



# **Chief Constables Council (27-28 September 2023) Virtual – MS Teams**

## **Agenda**

# Session 1



Session	Topics	Lead
<b>Session 1</b> 08:45 – 09:45	<b>Minutes for approval – July 23 meeting</b>	Gavin Stephens
	<b>Copy of Extraordinary CCC Decisions Log in pack (minutes will be submitted to December 23 Meeting)</b>	Gavin Stephens
	<b>Action Log</b>	Gavin Stephens
	<b>Parish Notices</b>	Gavin Stephens
	<b>Chair’s Update</b> Plans for the all Chief Officers Day (12 October) ESN	
	<b>Historic Data Wash Update</b>	Serena Kennedy
	<b>Home Office Counting Rules Review</b>	Chris Rowley
	<b>National Standards for Incident Recording</b>	Chris Rowley and Alex Goss
	<b>National Wellbeing APP</b>	Chris Rowley
	<b>Regional Papers:</b> NPCC Strategic Hub Risk Approach Victims and Prisoners Bill Witness Care Units Collaboration between Opal and Pegasus Intelligence Portfolio Briefing Paper AI Concordat Science and Innovation Coordination Committee POPS Gold Command CPD Chief Officers Appointments Guidance Draft Response Attendance Times	Gavin Stephens

# Sessions 2, 3 and 4



Session	Topics	Lead
<b>Session 2</b> 09:45 – 10:30	<b>Agenda for Reform including Future Criminal Justice Strategy</b>	Gavin Stephens
	<b>Break</b>	30 Minutes

Session	Topics	Lead
<b>Session 3</b> 11:00 – 11:45	<b>Head of HMICFRS Update</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Force Management Statements</li> <li>• Activism and Impartiality in Policing Inspection</li> </ul>	Andy Cooke
<b>Session 4</b> 11:45 – 13:00	<b>HMICFRS State of Policing Annual Assessment – Survey Responses (Closed Session)</b>  <b>Early Warning System HMICFRS Update</b>	Gavin Stephens  Richard Lewis
	<b>Lunch</b>	1 Hour

# Session 5



Session	Topics	Lead
<b>Session 5</b> 14:00 – 17:00	<b>Crime Coordination Committee</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Investigations</li> <li>• Acquisitive Crime</li> <li>• Intelligence                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Impact of the Forensic Science Regulator – Code on the Intelligence Analyst Profession</li> <li>- Intelligence APP</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Serious and Organised Crime                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- IPCO</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	Louisa Rolfe
		Scott Chilton Amanda Blakeman Lisa Winward
		Trevor Rodenhurst Graeme Biggar
		**S23**
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Forensics                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Digital Forensics</li> <li>- External Forensics Market</li> <li>- Forensic Science Regulation</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	Nick Dean  Gary Pugh
	<b>End of Day One</b>	

# Sessions 6, 7 and 8



Session	Topics	Lead
<b>Session 6</b> 08:30 – 09:00	<b>Chair of the Police Federation Update</b>	Steve Hartshorn

Session	Topics	Lead
<b>Session 7</b> 09:00 – 10:00	<b>College of Policing</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Chief Officer Appointments Guidance (regional paper)</li> <li>• Code of Ethics</li> <li>• Vetting APP</li> </ul>	Nick Bayley, Tom Harding and Jo Noakes  Sam De Reya

Session	Topics	Lead
<b>Session 8</b> 10:00 – 10:30	<b>Science and Innovation Coordination Committee and AI Concordat - Discussion (from regional submission)</b>	Paul Taylor
	<b>Break</b>	30 Minutes

# Sessions 9, 10 and 11



Session	Topics	Lead
<b>Session 9</b> 11:00 – 11:45	<b>DDaT Coordination Committee</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NMC Threat Picture Update</li> <li>• National Cyber Response Cadre</li> </ul>	Jo Farrell and Rob Carden  Jason Corbishley Pete O'Doherty

Session	Topics	Lead
<b>Session 10</b> 11:45 – 12:15	<b>Response Attendance Times (from regional submission)</b>	Rob Carden
	<b>Lunch</b>	45 Minutes

Session	Topics	Lead
<b>Session 11</b> 13:00 – 13:30	<b>NPCC Future Financial Planning Review</b>	Paul Sanford

# Sessions 12 and 13



Session	Topics	Lead
<b>Session 12</b> 13:30 – 14:15	<b>Diversity, Equality and Inclusion (DEI) and Operational Effectiveness</b>  <b>Police Race Action Plan</b> - Taser Disproportionality Review	Gavin Stephens and Rachel Swann  Alison Heydari Lucy D'Orsi and Clifford Stott

Session	Topics	Lead
<b>Session 13</b> 14:15 – 14:45	<b>Workforce Coordination Committee</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Leavers and Retention Framework</li> <li>• Professional Standards and Ethics</li> <li>• Pensions</li> </ul>	Jeremy Vaughan  Luica Leon Craig Guildford
	<b>Break</b>	30 Minutes

# Sessions 14, 15 and 16



Session	Topics	Lead
Session 14 15:15 – 16:15	Violence against Women and Girls (VAWG) with Operation Soteria	Maggie Blyth and Sara Crew

Session	Topics	Lead
Session 15 16:15 – 16:45	Review of Productivity in Policing (Open Session)	Alan Pughsley

Session	Topics	Lead
Session 16 16:45 – 17:15	Review of Productivity in Policing (Closed Session)	Gavin Stephens
	End of Day 2	



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## Chief Constables' Council Minutes

19-20 July 2023

### Attendees

AC Gavin Stephens	NPCC Chair
CC Sara Crew	Avon and Somerset
DCC Nikki Watson	Avon and Somerset
DCC Dan Vajzovic	Bedfordshire
CC Nick Dean	Cambridgeshire
CC Mark Roberts	Cheshire
ACC Bill Dutton	Cheshire
Cmsr Angela McClaren	City of London
CC Mark Webster	Cleveland
CC Rob Carden	Cumbria
CC Rachel Swann	Derbyshire Constabulary
CC Will Kerr	Devon and Cornwall
Det Supt Mark Beacon	Devon and Cornwall
CC Amanda Pearson	Dorset
DCC Ciaron Irvine	Durham
CC Dr Richard Lewis	Dyfed-Powys
CC Ben-Julian Harrington	Essex

CC Rod Hansen	Gloucestershire
ACO Ian Cosh	Greater Manchester
CC Pam Kelly	Gwent
DCC Lucy Hutson	Hampshire
CC Charlie Hall	Hertfordshire
DCC Paul Anderson	Humberside
CC Tim Smith	Kent
CC Chris Rowley	Lancashire
CC Rob Nixon	Leicestershire
CC Chris Haward	Lincolnshire
CC Serena Kennedy	Merseyside
AC Matt Jukes	Metropolitan Police Service
AC Louisa Rolfe	Metropolitan Police Service
AC Barbara Gray	Metropolitan Police Service
CC Amanda Blakeman	North Wales
CC Paul Sanford	Norfolk Constabulary
CC Nick Adderley	Northamptonshire
CC Kate Meynell	Nottinghamshire
CC Vanessa Jardine	Northumbria
CC Lisa Winward	North Yorkshire
Sir Iain Livingstone	Police Scotland
DCC Jane Connors	Police Scotland
DCC Mark Hamilton	Police Service for Northern Ireland
ACC Alan Todd	Police Service for Northern Ireland
CC James Vaughan	South Wales
CC Lauren Poultney	South Yorkshire
CC Chris Noble	Staffordshire
CC Rachel Kearton	Suffolk
CC Tim De Meyer	Surrey
CC Jo Shiner	Sussex
CC Jason Hogg	Thames Valley
DCC Ben Snuggs	Thames Valley
CC Debra Tedds	Warwickshire
CC Pippa Mills	West Mercia
CC Craig Guildford	West Midlands
CC John Robins	West Yorkshire
CC Catherine Roper	Wiltshire
CC Lucy D'Orsi	British Transport Police
CC Simon Chesterman	Civil Nuclear Constabulary
CEO Andy Marsh	College of Policing
**S23**	**S23**
**S23**	**S23**
CC Melanie Dales	Ministry of Defence Police
Provost Marshall Sarah Pringle-Smith	Royal Military Police

Gp Capt Russ Foster-Jones  
Col Kristian Rotchell  
CO Ruari Hardy  
CO Robin Smith  
CO Russell Foster  
CC Chris Eyre  
Cmsr Ian McGrail

### **In attendance**

Act Exec Dir Yvonne Cooke

**\*\*S23\*\***

HMI Wendy Williams  
Abimbola Johnson  
DAC Laurence Taylor  
Professor Paul Taylor  
AC Stephen Jupp  
ACO Adrian Rutherford  
Aimee Smith  
T/DCC Simon Megicks  
Andy Rhodes  
Alan Pughsley  
Lianne Deeming  
DCC Maggie Blyth  
Jo Noakes  
Melanie Williams  
Roisha Hughes  
Alan Pughsley  
Marcus Sterling  
ACC Owen Weatherill  
ACC Mark Williams  
Gemma Stannard  
Tracy Holyer  
Hannah Hart  
Richard Hampson  
Anil Mander  
Kim Morris  
Fi Greenlees  
Sherry Traquair  
Lee Milton  
Victoria Arnott  
Hayley Equi  
Vicky Reay  
Tanya Leonard

Royal Airforce Police  
Royal Navy Police  
Guernsey Police  
States of Jersey Police  
Isle of Man Police  
Sovereign bases of Royal Cyprus Police  
Royal Gibraltar Police

Garda Police

**\*\*S23\*\***

HMICFRS  
Independent Scrutiny Oversight Board  
Metropolitan Police Service  
NPCC Chief Scientific Officer Policing  
Serious and Organised Crime Lead  
Surrey/Sussex Police  
Metropolitan Police Service  
Norfolk Constabulary  
Oscar Kilo  
NPCC Review of Productivity in Policing Team  
CEO BlueLight Commercial  
NPCC Violence Against Women and Girls Lead  
College of Policing  
Hampshire Constabulary  
NPCC Productivity Review Team  
Head of NPCC Productivity Review  
Home Office  
National Police Coordination Centre (NPoCC) Lead  
Police Scotland  
NPCC Strategic Hub Lead  
NPCC Head of Organisational Development and Change  
NPCC Strategy, Planning and Performance Lead  
NPCC Business Support Manager  
NPCC Staff Officer to NPCC Chair  
NPCC Criminal Justice Coordination Committee Coordinator  
NPCC Freedom of Information Act Officer  
NPCC Freedom of Information Act Officer  
NPCC Strategy, Planning and Performance Team  
NPCC Strategy, Planning and Performance Team  
NPCC Head of Communications  
NPCC Business Support Assistant  
NPCC Business Support Officer

Elliot Sydney  
Cathy Willis

NPCC Business Support Officer  
NPCC Executive Assistant to NPCC Chair

## SESSION 1:

### MINUTES AND ACTIONS FROM PREVIOUS MEETING

The minutes for the previous meetings held were agreed:

**Decision:** May 2023 – Agreed

#### Action Log

#### **1.2 : Session 2 (February 2023) – National Operating Budget – (Action Owner: Paul Sanford):**

**Action:** Finance Coordination Committee will be starting a 3-year MTFP for programmes and functions funded through the Operating Budget by the end of April 23 and will bring this back for discussion at a future Chiefs' Council meeting.

