problem is particularly acute in cases relating to serious crime and terrorism where the threat against individuals is substantial. To confirm or deny any additional information would place those individual(s), if any, at an increased risk from danger as detailed above.

It may be viewed by those not involved in the management of informants that a statistical number in itself is unlikely to cause any such adverse effects. However, the subject has to be viewed more holistically. Those determined to identify informants have the ability to use small pieces of information in order to build a more complete picture and it is the cumulative effect of information disclosures that the Police Service feel will lead to this prejudice being realised.

Confirming or denying any additional information exists could impact on the recruitment and retention of CHIS in general, due to the perception of (rather than the actual) risk of identification. In an Information Tribunal case relating to the payments made to CHIS in Croydon (EA/2010/0006), it was accepted that this argument applied as much to CHIS providing intelligence in relation to national security concerns as to CHIS engaged in countering more traditional criminal threats. In this way, the disclosure of payment information would damage national security through discouraging current national security CHIS from co-operating with the Police Service in other geographical areas, or preventing the recruitment of national security CHIS in the future - regardless of whether

the area in question actually currently runs CHIS reporting on serious crime, terrorist or other threats.

[FORCE] can Neither Confirm Nor Deny that it holds the information relevant to your requests as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 does not apply by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 23(5) – Information Supplied By Or Concerning Certain Security Bodies:

Section 24(2) - National Security

Section 30(3) - Investigations

Section 31(3) – Law Enforcement

Section 40(5) – Personal Information

Public Interest Test

Factors Favouring Confirmation or Denial – Section 24(2)

The public are entitled to know how public funds are spent and by confirming or denying that this information is held would allow them to see where money is being spent and know that [FORCE] is undertaking its duty to robustly tackle any form of activity relevant to this request. The information simply relates to national security and disclosure would not actually harm it.

Factors Against Confirmation or Denial - Section 24(2)

Confirmation of any policing arrangements of this nature would render security measures less effective. This would lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infrastructure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public. To counter this, a full review of security measures would be needed and additional costs would be incurred.

By confirming or denying any policing arrangements of this nature would render national security measures less effective. This would lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infra-structure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public.

Factors Favouring Confirmation or Denial - Section 30(3)

The confirmation or denial that information is held by [FORCE] would provide a greater insight into policing and how resources are allocated to investigate crimes. The confirmation or denial that any other information is or is not held would identify how often [FORCE] utilise CHIS within this type of investigation.

Factors Against Confirmation or Denial - Section 30(3)

To confirm that [FORCE] have used informants with previous investigations and criminal convictions in specific investigations would provide sensitive information that would undermine policing and investigations.

Factors Favouring Confirmation or Denial - Section 31(3)

Confirming or denying whether [FORCE] holds information relevant to this request the public would see where public funds have been spent and allow the Police service to appear more open and transparent. [FORCE] is committed to openness and transparency with the general public. When a request for information is made, it is correct that the police make appropriate information available to the general public. The provision of information, through confirming or denying whether information relevant to this request is held would accordingly, reinforce our commitment to be an open and transparent organisation.

Factors Against Confirmation or Denial - Section 31(3)

By confirming or denying whether information is held could compromise law enforcement tactics which would hinder the prevention and detection of crime and impact on police resources which may need to be increased to reassure the public and protect the surrounding community. This would result in more risk to the public and consequently require the use of more police resources.

Overall Balance Test:

When balancing the Public Interest Test we have to consider whether the information, if held, should be released into the public domain. Arguments need to be weighed against each other.

The security of the country is of paramount importance and [FORCE] will not divulge whether information is or is not held if to do so would undermine National Security, our law enforcement functions or the investigative process. Whilst it is recognised that there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by various groups or individuals, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of police investigations and operations in this highly sensitive area.

As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. Areas of interest to the police are sensitive to the extent that they reveal local intelligence. To confirm or deny the existence of the requested information, would allow interested parties to gain an upper

hand and awareness of policing decisions used during investigations, leading to an increase of harm to either the investigation itself, and the subject of the investigation.

Whilst to confirm or deny that information is held, would reassure the public that any operation had been or was being properly conducted and allow for a greater understanding of how information has been gathered, this could undermine the role and effectiveness of any future operations. Any disclosure of information, if held, which has the potential to jeopardise an operation/investigation, is therefore likely to prejudice law enforcement.

Therefore, at this time [FORCE] have determined that confirmation or denial that any other information is held relating to CHIS and Palestine Protest groups would not be in the public interest.

However, this should not be taken as necessarily indicating that any information that would meet your request exists or does not exist.

If you need any further advice please let us know.

Kind Regards

S.40(2)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

NPFDU FOI Referral Officer

National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit | National Police Chiefs Council
,NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

*S.31(1)

' Via MS Teams

Advanced notification of leave:

From: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)

Bcc: S.31(1)

S.31(1)

[NPCC Media ** DO NOT REMOVE FROM FORCE CONTACTS **](#);

Subject: OS - CRU 25/5473 - FOI - VR and MR training

Date: 30 October 2025 11:48:00

Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)

Dear All,

The below FOI request has now been logged in the CRU and will be treated as a national request. Advice will be sent to all forces in due course.

Please note we do not require confirmation that it has been received by your force.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005473/Q

Referred by: Metropolitan Police, Merseyside Police

Sent from: S.40(2)

The Applicant name is included in the acknowledgement email as a reference for forces only, any future correspondence will only quote the CRU reference number. Please do not duplicate the applicant name in any future correspondence and use only the CRU reference number

Applicant's request:

I am conducting PhD research into the use of Virtual Reality (VR) and Mixed Reality (MR) within police education and training across the UK. Under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, I would be grateful if you could provide the following information:

1. Does your force currently use Virtual Reality (VR) or Mixed Reality (MR) technologies?
 - o If yes, please provide a brief description of how they are being used (e.g. training, assessment, guidance, public engagement, etc.).
2. Please specify:
 - o The project name or topic area where VR/MR is being used.
 - o The intended outcomes of using VR/MR (e.g. competency testing, assessment, certification, skills training, or awareness exercises).
 - o The hardware being used (e.g. Pico, Oculus Quest 2, HTC Vive, etc.).
 - o The software or platform being used (if known).
 - o Whether the force is using Mixed Reality (e.g. VR integrated with presentations, 360deg imagery, or other media).
 - o How long the force has been using this technology.
 - o Any measured or observed outcomes or feedback regarding its effectiveness.
3. If your force is not currently using VR or MR, is there any plan, pilot, or project under development to explore these technologies in the future?

S.40(2)

Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs Council

 NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

S.31(1)



From: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)

Bcc: S.31(1)

[NPCC Media ** DO NOT REMOVE FROM FORCE CONTACTS **](#); S.31(1)

Subject: CRU ref: 25/5480 - PAG protests and Prevent Referrals

Date: 31 October 2025 09:46:00

Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request has now been logged in the CRU and will be treated as a national request. Advice will be sent to all forces in due course.

Please note we do not require confirmation that it has been received by your force.

Our reference: 25/5480/P

Referred by: Derbyshire Police (national request)

Sent from: S.40(2)

The Applicant name is included in the acknowledgement email as a reference for forces only, any future correspondence will only quote the CRU reference number. Please do not duplicate the applicant name in any future correspondence and use only the CRU reference number

Applicant's request:

Please can you give this information from 2020 to date. However, if that would lead to the request being out of scope, please do as much as you can from 2025 working backwards

1. The number of incidents that your police force has attended that relate to, or were suspected to relate to, the organisation Palestine Action
2. The number of arrests and charges in relation to Palestine Action, this is for prior to the proscription in July 2025.

3. The number of arrests that your police force has made relating to the proscription of Palestine Action (so since summer 2025)
4. The number of charges that your police force has made relating to the proscription of Palestine Action (so since summer 2025)
5. For questions 2 and 3, please can you break down how many people have been arrested or charged. We understand that some people may have been arrested and charged multiple times.
6. Please can you specify how many people, if any, have been arrested and / or charged with being a member of Palestine Action?
7. Since the proscription of Palestine Action, how many police officers have been deployed to police protests about the proscription?
8. Do you have any reports or estimates of the costs of policing the protests against Palestine Action's proscription?
9. How many people have the force referred to Prevent in relation to Palestine Action?