**Response** – An update will be provided at the July Chiefs' Council meeting. Work ongoing and on track for submission to a future Chiefs' Council meeting.

#### **1.3 : Session 7 (March 2023) \*\*S23\*\***

**Action:** \*\*S23\*\*

**Response** – \*\*S23\*\*

#### **1.4 : Session 1 (May 2023) Kings Coronation Coins - (Action Owner: NPCC Office):**

**Action:** Chiefs agreed an equality impact assessment should be completed following discussion.

**Response** – Following up on the EIA survey – the NPCC team need further discussion, as we are aligned to the Kings Coin eligibility criteria we would need to explore who would take the lead on carrying out an equality impact assessment. In terms of the coins, update on progress (1) Specification close to completion, (2) Tender due to go live this month, (3) Contract award likely in September and (4) Forces have been contacted to provide provisional numbers of medal required.

#### **1.5 : Session 1 (May 2023) JESIP Awareness Mandated Core Training - (Action Owner: Vicki Evans and Charlie Hall):**

**Action 1:** Chiefs agreed for the team to do a resource impact assessment and for costs, sequencing and flexibility points to be appended to the paper and linked back to the national productivity review.

**Action 2:** Chiefs agreed for the team to undertake resource impact assessment and for costs, sequencing and flexibility points to be appended to the paper and linked back to the national productivity review.

**Response** – Updates will be provided in the meeting by the Operations Coordination Committee Chair.

#### **1.6 : Session 12 (May 2023) College of Policing (Vetting) - (Action Owner: Andy Marsh):**

**Action 1:** College to circulate update on the Vetting Code of Practice, including the legal position.

**Response** – The code is currently sat with the policing minister and Home Secretary awaiting sign off and

a date for laying in parliament. The legal position around dismissal remains the same which has been in place since the 2017 APP. This is also in line with the Met's Op Assure process for which they have obtained specific legal advice. We await a JR on this issue that proceeds, that may support or counter the current position. The Home Office are considering legislative routes (Police regs) for dismissal if vetting is withdrawn and a requirement to obtain and maintain vetting clearance which will strengthen the position on this.

### **Chair's Update**

The chair welcomed visitors to CCC. The following new appointments and Honours were welcomed at the meeting:

### **Parish Notices**

**Decision:** Chiefs noted all the new appointments, recent retirements and new honours in HM the King's first Birthday Honours List of chief constables.

- Michelle Skeer QPM – Officers of the Order of the British Empire (OBE)
- Amanda Blakeman – King's Police Medal (KPM)
- Stephen Jupp – King's Police Medal (KPM)
- Serena Kennedy – King's Police Medal (KPM)
- Malcolm Graham – King's Police Medal (KPM)
- Paul Anderson has been successful and will become chief constable for Humberside Police
- Jo Farrell has been successful and will become chief constable for Police Scotland
- CC Sir Iain Livingstone last meeting at CCC
- CC Lee Freeman last meeting at CCC
- ACC Owen Weatherill (Head of NPoCC) last meeting at CCC

### **Chair's Update**

#### **CCC Decision Making**

The chair of the NPCC commented that one of the sessions at CCC appearing later on in the agenda was to look at the HMI State of Policing report and a critical area of the report concerns NPCC decision making which has been criticised as being too slow prompting a debate on how chief constables consult and implement big national issues.

There is a provision in the Section 22A agreement document for chief constables to vote at CCC meetings, working together and reaching decisions by consensus and voting by a show of hands for a majority vote with the chair having the casting vote. Any chief constables not voting will need to notify the chair in writing as to the reason for this. The chair commented that they have looked at comparable bodies' decision-making processes such as The Royal College of Nursing and the General Medical Council. These bodies all have similar systems in place whereby the chair has the casting vote.

The question was posed to chief constables as to whether they wanted to apply the Section 22A voting to sharpen up on decision making? There was broad support for this but chief constables discussed what a majority vote should be (30 or more chief officers are required for the meeting to be quorate and a simple majority being 51 percent.) Some chief officers raised the point that 51% is a bit too low. The point was made that when companies make material changes to their articles of association a 75% majority vote is required. The fact that Police Scotland and Police Service Northern Ireland are not able to be part of the Section 22A agreement was raised. Chiefs also expressed the view that clarity is needed on when it is necessary for chief constables to vote and when they don't, so they don't have to vote on every agenda item.

It was agreed that this item would be brought back as a regional paper so chief constables could have sight on the proposals.

The question of whether chief constables wanted to give the Committee Coordinators more authority to agree and make decisions on non-contentious items was raised. There was good support for this, but some key points raised by the chief constables was the need to get clarity on what the Chair role is and whether section 22A has any detail on the role of the Committee Coordinating Chairs. The Chair's need to be trusted to make decisions, but the chief constables still need to have sight on and see the decisions being made which may affect their force. How do forces decide on what is a contentious matter and what is not?

**Action:** Following the discussion and the polls presented the NPCC Team will capture the result of the vote and decisions with the additional suggestions provided with a view to updating chiefs further at the September Council meeting.

### **Agenda for Reform**

The focus and development work has been focused around the work on the Finance resilience work. There has been a briefing to the National Audit Office (NAO) who are interested in sustainability of funding into policing and law enforcement. There is a 3.3-billion-pound cash deficit in police funding which is made up of 1.3 billion savings that colleagues have to find collectively.

There is a billion-pound increase in borrowing and colleagues are starting to borrow for short life assets and a billion-pound reductions in reserves.

What has happened to the balance of funding and the impact on police staff colleagues? There are 5,000 police staff vacancies. The Home Office grant has been level from 2009 to present day. The Opposition are to set out their intention's pre-election on Crime and Criminal Justice issues but there is not going to be any additional money for public services so with the level of deficit a discussion will need to be had after the Summer about what is the collective approach to this which will take place in September.

**Action:** Chiefs noted the update.

### **National Emergency Services Network (ESN) Role**

A reminder was given to forces that the ESN role is still vacant. A chief constable is still required to lead this programme.

**Decision:** Chiefs were encouraged to apply for the role.

### **NPCC Digital, Data and Technology Coordination Committee (DDaTCC) Role**

Chiefs were encouraged to apply for the NPCC DDaTCC role advertised via ChiefsNet.

**Decision:** Chiefs were encouraged to apply for the role.

### **Performance Management Sub Committee:**

The chair of the Performance Management Sub Committee provided an update which is an Interface between the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and the chair of the NPCC. The chair appealed for a chief constable to join him in the committee. A chief constable is required to agree a process for appointment for CC NPCC Leads, to agree the Chair's objectives, to deal with any complaints, authority issues and to join the short meeting of 30 minutes every quarter.

**Decision:** The chair appealed for a chief constable to join him in the committee and encouraged chiefs to put themselves forward.

### **Sustainable Funding Proposal Update**

There are ongoing talks with the Home Office colleagues about sustainability funding for what is in the centre. The breakdown of the Hub funding is 3.1 million from the Home Office, a couple of million coming from contributions from PCCs/forces and some partner funding. There is no re-assurance for Home Office funding for next year. The Home Office has found some money on the officer pay settlement, but this will squeeze other areas of the budget.

The breakdown of where money is spent is as follows: 10% of money spent on Communications activity, 10% on leadership/governance activities, 20% spent on supporting Coordinating Committees, some spent on transporting premises but there are some savings with the estate move, 10 percent on risk analysis and future planning and there are Information Technology (IT) costs. Hub funding enables all of the Human Resources (HR), Finance and IT for all the big programmes of work without having to repeat this themselves so avoiding duplication. If the money is not received at the centre, the work will go back to the individual areas of work. There is no appetite from forces to put more money in. There is a letter to go to the Policing Minister which is co-signed by the heads of the national programmes and the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners (APCC) have also indicated that they will support it too.

Chief Constables commented that some areas are underinvested – for example in the national rewards team there are two and a half people whereas the National Health Service (NHS) have 50 people working in pay and rewards. The view was also expressed that it is not sustainable to keep adding more work at the centre. There is the work on the National Operating budget by the Finance Coordination Committee with some tough decisions needing to be made. However, a strong national infrastructure is required. Chiefs also expressed the need to look at what is being propped up by forces own budgets– if funding is cut, forces will have to pick this up and there will be additional demands on forces.

There was the suggestion to revisit and redo the portfolio survey to establish how much work is going on locally which is not being picked up.

Forces need a longer-term workforce plan and tough choices will need to be made. There was also the suggestion of a vote in September to determine the priorities to focus on.

**Action:** Chiefs noted the update.

### **National Strategic Risk Approach**

Before 2021 there was no standard risk management framework across the NPCC. Over the past few years, the RMF is being tested with good engagement from the Committees and a number of national programmes and functions to adopt and test the RMF. An external audit was carried out with good feedback and strong risk management approach. There is still a long way to go to get into the maturity level that you would expect from an organisation of the size and remit of the NPCC.

The RMF will be refreshed and will be brought to CCC in September. There is the new National Strategic Risk Forum and there has been great engagement through the risk leads. There is great representation at the forum. It is about identifying best practice. In September there will be the 1<sup>st</sup> proposal about how to manage strategic risks which are high level, complex and cross cutting threats to the strategic objectives, and this strategic approach will look to collate and report risks. There is engagement with stakeholders, looking at best practice for this process working with the College of Policing, Police Digital Service (PDS), **\*\*S23\*\*** and Bluelight Commercial- there will be a detailed paper brought to regions in August with proposals.

**Action:** Paper to go through regional CCC process for the September CCC meeting.

### **Review of Productivity in Policing Update**

On 13 September the Productivity Team will come back to CCC to talk about recommendations.

There is the Model process build by the six forces. They are changing and tweaking the digital tool which does what forces want – a decision making and performing tool to tell forces how productive they are and a comparison with other forces. The model has been refined and tweaked – for example, there are no longer red, amber and green indicators.

At the extraordinary CCC meeting, the team will show forces more about the model process but will also outline on the recommendations. The review will go to the Home Secretary. Forces will know what is in the report. They have been to every force. There are some excellent areas, but there are some areas for improvement. There will be case studies and best practices in the review. On the 29 September the report goes to the Home Secretary.

The Mental Health protocol has been signed by the two Ministers which will be launched on the 24 July. The two key things are the risk assessments at the beginning, crime or threat of harm and if there aren't those two things then there is an argument that policing shouldn't be dealing with it. The 136 detainee was mentioned and how long spent with the detainee when all of the risk and crime has gone and there is an aspiration for the handover to be 1 hour as opposed to 22 hours.

There is an 18-point plan around how to make Criminal Justice more effective. They have costed out how much a case file costs to do to calculate how much wasted time and effort is spent on files which are not going anywhere. If they find savings, the Minister intends to invest them back into policing.

Spending Review – looking at how to maximise existing resources but there is room for improvement on how to put best cases forward for future spending reviews. There has been a good workshop to try and set out a vision which hopefully ministers will buy into.

Technology can be an un-locker of productivity. Can the service box be more clever? There is a pitch for more investment in technology but how to do things a bit smarter. Other organisations are ahead of the police and have more resources, looking at model of education endowment fund – money put at the centre – testing before it is rolled out.

**Action:** An extraordinary CCC meeting will be scheduled in September to go through the recommendations.

### **Historic Data Wash Update**

They are halfway through phase 2. 71% of all the data has now been processed with 15 forces having completed all their data washing, 26 forces are green and on track, 7 forces are red so unlikely to meet the target of the end of September. Where forces are not on track, additional resources have been put in.

**Decision:** Chiefs noted the update and more detailed timeline on next steps would be presented at the September CCC meeting.

### **Data Maturity Assessments**

Starting to roll out across all forces a consistent data maturity assessment. A modern way that industry standard organisations take assessment of whether they are fit for purpose to roll out exciting, analytical and data science capabilities. It is important that this is done consistently so from the centre

assurance can be given to forces that they are doing things once and doing it well in terms of how capabilities are defined and matured. As a sector policing is behind.

A data maturity assessment is an industry standard data maturity assessment. It is in plain English about how the organisation is maturing its use and understanding of data. The assessment is not for publication—it is for forces to use and the data board. It will help with planning and will be a face-to-face workshop at first and then an online assessment to get a broad assessment of how data is used. It is important to help build public trust and confidence – when we don't get data quality right then the public trust is lost. It is important for forces to see where they sit and what is being done well. Forces are investing more in tech than in the data and will help to put forward a good Spending Review bid. It will also help staff on the front line.

A trial is underway with five forces taking part.

**Decision:** Chiefs agreed/supported the following from the paper:

- To engage with the data maturity assessments process as it rolls out to all forces.
- To support the “maturing” of the use of data and analytics to improve decision making, performance and intelligence within policing.
- To timetable the next update on the collective findings of the assessments and a “next steps” plan for forces and CDAP design, so that Chiefs are in a position to influence both.

### **Criminal Justice Input**

Criminal Justice has been slightly invisible but there are many hard working and committed people in forces and leading on pieces of work but also people working in the various agencies wanting to make a difference. The Criminal Justice System (CJS) system is under significant strain. Over the past few decades, there has been lots of new legislation, new guidance, new doctrine, technology, a surge in safeguarding etc which has impacted the CJS, but this has not followed with the correct level of investment.

There are pockets of innovation but also pockets of silo thinking which is being addressed. There is no clarity on what the national strategy is and the absence of an overarching view on how the CJ system is performing. The political instability over the past few years has made things worse. There are backlogs across the system and this problem has been compounded with Covid. There is not a single data set so there is a need to get national and local consistency on data and how this links in with Local Criminal Justice Boards.

Conversations were had with the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) to get the right people to start looking at this as a systemic issue and how to improve it. Through the CJ Action Group they have decided to form a problem statement which is the state of the CJ system as it is now, and the intent is how do we optimise a problem solve and they are using it to inform the new administration. Policing needs its own voice and all forces have been written to with 32 forces responding. The themes which came out are as follows:

- There is a lack of strategic direction/increased time, complexity, and cost, with junior people handling complex procedures, a back log of things taking a long time to go to trial having an impact of victim and witnesses. 1 in 2 people declare that they would not go through the criminal justice system again. The demand is outstripping capacity. There is a backlog of cases and not enough judges.
- Prison capacity is a real issue. Increasing by 200 every couple of weeks. In the Northeast and Northwest there are no places at all. The pressure in the prison system will continue into early next year.
- Case progression – some good work going on but there is a huge variant up and down the

country. The mean average is 59% but MPS are running at about 27%. Need to get MPS up by 45-50%.

- Great progress being made on redaction. Still progressing for the potential for a data bubble.
- Back log around the crown courts.
- The National CJ Board is back up. The ministerial round table was positive.
- The JOIB reports to the Criminal Justice Board – how do we develop a greater consistency around case progression units.
- They are pushing for the national strategic vision.
- There is the need to lobby for legislation around redaction which would free up time.

A point was also made about the paperwork officers must contend with for cases that are not even going to court and whether things will improve to free up more time for officers to focus on other priorities.

**Decision:** Chiefs noted the below next steps and a wider session will be planned for the December CCC meeting.

- Continuing to push for renewed strategic vision
- Ensure consistent, timely performance information national to local
- Pushing for demand modelling across the CJS to understand the demand versus the capacity
- Processes/systems to be victim focused, with an emphasis on improving timeliness
- Pushing for public confidence measure across CJS
- Talking with inspectorates – join inspections Police & CPS
- Renewed focus on effectiveness of LCJBs and JOIM
- Continued focus on file quality but with greater flexibility for pre-charge discussions
- Shared endeavour to reduce disclosure burden and optimise tech
- Improvement to CPSD performance
- Agreement to explore expansion of Red exemption cases and reducing 28 day charging period for Green cases
- Develop evidence based arguments for charging division/DA pilot
- Arguing for a recognition for future amendments/enhanced to the CJS need to understand time, cost, complexity for policing

### **Regional Papers**

**Decision:** All decisions and actions from the regional papers are listed in the circulated slides contained within the CCC pack:

#### **Digital Public Contact Strategic Direction**

**Decision:** Detailed feedback came in from regions. The paper is not signed off yet as there is more engagement work to be done.

#### **National Contact Management Strategy**

**Decision:** The national contact management strategy paper was endorsed.

#### **Operation Bridger Funding Request 23-28**

**Decision:** It is covered for this year but will be brought back to discuss further at the CCC September meeting as part of the wider NPCC Future Financial Planning Review.

## **Session 2 – Workforce Coordination Committee**

NPCC Chair for the Workforce Coordination Committee provided an overview of what is to be covered. The national Op Kilo lead provided an update on Covenant Workstream - Families and Leavers support. Main highlights were reported as below:

- Launch date for the programme is September 2023.
- Bereavement counselling is in place for officers and families in certain circumstances which can be accessed by OH departments and FLO's if required. This is fully funded.
- Suicide prevention tool kit has been released and is there to support forces.
- All family friendly policies already in place will be collated in one place for easy access to families and officers.
- Ongoing work around financial stress.
- Trauma Tracking work ongoing in two pilot forces to track trauma.
- Offer from Police Care UK to fund establish microsites for each force and populate this site with national support policies and also with local products. This will address concerns from families who want to be better informed to what services are available, to help early engagement when issues are spotted.

NPCC Workforce Chair provided the following updates on:

### **Police Uplift Programme (PUP):**

- 10 forces are been interviewed.
- Many already contacted.
- Many forces to respond.
- All forces will have data returns sent and important forces engage to capture data from PUP.

### **Mandatory Training:**

A small team is working with the College of Policing to review all training requirements to understand where duplication can be avoided but training quality is not impacted.

The Workforce Chair then handed over to the NPCC Job Fitness Testing (JRFT) Lead. The Lead provided an overview in relation to the Chester treadmill test and validate the 5.4 shuttle run. Further work was required to validate the test. Chiefs supported the following at previous the May 23 CCC meeting:

- Maintain mandated JRFT.
- UPP supported if individual unable to pass the test but only if all support is exhausted.
- Try to address equality issues related to JRFT.
- JRFT linked to aerobic demands of officer safety training.

However, police safety training has been amended and as the curriculum is over two days training and is much more interventionalist, the findings suggest a 15% reduction should be applied to JRFT.

The lead requested chiefs if they wish to accept a reduced JRFT and chiefs responded as follows:

- Agreed change is required, however not to reduce as the belief is this is too low.
- Difficult to support this nationally.
- Important to do work and understand what is required.
- Maintain current levels until work is complete.

**DECISION:** Maintain current JRFT levels until further work is completed. Police Safety Training is no longer an appropriate anchor for JRFT and need to identify new link to new job-related fitness test and re-validate levels for fitness roles.

**DECISION:** Chief Constables agreed with the recommendation that we should not accept this revised JRFT standard and that the PPST is now not the appropriate anchor for the JRFT. Chief Constables agreed that we should undertake further work to ascertain a more direct job-related element.

**ACTION:** Further update should be provided by the lead on JRFT at the next CCC meeting in September. Next on the agenda was the discussion on the Ethnicity Action Plan.

Background provided around the action in Police Race Action Plan, Action 16 centred on two parts:

- We will address the challenges with the ethnicity pay gap reporting to support employers who want to demonstrate and drive greater fairness in the workplace.
- BEIS will publish guidance to employers on voluntary ethnicity pay reporting in summer 2022.

It was outlined to do this, first we need to understand what the pay gap is.

Research carried out looked at different best practice around what methodologies and principles applied in industry. Recommendations from the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD) have the most robust principles and the recommendation is to align these to policing, adapt these principles and create an action plan to progress and improve the overall position.

A number of ice breaker forces have contributed data to help understand how ethnicity pay back can be calculated. For policing the recommendation is we adopt a blended approach to calculate pay across police staff, police officers and ranks.

The team have created technical guidance, minimum standards for publication and emphasised the need to create force action plans to drive improvements. Chiefs were requested to agree the following decisions:

- Agree the guidance, principles and methodology.
- To support the Police Race Action Plan exercise of surveying Force's to determine the national timeline for ethnicity pay gap reporting.

**DECISION** – Chiefs supported the decisions required.

**ACTION** - To bring back accurate timeline once it has been identified to CCC.

NPCC Workforce Chair updated on Police Staff Pay following the recent announcement on Police Officer Pay and is hoping to complete discussions by September.

NPCC Lead on Pay and Conditions gave an update on police officer annual leave entitlement. The view is

to modernise the annual leave entitlement and are looking to halve the time it takes to reach maximum leave entitlement.

### **Session 3 – Counter Terrorism Update**

This was held at Secret Level and no minutes were taken.

### **Session 4 – Crime Coordination Committee**

The Chair of the Crime Coordination Committee introduced the session and provided an overview of the wide variety of work that sits within the National Crime Coordination Committee including twelve portfolios and over 100 working groups. The Crime Committee has volunteered to work with the Strategic Hub to ensure its structure and portfolio areas meet the overall strategic threat assessment on crime – further updates on this review will be brought back to later CCC meetings.

**\*\*S23\*\***

### **Serious and Organised Crime (SOC) Chief Post Discussion**

The Chair summarised the history around the appointment of a dedicated Chief Constable SOC lead and congratulated Chief Constable Steve Jupp on his recent appointment which would leave the position vacant from November 2023. The chair advised that the Home Office had agreed to underwrite the funding of the dedicated SOC role for a further two years and a debate was welcomed with Chief Constables on the continuance of the role and the way forward.

The SOC lead referenced a paper which had been circulated outlining the current position and he summarised the achievements made in the SOC arena in the last year and the requirements of the role holder going forward. The SOC lead highlighted some of the areas that had previously been discussed and advised that those issues (including the rank of the role holder) were still relevant. The SOC lead summarised the key areas of work that were being progressed which included the development of the Clear/Hold/Build approach, the SOC system reform, LRO training, SOC Community Coordinators and work with the Homeland Security Group – all of which were now building momentum.