Kind regards

S.40(2)

National Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)
National Police Chiefs' Council

NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

S.31(1)



From: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)

Bcc: S.31(1)

NPCC Media **** DO NOT REMOVE FROM FORCE CONTACTS ****; S.31(1)

Subject: CRU ref: 25/5481 - First Responder/Drones in a box Policy

Date: 31 October 2025 10:07:00

Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

The below FOI request has now been logged in the CRU and will be treated as a national request. Advice will be sent to all forces in due course.

Please note we do not require confirmation that it has been received by your force.

Our reference: 25/5481

Referred by: Hampshire & Isle of Wight Constabulary (advised us it is national)

Sent from: S.40(2)

The Applicant name is included in the acknowledgement email as a reference for forces only, any future correspondence will only quote the CRU reference number. Please do not duplicate the applicant name in any future correspondence and use only the CRU reference number

Applicant's request:

I am writing to request the following information relating to drones in a box, or drones as first responders

- A copy of any policy governing the use of drones as first responder/drones in a box by your force, any DPIA regarding their use and any standard operating procedure for their use

Kind regards

S.40(2)

National Freedom of Information Referral Officer

National Police FOI & DP Central Referral Unit (NPFDU)
National Police Chiefs' Council

📧 NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

■ S.31(1)

■



From: [NPCC CRU Mailbox](#)

Bcc: S.31(1)

DO NOT REMOVE FROM FORCE CONTACTS ***S.31(1)

[**NPCC Media**](#)

Subject: OS - CRU 25/5311 - Babel Street Locate X tool - Full NCND

Date: 31 October 2025 13:10:00

Attachments: [image001.png](#)
[image002.png](#)

OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE

POLICE EYES ONLY

Not to be distributed outside of the Police network or other agencies without prior authorisation from the CRU

Dear All,

For awareness, please see the advice below in respect of a request concerning a product which, for the purposes of operational policing, would be technology that could be used for covert surveillance.

Our reference: 01/CRF/25/005311/Z

Referred by: 01/FOI/25/044619/G Metropolitan Police Service (**Advice circulated national**)

Applicant's request

1. Does the Met Police currently use, or have access to, the software 'Locate X' developed by the company Babel Street?
2. Has the Met Police previously used or had access at any point in the last three years to the software 'Locate X' developed by the company Babel Street?
3. If the Met Police (or any departments within its remit) has had access to these products, or currently has access, please provide documents showing:
 - a. When the contract was signed
 - b. Which company you contracted with
 - c. The start date of the contract
 - d. The end date of the contract
 - e. The financial value of the contract

CRU Advice

Babel Street's product called Locate X relates to what is often termed as 'Ad Tech data'. This refers to the systems, platforms and tools used to buy, sell, deliver, and measure digital advertising. The data is the information collected and analysed to make these systems more effective. We often perceive this on our devices as targeted or personalised advertisements.

Types of data collected can be demographic, [age/gender etc], behaviour [pages viewed, time

spent, clicks for example] or location data [IP or GPS].

Such data has commercial value and is often collected by brokers and 're-sold'. This data has been collected commercially for a considerable period but there has been increased Societal change to protect one's personal privacy and data, from commerce and State alike. For example, Apples ATT – App Tracking Transparency - which identifies what is being collected on an app you download and by whom.

From the policing perspective, if it were to be used, Ad tech data may complement traditional comms data. Evidentially the police rely upon the confidence of lawfully acquired comms data which captures distinct network events. A key element is if this technology was utilised it must be lawfully authorised as private information is obtainable.

Accordingly, and in line with the views of policing leads, forces should neither confirm nor deny holding information relevant to the manufacturer of such technologies, nor tools such as Locate X and the prevalence, or not, of their use in operational policing – some of which might be covert.