The Chair welcomed comments from chief constables. Following discussion chief constables were supported filling the role at chief constable level and the following areas were highlighted:

- The role holder must understand the competing demands and complex threat, harm and risk picture.
- Recognition that the work has grown in relation to challenge and demand levels.
- Home Office funding was key.
- Need to ensure synergy with key stakeholders (including **\*\*S23\*\***).
- Build in a review process and associated timescales.
- Need to fully articulate the benefits across forces and consider a potential exit plan when the funding expires.

• **\*\*S23\*\***

The NPCC Chair summarised that there was support to fill the dedicated role at chief constable level with further work to aid possible discussions at the September CCC if there wasn't sufficient interest received. Also, further consideration was required to consider 'what next' and how the SOC role can feed into the agenda for reform and strengthening the national infrastructure. A small working group was also

proposed, led by the Crime Committee, to articulate the benefits achieved by the role and to consider the criteria for any potential exit strategy or incorporate into other roles going forward.

### **Drugs Strategy**

The national Drugs Lead introduced the item and highlighted that it was the first anniversary of the publication of the Her Majesty Government (HMG) 10-year drug strategy. The session would focus on how policing can continue activity to feed into the three main aims of the strategy: breaking the demand for drugs, breaking drug supply chains and delivering a world class recovery and treatment service. The lead summarised some of the success areas achieved to date including the creation of local drugs partnership boards and the closure of party lines etc.

The lead provided an overview of the drugs landscape and some of the research into the impact on criminality by drug abuse. The HMG drug strategy had a significant amount of funding dedicated to drug treatment and recovery with a rise in the number of new treatment centres opened. The lead highlighted the lack of referrals into treatment centres by policing and advised that whilst policing cannot mandate people attend treatment, it can mandate attendance at assessments before referral to treatment. The lead welcomed the Deputy Director of Drug Misuse in the Home Office. The Deputy Director provided an overview of HMG's key focus areas:

- Strong HMG commitment to reduce drug consumption and the associated harms and how to proportionally redouble efforts via lawful engagement to reduce drug consumption.
- Greater referrals into treatment centres with significant funding allocated in this area including work to increase the level of drug testing at the point of arrest.
- Out of court disposals pilot work to identify areas of best practice.
- Update on naloxone and the evidence base on its use.

The lead stressed the need for forces to access funding available from the Home Office and provided an overview of work to expand drug testing at the point of arrest and the current level of force activity in this area and activity to increase the level of associated data. The lead provided an update on correspondence received from the policing minister which would be shared with chief constables regarding the drugs strategy action plan and the need for policing to increase activity to impact on the numbers of people referred to treatment centres and drug testing on arrest.

Chief Constables welcomed the update and the following issues/comments were raised:

- The use of naloxone by officers and the need for HMG support on its use, the required evidence base to support its use and the need for the Independent Office for Police Complaints (IOPC), Police Federation and Ambulance Services to be engaged and supportive.
- How can policing access funding from Public Health and the support required by HMG in this area.
- HMG need to explore delays and timescales for access/referral to treatment centres.
- Use of synthetic opioids and their impact.

The lead thanked colleagues for their input and agreed that it would be helpful for further work to be undertaken on the use of naloxone to provide an NPCC position on this.

### **Actionable Evidence**

The lead updated on this issue and the concern/perception that had been raised around whether policing was meeting public expectations in pursuing investigations particularly around acquisitive crime and the use of platforms such as 'find my phone' and vehicle tracking devices etc. As a result the policing minister had held a meeting with NPCC leads, the College of Policing and HMICRS to consider whether policing can pursue all actionable evidence. Work was ongoing to explore this issue further and the mechanisms

available to explore all reasonable and proportionate evidence. The College of Policing have been working on guidelines and Authorised Professional Practice (APP) on conducting effective investigations and correspondence had been sent to chief constables. The Crime Chair advised that HMG were keen to make an announcement on this and engagement was ongoing to ensure there were no unreasonable expectations set on this and that any requirements were in line with policing's aspirations to pursue all reasonable lines of enquiry. The College CEO provided an update on the APP and discussions at Professional Committee to support this and the potential launch date which may be combined with the Home Office planned 'policing/crime week' around the end of August.

### **Op Soteria**

The lead introduced the item and advised that she would provide an overview of the position with Op Soteria to date and the next steps activity planned post September.

The lead detailed the collaborative approach with academics in policing which had commenced as a pilot in 2021 in Avon and Somerset and was later rolled out to four pathfinder forces. Following a decision by the Home Office to expand the pathfinder forces, this increased by an additional fourteen forces. The lead provided an overview of deep dive activity that had been undertaken and some of the learning that arisen from this activity including force action plans and exposure of some of the challenges which included too much emphasis on the credibility of victims, greater insight into psychology of offenders, burnout of investigators and issues around police force culture. This evidence had been fed into the development of a National Operating Model delivered into the Home Office in June and launched on the 10 July by the Home Secretary. This model was available on the College website and knowledge hub and learning continues to be shared via national learning network events and RASSO focused training and knowledge programmes. The lead updated on work to form a joint unit to ensure delivery and ownership by policing under the Violence against Women and Girls (VAWG) infrastructure.

The lead updated on forthcoming work post September for adopter forces and work to look at issues including key performance indicators, technology capability and the required infrastructure model. The Lead advised Op Soteria would now move into a joint leadership approach (across forces, college or policing and NPCC). Chief Constables raised the following:

- Benefits of the RESDIP course and encouragement to all forces to make the best use of this resource package available.
- Challenges associated with conviction rates and whether the dialogue should now move to consider issues including the sufficiency of the law, burdens of proof etc.
- Space to look at national society issues and long-time planning on prevention and change of approach.
- Overview of 'tell not report'.
- Level of training and skills that are transferable into core investigative roles.

### **Serious and Organised Crime (SOC)**

**Decision:** Chiefs supported the continuance of a full time NPCC SOC Lead at Chief Constable rank, for a further two-year period.

**Decision:** Chiefs noted the update and agreed as part of the agenda for reform as next steps a review should take place after the 2 years criteria whether to continue with the role if no further Home Office funding is available and if this should be incorporated into the Crime Coordination Committee.

### **HMG Drugs Strategy**

**Decision:** Chiefs noted the update.

## Op Soteria

**Decision:** Pathfinder forces letter going out on resources and what next steps for the adoption is going forward.

**Session 5 – \*\*S23\*\***

## **Session 6 – Discussion on HMICFRS Secondment Programme**

The HMI lead provided an update on police secondments to Her Majesty's Inspectorate Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Service (HMICFRS) outlining the potential benefits of the scheme for forces.

It was recognised that this is a really challenging time for policing, however there are some tangible opportunities that the secondment programme offers as it will increase a greater awareness in forces of the inspection regime and what the national policing landscape looks like with emerging themes.

HMICFRS would like to see a greater mix with more officers and staff who are in early or mid-service as well as those coming towards the end of service.

There is a variety of opportunities such as the Assistant HMI roles, long-term secondments (up to 2 years) and short term ones (anywhere between 3-12 months) providing a greater degree of flexibility for forces.

The benefits for forces and individuals were highlighted such as insight into national and local policing performance, a more in-depth understanding of HMICFRS practices, methods and inspections including how to prepare for inspections and an awareness of all inspection portfolios. A number of success stories and examples were referred to in the presentation of past and present officers and staff on secondment.

There was a discussion on what the barriers might be and how these can be collectively overcome. Chiefs welcomed and supported the improved approach as this is about developing future leaders in policing. Chiefs suggested forces build it into their Professional Development Review (PDR) earlier on so that this can be a fundamental part of the conversation when looking at the strategic development of future leaders and the benefits which returns to force as they continue their journey. Chiefs believe it is important for the long-term vision of policing by improving development, understanding governance and embedding good practice at frontline level, as secondees at HMICFRS gain a different perspective. It should be part of talent management for serving communities now and in the future.

Chiefs mentioned they were about to launch a next step on the national centre for police leadership on what that talent pipeline looks like. There is scope to recognise the value of secondments to HMICFRS and other agencies.

Chiefs noted that there needs to be a dialogue of readiness for promotion as different qualities are displayed in one environment compared to another and forces would welcome HMICFRS assessment.

### **Decisions:**

- Encourage forces to recognise and support the right individuals for secondment.
- Invited Chiefs to nominate candidates for Assistant HMI roles – speak to Andy Cooke.
- Invited forces to proactively advertise and promote job adverts.
- HMICFRS will give progress reports and have a reciprocal arrangement in place with forces.
- Invited forces to consider skills of returning secondees where workforce planning is concerned.

## **Session 7 – Police Race Action Plan – Improving Policing for Black People**

An update was provided from the Chair of the Independent Scrutiny and Oversight Board (ISOB). The feedback report is now ready which is around the recommendations highlighted to all forces at the last CCC meeting. The embargoed version will be ready by the 2 August when it will be circulated for forces with publication on the 8 August.

**Action:** Report will be published nationally on ChiefsNet.

Between the 2-8 August there will be opportunities for key stakeholders to have 1-2-1 briefings with the Chair of ISOB to go through the content of the report before publication. The report looks at personnel concerns and how the structure of the programme does not allow people to bring their best to the programme and looks at how this can be changed.

One of the recommendations was to reflect on how much breathing space CCs are giving to people to reflect on the plan and make things work. Some officers or staff seconded to the Police Race Action Plan have been pulled back into force which can have an adverse effect on the content of the programme and can set the programme back by months.

How much time is being given to mid-ranking officers who are more on the front line to be able to absorb and consider promises being made by CCs and enact those actions from the Race Action Plan. Work is being carried out to restructure the programme to make it a longer, more impactful piece of work, with a legacy in policing. Running the programme on an annual budget is not helpful. They are losing people due to annual contracts where there is no stability and career progression. They are also looking at joined up working with stakeholders and how forces are engaging with them – picking up information without having to keep going back to them and speaking in a thoughtful way.

Forces raised points such as the need to look at what does the next few years look like in terms of delivery/getting the right structures in place with resources, skills and funding and to understand what communities think about the work being carried out.

The plan is to wait until the new Programme Director is in place before having a discussion on the key areas of focus.

There was also the point raised about young black communities and their distrust of the police preventing them from considering a career in the Police Service and the importance of tackling the culture first to attract young black communities to joining the Police otherwise there will not stay. People through the door won't stay. Need to change culture first to attract people to police. There is no legacy in black communities.

A need to support the new Programme Director once in post was expressed as this was the plan all forces have signed up to and forces need to support the Programme Director with this.

**Decision:** Chiefs noted the update.

### **Session 8 – College of Policing Update**

Chief Executive Officer (CEO) for the College of Policing (CoP), gave an outline of the two areas of discussion for today's session and outlined the Government want to maintain blended entry routes. 4th route will be available for April 2024.

Items for discussion:

- 4th entry route progress
- Executive Leadership Programme

CoP, Director of Leadership and Workforce gave the following update:

#### **4th Entry Route:**

##### Rational

4th Entry Route Now called Police Constable Entry Programme (PCEP). The rationale and decision making for PCEP was outlined and linked and entry route to be set at equivalent of level 5 qualification but open for individuals to use experience to gain qualifications in the future.

### Progress

The programme has experienced challenges in the initial stages of development, and these have been considered and included in development and optimisation of the work. The main challenges centred around:

- Differing interpretations of the 'ask' from Chiefs.
- Impacts on existing routes and pay progression.
- Concerns around ability to deliver and implement by April 2024.

Outlined the College are acutely aware of views and feedback.

Main considerations around the development of PCEP centre around:

- Maintain standards and provide consistency.
- How all routes work together to Avoid 2 - tier policing.
- Considered role requirements to prepare new recruits to undertake role effectively.

PCEP will be a 2-year learning programme, with appropriate learning, to take new recruit from a standing start to operational competence. The curriculum considers, in partnership with wider policing, includes important operational learning and skills. The curriculum has been designed with flexibility to meet individual force requirements and it will be down to forces to outline how they will assess individual candidates.

Both Police Constable Degree Apprenticeship (PCDA) and PCEP will result in operational competence of officer after two years, however the PCEP programme will lead to more flexible approach to reach full operational competence. The College will look to set clear parameters for what post operational competence programme will consist of.

The details on all existing routes including diversity of candidates, abstraction and cost breakdown was shared with all Chief Officers.

CoP will support forces with implementation and provide a Quality Assurance process. There are no limits to the number of forces who want to go live in April 2024 and support will be provided to all forces.

### Expected Timeframes

- The new draft curriculum and assessment strategy will be shared with Sept and final version in December 2023.
- New marketing Strategy will be available in September 2023.
- Procurement framework will be ready in early January 2024
- Confirmation of forces using the new route and QA requirements January 2024 - March 2024.

**Chiefs were requested to agree the following decisions:**

For all entry routes:

- To support national implementation of the optimised/new curriculum on all routes
- To support the approach to setting minimum requirements for Operational Competence and Full Operational Competence for all new recruits.

For the new entry route:

- To agree the high-level concept model presented for the new entry route, and support its further development.
- To agree the probationary period for the new entry route noting the potential implication on the other entry routes.

CEO of CoP opened the floor to questions:

Chief Constables' raised the following points:

- Unable to make a decision today as there has been a lot of work taking place and need time to digest the data shared.
- Highlighted the hard work and clarity shared.
- Highlighted need further clarity around the difference of OC and FOC - want an officer FOC after two years. CEO of CoP response - 2yr point would be maximum flexibility and after that point officers would enter a period of continuous professional development. Consideration will not be given to the naming of OC/FOC. Want to ensure there are no barriers to individuals in later career/promotion.
- Thanked the CoP for the work that has been done in a short space of time.
- Cognisance needs to be given to student officers who would want to transfer from PCDA to PCEP at the two-year point.
- One force highlighted concerns around cost implications and capacity implications and needed to go away prior to making a decision and taking an informed view. CEO CoP - highlighted the need not to change the 'ask' and reiterated the route to delivery is flexible. This is a level 5 programme and delivery will be done to forces. **Formal learning to end at two years** - one way to do this could be to front load operational learning into first two years of training. Can not remove from flexible third year.
- A number of Chiefs reiterated the need for a two-year probation (and to be fully operationally competent) then flexibility for further options linked to future career pathways.
- One Chief believed this was a CoP decision and CoP should be consulting forces and making the decision.

CEO CoP - Summary - ensure officers are FOC after 2 years, with as much flexibility as possible regards ongoing CPD thereafter with this not linked to pay progression against other entry routes. Asked if reasonable to progress on that basis. There were no further comments from Chiefs.

#### **DECISIONS:**

- Design principles for the College to take away:
  - Full Operational Competency signed off after two years.
  - Maximum flexibility in relation to continuous professional development.

- Light touch QA from College with guidance provided to forces to assess.
- Provide more detail on how implementation will work.
- No barriers to pay progression and promotion prospects.

#### **ACTIONS**

- College to share slides and pack with full detail to all chiefs.
- College to send letter to colleagues summarising all the main points from the discussion.

#### **Police Executive Leadership Programme (PELP)**

CEO of CoP highlighted further assessors are need from all forces, with some forces not providing any assessors to assist with the PEL programme. Understands the difficulty forces face releasing Chief Officers for four-day assessment centres, and with some forces only having temporary individuals carrying out the roles. Profiling has been undertaken to understand number of Chief Officers available and the is enough to support Cohort one and Cohort two.

Want to ensure cohort one/two are delivered and will pause prior to beginning cohort three to reflect and identify learning. This will double the number of candidates in the pipeline compared to previous years on the Strategic Command Course.

Reiterated need for forces to engage and send appropriate Chief Officer assessors.

**Decision:** Chiefs supported engagement and would promote sending appropriate chief officer assessors.

#### **Session 9 – Chair of the Police Federation Update**

This item was withdrawn from the agenda.

#### **Session 10 – HMICFRS State of Policing Annual Assessment – Survey Responses**

The NPCC Chair advised that HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary was unable to attend this Council meeting due to pre booked leave. The Chair confirmed that the results of the Chief Constable survey regarding the State of Policing report had been shared within the CCC pack and regular dialogue had been ongoing with HMICFRS. The Chair updated that the APCC had provided feedback direct to the HMICFRS and the next steps was to get round the table and discuss what the report means in practice and what any alternative proposals may be around the recommendations. The Chair confirmed that he would take the feedback from Chief Constables into the future discussions, and it was recognised that there was a significant amount of work to progress (including some areas that would require legislative/regulatory changes) before any of the recommendations could be put into practice. The Chair confirmed that this agenda item would come back to September's CCC meeting with an invite HMI Cooke to attend the meeting to contribute to part of the discussion.

**Action:** Invite HMICFRS to attend the September CCC meeting for discussion on this item with all chiefs.

The Chair updated on correspondence received from the HMICFRS regarding attendance at NPCC Coordination Committee meetings. Following consultation with Committee Chairs, it had been agreed that this professional engagement was welcomed and helped HMIC understand some of the challenges faced. Further clarity was required around the remit of this and HMI Cooke had agreed to work with the NPCC Chair to provide this clarity.

#### **Session 11 – Aviation, Drones and National Police Air Service (NPAS) Update**

The national lead for aviation discussed the importance of this subject matter, not only in terms of what

we have now but what can happen in the future. A new governance structure was proposed and presented to Chiefs to try to move this forward.

National lead outlined the Transition Programme from West Yorkshire currently hosting National Police Air Service (NPAS) to another entity, which might be another force, a private entity or Blue Light Commercial, but this is not known yet and is funded through the NPAS board. Transformation is what we have now and what we might want in the future. All options for how to 'transform' Police Air Support capabilities to meet the needs of policing remain on the table.

Key message is to work with the government and NPAS to get to a position to offer a proper aviation support to police services. Chiefs are asked to decide what they want in terms of aviation, to understand operational needs and requirement for now and in the future. They are asked to have a conversation with the Police Crime Commissioners (PCC) about funding it.

National lead will work on risk assessments with the forces, establish capabilities required and lead engagement. The lead will then create and collate all evidence-based capabilities to scope best options for capability.

Chiefs asked for clarity around the fleet replacement programme. In response, the aim is to show the transformation programme which will take place over next 3-4 years and show some progress and development, then there may be options available.

Next, the national drones lead provided a presentation on drones and the huge opportunity for policing. Drone usage across forces is at different stages; some have quite advanced capabilities, others are just starting out. It was identified that one of big drivers around drone capabilities is not the equipment, but whether the public accept that the police fly drones and what those capabilities are and how they're used.

The lead outlined a clear vision to enable local forces and partners to deliver safe and efficient effective drone Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) capabilities across all 48 police forces to meet the needs of policing and keep the public safe. A new single programme has been set up to provide coherence across the country, consistency and delivery. There are eight key objectives including developing a framework for scrutiny, oversight and regulation. The programme will introduce robust governance, standardisation, professionalisation and sharing of resource and expertise across a wide and varied centrally co-ordinated network of experts and practitioners. The aim of the programme includes the development of a 'Centre for Excellence' for drone use that gains international recognition.

A strategic board has been set up and a board to understand what policing wants from drones. An operational delivery board feeds into this. The drone programme work needs to inform and align with the transformation programme to avoid unnecessarily buying aircrafts and where they should be located. There are four phases to the programme; alignment phase, development phase, expansion phase and sustainable phase and currently in the first phase.

A commissioned survey was sent across the UK to find out what capabilities exist, what is wanted from drones and how policing could deliver the drones operationally. Chiefs have the option to consider the level of capability investment vs the risk they need to address on the ground. The team wants to achieve a national strategy with local delivery. This would include sharing and leveraging local excellence and knowledge across forces to enhance police drone operations

Chiefs mentioned that it was not easy to withdraw from the current arrangements. Chiefs supported the idea to have opportunity to have a separate meeting about the operational requirements of policing and overlay that. There are financial choices to be made.

Chiefs agreed the success of this will be the governance around the programme which will be key going forward and for the future deployment of the drones. It was noted that it is important to keep NPAS well regulated, in terms of its performance, cost and coverage.

Chiefs agreed to support the lead on drones and the future of aviation.

**Decisions for Aviation:**

- Chiefs agreed to speak with their relevant leads in force to feedback to the programme on risks.
- Chiefs supported the development of the revised 3-year strategy that would be written.
- Chiefs highlighted the contentious exercise of funding but were keen to move forward with forward planning and assessing the risks.

**Any other Business**

**Cellmark**

**Action:** Update would be circulated on ChiefsNet to all forces.

**Home Secretary Briefing – Public Order**

Decision: Chiefs noted the update and would support both mobilisation tests to take place and would engage with local teams.

**Covid-19 Inquiry**

**Action:** NPCC Finance Coordination Committee team to bring costs from inquiry into the NPCC future financial planning review.

**DATE OF NEXT MEETING**

Extraordinary CCC meeting will be held on **13 September 2023**

The next full CCC meeting will be held on **27-28 September 2023**



## Reference

## Decisions &amp; Actions

## Extraordinary Chief Constables' Council – Review of Productivity in Policing

13 September 23

**Next Steps****Decision:** Chiefs endorsed the following next steps:

- Submission to the 29 September – Chiefs' Council meeting with the final recommendations.
- Publication (TBC) – overview of timing and handling possibilities to be submitted to the September Chiefs' Council meeting.
- Implementation of recommendations and further areas of focus will take place up to March 24.
- Building a Model Process – 21 September - Workshop taking place with the 6 involved forces to consider feedback. Forces will then be expanded to 15.