Should any force have done so in recent times, please make your response erroneous and issue a new response.

The NCND is by virtue of s24(2) National Security, and s31(3) Law Enforcement. A form of words to assist responses is below:

Overall Harm:

Any disclosure under FOIA is a disclosure to the world at large and confirming or denying the use of specific tools, which the police service may or may not deploy in specific circumstances would prejudice law enforcement. If the requested information were held by the force, confirmation of this fact would reveal that the police have access to sophisticated communications analysis techniques. This would be damaging as it would:

- (i) Limit operational capabilities as criminals/terrorists would gain a greater understanding of the police's methods and techniques, enabling them to take steps to counter them.
- (ii) Provide an indication to any individual who may be undertaking criminal/terrorist activities that the police service may be aware of their presence and taking counter terrorist measures.

Conversely, if information were not held by the force, and a denial were issued, this would reveal to those same individuals that their activities are unlikely to have been detected by the police. It may also suggest (whether correctly or not) the limitations of police capabilities in this area, which may further encourage criminal/terrorist activity by exposing a potential vulnerability. Disclosure of the information could confirm to those involved in criminality including terrorism that they are or have been the subject of such activity, allowing them to gauge the frequency of its use and to take measures to circumvent its use. Any compromise of, or reduction in technical capability by forces would substantially prejudice the ability of forces to police their areas which would lead to a greater risk to the public.

This detrimental effect is increased if the request is made to several different law enforcement bodies. In addition to the local criminal fraternity now being better informed, those intent on organised crime throughout the UK will be able to 'map' where the use of certain tactics are or are not deployed. This can be very useful information to those committing crime including terrorism.

To state that no information is held in one area and then exempt information held in another,

would itself provide acknowledgement that the technique has been used at that second location. This could have the likelihood of identifying location-specific operations, enabling individuals to become aware of whether their activities have been detected. This in turn could lead to them moving their operations, destroying evidence, or avoiding those areas, ultimately compromising police tactics, operations, and future prosecutions.

Any information identifying the focus of policing activity could be used to the advantage of terrorists or criminal organisations. Information that undermines the operational integrity of these activities will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on both national security and law enforcement.

Public Interest Test:

Factors favouring confirming or denying whether other information is held for Section 24

The public is entitled to know where its public funds are being spent and a better-informed public can take steps to protect themselves.

Factors against confirming or denying whether other information is held for Section 24

Confirming or denying the use of specialist techniques could render security measures less effective. This could lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infra-structure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public.

Factors favouring confirming or denying whether other information is held for Section 31

Better awareness may reduce crime or lead to more information from the public, and the public would be able to take steps to protect themselves. Some information is already in the public domain - [Revealed: Home Affairs paying to access controversial tool tracking mobile phone movements | Australian security and counter-terrorism | The Guardian](#)

Factors against confirming or denying whether other information is held for Section 31

By confirming or denying whether such techniques were used would compromise law enforcement tactics and undermine the partnership approach which would hinder the prevention or detection of crime. This would impact on police resources; more crime would then be committed and individuals placed at risk.

Balance test

The security of the country is of paramount importance, and the police service will not divulge whether information is or is not held if to do so could undermine national security or compromise law enforcement. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and in this case providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by the criminal fraternity, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both national security and the integrity of police investigations and operations in this area.

As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced in matters of national security this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances.

There is also no requirement to satisfy any public concern over the legality of police operations and the tactics we may or may not use. Forces are already held to account by statute, for example the Police and Criminal Evidence Act and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, and independent bodies such as His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS), The Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner Office (IPCO). Accountability is therefore not enhanced by confirming or denying whether any information is held.

Therefore, it is our opinion that for these issues the balancing test for confirming or denying

whether any information is held regarding the information requested is not made out.

None of the above can be viewed as an inference that the information you seek does or does not exist.

Kind regards,

S.40(2)

Freedom of Information Referral Officer
National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit
National Police Chiefs Council
, NPFDU PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire. PO14 9FS

S.31(1)