**Decision:** Chiefs noted the update regarding the extension of the team to March 24 being funded by the Home Office.**Review of Productivity  
in Policing**



# Chief Constables' Council

## NPCC Strategic Hub: Strategic Risk Approach

27 September 2023/Agenda Item: Regional Session 1

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<b>Author:</b>	Lee Milton, Strategic Planning and Risk Manager
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<b>Attachments @ para</b>	App 1
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<a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management">https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management</a>	

### 1. PURPOSE

- 1.1. The paper seeks to brief Chief Constables' Council (CCC) on the development of the NPCC's risk management framework (RMF) and the planned 'Strategic Risk Approach' (SRA) - proposed by the Strategy, Planning and Performance (SPP) team; within the NPCC Strategic Hub.
- 1.2. The paper outlines the requirement to implement an approach, as well as the rationale for the proposal, documentation, and the processes to deliver the NPCC SRA.
- 1.3. Input is sought on the RMF development and proposed SRA, including any comments on the approach and planned activity (*Appendix 1 - Risk Management Framework Development Summary*).
- 1.4. To ensure the SRA is responsive and relevant to policing, input is sought, on an ongoing basis, on any specific strategic risk considerations which CCC would seek to include within the SRA. In addition, updates are also sought to subsequent 'context' reporting (should the proposal be agreed) which will be shared with CCC in subsequent paper packs as a standing item for review.
- 1.5. Any queries on the SRA, or risk management in general can be forwarded to the SPP team – **\*\*S31\*\***

### 2. BACKGROUND

- 2.1. NPCC Risk Management Framework (RMF) V3



- 2.2. The initial version of the NPCC RMF was introduced in Nov 2019, creating the first framework for risk management processes and templates used within the NPCC 'Central Office'. Since subsequent introduction to committees and programmes, the RMF has been tested, implemented, and further reviewed. Response from those who have adopted the framework has been positive, with agreement from colleagues using the RMF, NPCC Hub Senior Leadership Team (SLT), Audit and Assurance Board (AAB) and Strategic Planning & Coordination Board (SPCB) to continue the use and development of the RMF. To continue to mature the NPCC's wider risk management approach.
- 2.3. A refresh in Q1 2023/24, resulted in updates and changes to the RMF policy including - expanded roles and responsibilities within the policy, tweaks to definition language, development of an initial risk appetite statement (further details on changes to the RMF are included in *Appendix 1 - Risk Management Framework Development Summary*).
- 2.4. The updated framework builds on the previous iteration of the RMF and draws on best practice from ISO 31000: Risk Management Guidelines, the Home Office Orange Book, engagement with NPCC colleagues and force risk management practitioners - via the newly established National Strategic Risk Forum (NSRF), and DARA (Directorate of Audit Risk and Assurance, NPCC internal auditors) advisory audit consideration.
- 2.5. The RMF refresh also includes the first proposal for the Strategic Risk Approach (SRA), see below.

### 3. STRATEGIC RISK APPROACH (SRA)

- 3.1. In continuing to mature the NPCC's risk management framework there is a need to develop a consistent and effective approach to management of 'strategic risk.' It is accepted best practice that effective risk management should exist at all levels of an organisation to best mitigate or avoid threats to delivery of objectives, as well as maximising the opportunities available to the organisation (consideration 9)<sup>1</sup>.
- 3.2. The NPCC existing RMF currently identifies and responds to strategic risks throughout the organisation as part of general business as usual (BAU) activity, planned programmes and projects, delivery of objectives, and its existing governance and management routes (consideration 9). However, for strategic risk specifically, there has previously not been a consistent or collated approach to reporting across the organisation.
- 3.3. The 'Strategic Risk Approach' proposed forms part of the wider NPCC Risk Management Framework (RMF) Policy, and broadly defines strategic risk, as –
 

“... high level, complex and/or cross cutting risks which may threaten the strategic objectives of the organisation. Risks which the NPCC has an interest, duty/responsibility to assess, monitor and/or mitigate. Risks directly impacting the organisation, its Parties and national policing.”


The Senior risk Owner for Strategic Risk is CCC/NPCC Chair
- 3.4. The SRA seeks to provide insight for NPCC management (i.e. NPCC Chair, NPCC Hub Lead, Chief Officers) and key governance forums (i.e., CCC and SPCB); including contextual strategic analysis, high level risk assessment and summary of ongoing activity (across the NPCC) related to strategic risk considerations, to support confidence of mitigation, delivery of controls and to assess further activity requirements. This will “help to ensure that CCC discussions are focused on key areas of strategic importance”<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Development of an effective strategic risk approach was a key consideration of the DARA advisory audit of the NPCC's RMF, reported in November 2022 (consideration 9, [NPCC Risk Management Framework – DARA Advisory Review], referred to as 'corporate risk' within that document).

<sup>2</sup> Development of an effective strategic risk approach was a key consideration of the DARA advisory audit of the NPCC's RMF, reported in November 2022 (consideration 9, [NPCC Risk Management Framework – DARA Advisory Review], referred to as 'corporate risk' within that document).

3.5. The SRA has been designed around the following key principles -

- The SRA should be integrated and complimentary to the existing RMF.
- The SRA should draw on existing processed **without** creating additional recording/reporting requirements, governance processes or increased workloads (beyond the SPP team).
- The SRA should provide a platform of information that can be accessed across the NPCC network to support wider work, discussion and decision making, avoiding duplication of tactical/operational efforts already in place and maximising existing risk management reporting and mitigation activity (i.e., work already underway across the NPCC).
- The SRA should increase visibility of strategic risk considerations across the NPCC, providing risk owners, senior decision makers and NPCC staff the opportunity to engage with strategic risks at any point, and the ability to influence risk considerations.
- The SRA will provide a high-level assessment comprising of; likelihood, impact, appetite, confidence, context, and treatment.
- The SRA will deliver an iterative process that can be matured over time to best suit the changing needs of the organisation.




3.6. The above illustrates the documents, escalation and governance processes that will integrate with the existing RMF, within the Strategic Hub and the wider NPCC. The SRA is to provide a collation and reporting point for high level considerations.

3.7. A risk (or series of related risks) may be represented across/between the three areas, dependent on the identified risks and its relevant owners, required action/control etc. For example, the rapid development and use of AI (artificial intelligence) may pose a variety of potential risks for the NPCC –

- Strategic Risk: large scale AI adoption may lead to significant changes in criminality, scope/remit of policing, modern technology and ways of working within the NPCC/forces, workforce changes, financial implications, opportunities.
- Hub Risk: changes to business operations requiring policies, training, CPD/knowledge, new roles etc.
- Business Area(s): operational/tactical impact of AI uptake on key deliverables, business requirements etc.

3.8. The SPP team regularly engage with colleagues across the NPCC and collate information about NPCC activity including risk, delivery plans and progress reporting (DPT), strategic and business planning (Business Plan, Annual Report), recommendations and responses (Recommendations Register), and various analysis and consultation requests. The diagram below illustrates the information flow:



3.9. The SRA will sit within the SPP team, drawing on the information already available through the variety of BAU processes, products, and meetings already in place, to populate strategic risk reports which will be shared with management and governance meetings for reference, review, and input, and reported to CCC as a standard paper submission.

3.10. Specific actions/controls will be captured and reported within existing risk documentation for individual business areas, programmes, NPCC Hub etc. with only high-level summaries captured in the SRA context reports.

#### 4. ASSOCIATED RISK/S (Related to the Submission of this Paper)

4.1. There are no inherent risks associated with content of this document - the proposed approach can be delivered within current resource and working practices. However, failure to implement a suitable process around strategic risk management would potentially leave the NPCC vulnerable to unmanaged risk, fall short of best practice, good governance, and management responsibilities for the NPCC, limit organisational development and learning opportunities, and could impact on trust and confidence for the organisation (should risks not be well identified, recorded, and managed).

4.2. The SRA has been designed to draw from best practice models and good practice guidance, whilst remaining cognisant of the NPCC's unique structure, responsibilities, and operating environment; providing an iterative approach that can grow and mature as the organisation developments and continues to mature its own assurance and risk management processes in support of the NPCC's strategic and delivery objectives.

#### 5. NEXT STEPS

5.1. Existing risk considerations will continue to be reviewed and fully populated into the proposed SRA for CCC review and comment in December 2023.

5.2. Current strategic risk considerations include, in no particular order:

- Public Trust and Confidence
- Policing Culture (Improvement and Reform)
- Politicisation of Policing (Local and National Impact)
- Artificial Intelligence (Effect and Impact on Changes to Crime)
- Artificial Intelligence (Effect and Impact on Delivery of Policing, Workforce and Processes)
- Police Budgets and Funding (Sustainable Funding of Policing)
- Pay and Conditions (Pensions)
- Pay and Conditions (Salaries, Degradation and Cost of Living)

- National/Global Pandemic (Readiness and Preparedness)
  - Environmental Sustainability/Net Zero
  - Forensic Marketplace Sustainability and Service Provision
- 5.3. The SPP Team will continue to populate and manage the 'strategic risk considerations' list, dashboard, and reports within existing BAU and ongoing risk management, governance, and team meetings, drawing on input from subject matter experts (SME) colleagues within relevant business areas to inform the strategic risk reports.
- 5.4. Strategic risk reporting will be provided to the NPCC's key governance forums (CCC,SPCB, AAB etc) and relevant management meetings (Command, SLT etc) as standing paper submissions, for discussion by exception, and colleagues are invited to contact SPP through existing meetings or directly (via **\*\*S31\*\***, **\*\*S23\*\***) to discuss new or existing risk concerns for review/inclusion in the report deck.
- 5.5. The SPP team will seek input from CCC relating to the content of the SRA in December 2023, and will schedule an annual review of the SRA, including the approach, its effectiveness and content, to support effective risk management across the organisation and to support maturity development and iterative improvement to the SRA.

## 6. DECISIONS REQUIRED

- 6.1. CCC are invited to review the development of the RMF and the proposed SRA and provide comment on the update and planned activity.
- 6.2. CCC, and NPCC colleagues are invited to contact to the SPP team to provide strategic risk concerns for consideration/inclusion in the SRA reporting planned for submission to CCC in December 2023.

**Lee Milton**  
**Strategic Planning and Risk Manager**  
**Strategy, Planning and Performance Team**  
**NPCC Strategic Hub**

# **NPCC Risk Management Framework (RMF) Development July 2023**

**July 2023  
NPCC Strategic Hub  
(Strategic Planning and Performance Team – SPP)**

**Lee Milton**

Strategic Planning and Risk Manager

# NPCC RMF Policy

## Risk Management Framework 23/24 Refresh (v3)

- The initial version of the NPCC RMF was introduced in Nov 2019, with v2 implemented in April 2021 and tested across various NPCC business areas.
- The RMF v2 was reviewed during 2022, to assess engagement and feedback from colleagues (with positive response and agreement to continue the approach),
- And is now subject to formal review and refresh in 2023/24.
- Best practice has been drawn from ISO 31000: Risk Management Guidelines, the Home Office Orange Book, DARA advisory audit consideration and engagement with the National Strategic Risk Forum (benchmarking input from force risk leads).

### The RMF aims to –

- Promote and support identification and mitigation of risk across the NPCC,
- Ensure consistent risk assessment and management across the NPCC,
- Support reporting and escalation of risk,
- Prioritise mitigation of high risk activity and consolidate effort (one risk, one response).
- Align risk management with NPCC's objectives, strategy and culture.
- Understand the risks facing the NPCC in pursuit of its objectives.
- Ensure that risks are adequately considered when setting the organisation's objectives.

The following changes have been made to the RMF Policy in v3...

# NPCC RMF Policy

## Roles and Responsibilities

Existing 'roles and responsibilities' definitions from v2 remain largely unchanged but are expanded upon to cover the Strategic Risk Approach including with the suggested roles/functions where possible; plus the addition of 'Policy/Framework Owner' and inclusion of NPCC Hub Lead role.

	Policy/Framework Owner	Senior Risk Owner	Risk Register Owner	Risk Owner	Risk Identifier
	Responsible for the design and testing of agreed risk management processes, documentation and framework.	Senior post holder(s) with suitable accountability and authority to agree or reject risks and/or planned activity where risks, controls or updates require decisions/escalation.	Designated owner of each risk register, responsible for reviewing and collating risks, ensuring updates are received and reflected within the register and circulation/escalation of risk information.	Designated SPOC responsible for the progression and updating of mitigation activity for an individual risk. Risk owners should have the accountability and authority to manage the risk, as well as suitable skills, experience and capacity.	All staff colleagues, stakeholders etc. should consider risk as part of day to day activity and should be engaged in risk identification and reporting, and risk development activity.
<b>NPCC Strategic Risk Approach (Register/Landscape)</b>	NPCC Chair/CCC,  NPCC Hub Lead,  Strategic Planning and Risk Manager	NPCC Chair, Chief Constables' Council	Strategic Planning and Risk Manager, Business Planning and Risk Officer		
<b>NPCC Hub Risk Register/Radar etc</b>		NPCC Chair, NPCC Hub Lead	Strategic Planning and Risk Manager, Business Planning and Risk Officer		
<b>NPCC [Function/Business Area] Risk Register/Radar etc</b>		NPCC Function/ Business Area Lead - Committee Chair, Programme Lead etc	NPCC Function/Business Area Support - Committee Coordinator, Support Officer, Portfolio Lead, Programme Manager etc		

# NPCC RMF Policy

## Risk Appetite

The RMF v3 will maintain the ‘risk appetite’ approach during 23/24, with some minor tweaks to wording based on colleague feedback. A more detailed review of the application of appetite to individual risks is planned for early in 24/25. Development of the wider NPCC risk appetite approach will include recommendations on preferred appetite levels for individual risk categories, following planned maturity assessment (Q4 23/24).

The majority of risk appetites applied by NPCC colleagues during 21-23 fall within ‘averse’ to ‘moderate’, with the majority in the ‘cautious’ definition.

It is acknowledged that, especially for a public service organisation that some degree of risk is unavoidable, and an overarching ‘averse’ risk appetite is likely to be counterproductive to NPCC objectives.

Appetite	Approach	Tolerance for uncertainty	Choice	Compromise
	Overall risk taking approach	Willingness to accept uncertain outcomes or some quarter to quarter change	When faced with multiple options, willingness to select option that puts objectives at risk	Willingness to compromise against achievement of other measures
<b>Averse</b>	Significant avoidance of risk. Removal of risk as a priority.	Extremely low	Will always select the lowest risk option	Never
<b>Cautious</b>	Avoidance of risk. Reduction of risk as a priority.	Low	Will accept risk only if essential and there is limited likelihood/impact of failure	With extreme reluctance
<b>Moderate</b>	Preference for safe delivery, consideration of some risk. Will take strongly justified risks	Limited tolerance for uncertainty.	Will accept risk if likelihood/ impact heavily outweighed by benefits.	Willing to compromise only if it's the current best option for delivery.
<b>Open</b>	Will take justified risks	Willing to operate with some uncertainty	Will accept risk if likelihood heavily outweighed by benefits.	Willing to compromise, at risk of failure, to increase chance of delivery.
<b>Brave</b>	Will take justified risks	Fully anticipate and accept uncertainty	Will choose the option with the greatest positive outcome; accept possibility of failure	Willing

Adapted from: Quail R "Defining your taste for risk" Corporate Risk Canada 2012, recommended by MPS 2021-02

## NPCC RMF Policy Risk Treatment

- A definition set for ‘treatment’ has been drafted from best practice (and ISO guidance). Treatment will be used within indicators within the Strategic Risk Approach, in place of risk ‘status’ to provide broader indicators of risk response; however, local risk registers will maintain during 23/24 to support tracking of progress/delivery of controls.

	Guidance	Notes
<b>Avoid (Terminate)</b>	i) suspend or redesign planned activity in order to <u>remove the risk</u> entirely from the operating environment; <b>OR</b> ii) identify alternative activities, resources, plans or decisions that support delivery of existing strategies, priorities, or objectives; <b>OR</b> iii) reconsider existing priorities, strategies, or objectives, to <u>avoid unacceptable risk</u> entirely.	
<b>Reduce (Treat)</b>	i) continue existing control activity in order to <u>reposition or reduce risk</u> ; <b>OR</b> ii) identify alternative activities, resources, plans or decisions that <u>reposition or reduce risk</u> to support delivery of existing strategies, priorities, or objectives; <b>OR</b> iii) reconsider existing priorities, strategies, or objectives, to <u>reposition or reduce</u> risk.	Actions should seek to lessen the probability, negative consequence, or both, associated with a risk (controls). Existing controls should be monitored and reviewed to ensure progress, implementation and effectiveness, new activity should be considered to improve mitigation.
<b>Monitor (Tolerate)</b>	i) continue BAU or planned activity <u>without further mitigation</u> . Risk remains open to <u>monitor and review</u> at next reporting point.	This option may also be relevant in situations where a residual risk remains after other treatment options have been put in place, or where a risk scenario may change quickly or significantly. No further action is taken to treat the existing risk, however, ongoing monitoring is recommended.
<b>Close (Tolerate)</b>	i) continue BAU or planned activity <u>without further mitigation</u> . Risk has been removed or reduced to a tolerable level.	
<b>Increase* (Treat)</b>	i) continue existing control activity in order to <u>reposition or increase risk</u> ; <b>OR</b> ii) identify alternative activities, resources, plans or decisions that <u>reposition or increase risk</u> in support delivery of existing strategies, priorities, or objectives; <b>OR</b> iii) reconsider existing priorities, strategies, or objectives, to <u>reposition or increase</u> risk.	Increased risk may sometimes be necessary, or preferred, in order to better position or reduce higher priority risk(s) or delivery of activity, strategy or objectives. Short term increased risk tolerance may also be beneficial to longer term strategic goals or where well defined opportunities are identified.
<b>Transfer/Share</b>	i) identify <u>alternative business areas</u> to support or deliver planned strategies, priorities or objectives; <b>OR</b> ii) identify <u>external resources</u> to support or deliver planned strategies, priorities or objectives; <b>OR</b> iii) identify <u>external resources to mitigate risks</u> in support or deliver planned strategies, priorities or objectives (e.g. insurance, specialists, contingencies, contractors).	Sharing or transferring of risk to another party or parties may be appropriate in a number of situations, particularly where risks relate to complex activities or objectives, where multiple stakeholders are involved or where specialist knowledge or skills are required.

\* Adapted from De Loach, J. W. (2000). Enterprise-wide Risk Management: Strategies for linking risk and opportunity. London: Financial Times/Prentice Hall.

# NPCC RMF Policy

## Risks vs Issues

The previous RMF focused on managing negative impacts (defined as 'risk') including impact 'issues'. This approach was based on the variable maturity of risk management across the NPCC and to allow the embedding of 'risk management' processes across risks and issues. The revised RMF v3 supports the distinction of 'risks' and 'issues' (in line with best practice, colleague feedback from more mature business areas and DARA advisory considerations), but does not force a separation... The RMF templates have been expanded to include an 'Issues Log' which can be used as separate documents, or as part of a collected approach.

### Risks

- an uncertain event or condition that results in a negative (or positive) effect on activity, delivery or objectives.
  - Future focused
  - May be positive (opportunities)
  - Requires mitigation
- Should be added to the register or radar.

### Issues

- an event or condition that has already happened and has impacted or currently impacting activity, delivery or objectives.
  - Immediate focus
  - Always negative
  - Requires 'work around'
- Should be added to the issues log.



# Chief Constables' Council

## Title: Collaboration between Opal and Pegasus in respect of Organised Retail Crime

27 September 2023 / Agenda Item: Regional – Session 1

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NPCC Policy: Documents <u>cannot</u> be accepted or ratified without a security classification (Protective Marking may assist in assessing whether exemptions to FOIA <u>may</u> apply):	
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<b>Author:</b>	D/C/Supt Jim Taylor
<b>Force/Organisation:</b>	Wiltshire Police
<b>Date Created:</b>	16/08/2023
<b>Coordination Committee:</b>	Crime Coordination Committee
<b>Portfolio:</b>	Acquisitive Crime
<b>Attachments @ para</b>	n/a
<b>Information Governance &amp; Security</b>	
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<a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management">https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management</a>	

### 1. Overview

- 1.1 This paper outlines a proposal for a collaboration between the retail industry and Policing in order to gather, develop and disseminate intelligence to UK law enforcement with the focus upon Organised Retail Crime (ORC).
- 1.2 There is a desire by a large section of the retail industry to provide external funding through the use of donation agreements, in order for Opal (The National Intelligence Unit for Serious and Organised Acquisitive Crime) to develop an ORC capability, through crime intelligence analysis and operational intelligence development.
- 1.3 The proposal is for retailers to donate enough funding to pay for this capability for a minimum of 2 years.
- 1.4 The initial phase of the collaboration would see the completion of a National Strategic Assessment of ORC in order to understand the scale and scope of the issues. Police data as well as industry intelligence will be used. Further development of this intelligence would then identify specific Organised Crime Groups and High Priority Individuals for mapping and disrupting at a force level through tasking processes.



## 2 Background

2.1 Chief Constable Amanda Blakeman holds the NPCC portfolio for Acquisitive Crime and governs the National Intelligence Unit for Serious and Organised Acquisitive Crime, Opal. The Opal team are funded by the NPCC through contributions from forces. In addition to this, funding has been obtained from commercial partners in order to supplement the costs of an enhanced intelligence analysis capability. This has allowed Opal to focus on two areas;

- theft of Construction and Agricultural Equipment
- Heritage and Cultural Property crime.

These areas would not be as closely scrutinised by UK policing without this capability in place.

2.2 The PCC for Sussex Katy Bourne MBE , who holds the APCC portfolio for business crime, chairs a task and finish group focussing on ORC. This group is called Pegasus and is working with high street retailers who have raised concerns about the response and coordination of policing to tackle this type of criminality. This has drawn ministerial attention and the Policing Minister, Chris Philp MP chairs a 6 monthly meeting to hear concerns from retailers.

2.3 PCC Bourne has approached the Mitie group, who have provided consultancy and structure to Pegasus and who will be the liaison between Opal and the industry should this proposal be agreed.

2.3 There is growing concern from the retail industry that ORC is not being prioritised by policing. Large scale theft together with an increase in assaults on shop workers has instigated Pegasus members to raise these issues with PCC Katy Bourne,. Industry data suggests that there has been a drop in the number of assaults on shopworkers since Covid; however, the Association of Convenience Stores 2022 crime survey suggested 41,000+ violence incidents. No data exists for ORC related crime, however, the British Retail Consortium state that in 2021-2022 shop theft cost the industry about £1 billion.

2.4 There is a perception within the industry that the Police do not treat incidents of shoplifting seriously and in many cases, there is a limited response. Pegasus members also cite issues of reporting the crimes, which can take too long and is seen as futile when no Police response is likely. In their view, there is under-reporting of offences and the true scale and scope of retail crime is not fully understood. This is leading to missed opportunities to identify crime series as well as linking Organised Crime Groups to this type of criminality.

2.5 The Pegasus/Opal initiative will be focussed on Serious and Organised Crime and not localised offending. The definition used to assess the offences will be the same as within the SOAC strategy. That is:

### ***Serious Organised Acquisitive Crime***

*Individuals planning, coordinating and committing serious offences that involve property, whether individually, in groups and/or as part of national or international networks, where material gain is derived.*

## 3 Proposal

3.1 As the APCC lead for business crime, PCC Katy Bourne has formed the Pegasus group, who will obtain funds from their members to finance the initiative. The initial concept is to provide enough funding for supervision, analytical capability and intelligence development staff (fig 1) for a minimum of 2 years.



(fig 1. Proposed staffing model for Organised Retail Crime capability)

- 3.2 The Mitie group will act on behalf of Pegasus to engage with Opal leadership and ensure there is a partnership approach. The agreement will be between Mitie on behalf of Pegasus and the OPCC and Chief Constable Amanda Blakeman for North Wales.
- 3.3 Whilst contributing members of the Pegasus group will provide intelligence and information to Opal and have the ability to refer crime series to them, it will be clear that Opal will retain operational independence and focus on the highest threat, harm and risk. Members of Pegasus will not be given special treatment over non contributors.
- 3.4 Financial contributors to the initiative will however be part of the steering group and help shape the broader response to ORC by Opal.
- 3.5 An overview of the 2-year costs are below. To be clear, this is an entirely privately funded initiative. At the conclusion of the 2 years, there is no expectation that further funding would need to be found from within Policing to sustain the staffing model. All staff will be hired under a 2 year fixed term contract agreement and at its conclusion a further decision will be made for any future funding by the retail industry.

## Appendix B: The Costs

Role (s)	Year 1				Year 2 No Capex, +2% Salary Increase and Inflation Costs		
	Salary	IT systems	Subsistence and travel	Training	Salary	Subsistence and travel	Training
Detective Sergeant	71,624	3000	3000	1000	72,459	3150	1050
Analyst	48,908	3000	3000	1000	49,478	3150	1050
Analyst	48,908	3000	3000	1000	49,478	3150	1050
Intelligence Development Officer	65,559	3000	3000	1000	66,324	3150	1050
Intelligence Development Officer	65,559	3000	3000	1000	66,324	3150	1050
Totals	300,577	15,000	15,000	5,000	304,063	15,750	5,250

	Total	Cap Ex	Op Ex
2 Year Funding	645,640	15,000	630,640



Official

3.6 It is anticipated that Opal will have access to industry intelligence and information, which is not currently available or offered to policing and therefore Opal will be in a position to enhance the overall SOC picture.

3.7 A clear governance structure will be established which will include performance and budgetary oversight. This governance will consist of Opal leadership as well as representatives from Pegasus. Operational meetings will be regular with clear accountability and record keeping of what operations have been referred to Opal and the onward development of crime series and OCG's.

#### 4 Approval of the coordination committee

4.1 Approval is sought for the Pegasus and Opal initiative to commence and the donation agreement to be agreed.

#### 5. NPCC Strategic Objectives that your Topic Supports

5.1 **Strategic objective 1.** Provide collective operational coordination and delivery on critical areas of business and emerging threats on behalf of the service.

**Strategic Objective 3.** Develop multi-agency partnerships to mitigate circumstances which lead to crime and criminality, whilst developing a whole systems approach to policing, partnership and criminal justice to safeguard communities.

**Strategic Objective 5.** Enable police forces and partners to shape and access important national information and initiatives that help to protect local communities.

#### 6. Conclusion

6.1 The UK has seen an increase in Acquisitive Crime in the last year and this is expected to increase due to the economic pressures the country will be facing over the next few years. The Opal team continue to make a significant impact on SOAC and have helped forces combat high levels of criminality as well as recover high value stolen property. The Opal team are now firmly established within UK policing and continue to support forces in the development of intelligence packages as well as raising awareness of SOAC within industry.

6.2 This initiative brings together the expertise of a national intelligence unit together with private sector funding and data in order to combat serious and organised crime. It will look to close the gap between ORC and the Police response to it.

6.3 It is believed that the Pegasus and Opal initiative will enrich the national intelligence picture as well as manage offenders involved in Serious and Organised Crime.

**7. Decision Required**

7.1 Chiefs to note the update.

# Chief Constables' Council

## Title: Intelligence Portfolio Briefing Paper

27 September 2023 / Agenda Item: Regional – Session 1

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<b>Author:</b>	CC Lisa Winward
<b>Force/Organisation:</b>	North Yorkshire Police
<b>Date Created:</b>	16/08/2023
<b>Coordination Committee:</b>	Crime Coordination Committee
<b>Portfolio:</b>	Intelligence Portfolio
<b>Attachments @ para</b>	App A
<b>Information Governance &amp; Security</b>	
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### 1. Impact of the Forensic Science Regulator (FSR) Code on the Intelligence Analyst Profession

- 1.1 This short paper outlines the requirements of the FSR Code on the Intelligence Analyst Profession and implications of achieving compliance.
- 1.2 In March 2023, the FSR published their statutory Code of Practice. This contains a provision under Section 83 (FSA – DIG 200 – Cell site analysis for geolocation) describing a Forensic Science Activity (FSA) relating to Radio frequency (RF) survey, mapping and/or cell site analysis for geolocation of a device related to criminal activity.
- 1.3 The details provided within the Code outlines core activities, routinely undertaken by all operational Intelligence Analysts across UK Policing and Law Enforcement.
- 1.4 The Code comes into effect on 2nd October 2023 and requires compliance within 24 months of that date, i.e., by **October 2nd, 2025**.
- 1.5 This compliance covers the requirements of Code, including section 110 (Cell Site Analysis). Compliance is demonstrated by having **accreditation to ISO/IEC 17025**. This rules that staff undertaking this work must demonstrate competency via qualification, skills, knowledge, and experience.
- 1.6 Section 110 describes in detail the work that needs to be undertaken, processes that need to be established, along with details of training requirements and records to demonstrate competency.
- 1.7 There will be a funding impact on all Forces and ROCUs to deliver and maintain accreditation.



1.8 The National Analysts Capabilities Board under the leadership of ACC Scott Young, have established a Strategic group to coordinate activity. No central funding or resources have been identified for the development of the competency framework and delivery of training ahead of implementation. Discussions are ongoing with the College of Policing although delivery timeframes are of concern.

## **2 Intelligence APP and review of the National Intelligence Model**

2.1 Internal consultation on the draft Intelligence APP has now concluded. Public Consultation will begin in November 2023 with publication scheduled by the College in May 2024.

2.2 Whilst the Intelligence APP has been refreshed, it is built upon the National Intelligence Model (NIM), Code of Practice that came into effect in January 2005.

2.3 In anticipation of a future Intelligence HMICFRS thematic inspection in 2025, it has been recommended that a full review of the National Intelligence Model is undertaken. **\*\*S23\*\***

2.4 At the heart of the NIM business model is the Strategic and Tactical Tasking and Coordination processes (local, regional, and national level), which is fundamental to direct and task all Intelligence led operational activity.

## **3 Recommendations**

3.1 The Intelligence Portfolio recommends Chief Constables to note the updates and further information and actions will be provided both within council and through the Intelligence Network.

## Background/rationale for the request?

In March of 2023, the Forensic Science Regulator (FSR) published their statutory Code of Practice. This contains a provision under Section 83 (FSA – DIG 200 – Cell site analysis for geolocation) (Appendix A) describing a Forensic Science Activity (FSA) relating to Radio frequency (RF) survey, mapping and/or cell site analysis for geolocation of a device related to criminal activity.

The details provided within the Code outlines activities routinely undertaken by Crime/Intelligence Analysts within Forces and ROCUs along with activities undertaken by Radio Frequency (RF) Technicians. In some cases, these activities may also be undertaken by other staff from these organisations such as Digital Media Investigators (DMIs).

Whilst draft versions of the Code had been circulated for comment and responded to, each version of this section of the Code was substantially different from previous ones meaning that it was not until the end of March 2023 that the final version of the provision was available.

The Code comes into effect on 2<sup>nd</sup> October 2023 and requires compliance with the Code within 24 months of that date, i.e. **by October 2<sup>nd</sup> 2025**. This compliance covers the requirements of Code, including section 110 (Cell Site Analysis). Compliance is demonstrated by having accreditation to ISO/IEC 17025, with the Code and this FSA or the sub-activities of this FSA that the organisation undertakes, on the schedule of accreditation.

Section 110 describes in more detail the work that needs to be undertaken, processes that need to be established and followed along with details of training requirements and records to demonstrate competency to undertake the work amongst other things.

Notably Section 110.1.1 defines how Cell site analysis relies on:

- a. communications data (i.e. CDR);
- b. processing of those data, sometimes in association with data captured during an RF propagation survey; and
- c. presentation of those data in the form of maps and tables with an **expert report**.

Initial discussions with the FSR's office have indicated that there would be an expectation that the reports and evidence provided will be in accordance with Part 19 of the Criminal Procedures Rules.

## What is the outcome/change that needs to be achieved?

The outcome sought would be the development and implementation of a competency based framework utilising training, use of prior learning and a portfolio of experience and ongoing CPD that would meet the requirements of both the FSR Code of Practice and Part 19 of the Criminal Procedures Rules (along with other parts) of demonstrating the competency of an individual to undertake the activities described in the Code and the Criminal Procedure Rules.

This would need to include specific training around the presentation of evidence in the form of reports or other products as well as achieving appropriate levels of courtroom skills appropriate to the role of an expert.

It would need to be able to provide learning and assessment of learning in relation to the requirements of Section 110 of the Code (Appendix B). Section 110.9 details various competences that are required and would form the basis for a learning framework.

The scale of the exercise and to ensure consistency in delivery would mean that the taught elements of this training would be best delivered through a centralised delivery system. Consideration would also need to be given in relation to existing staff with many years of experience and whether they need to attend taught and assessed learning or whether those with specified previous experiences or learning could be assessed via different route whereas new staff or those with lesser experiences would need to complete a more taught pathway. This might ease the demand for taught training but again would need to be robust to ensure consistency on a national basis.

Portfolio elements to evidence experience and CPD would require a solution that has centralised governance with localised assessment. A mechanism to ensure consistency of localised assessment to ensure overall national consistency would also be essential.

### What does success look like?

Success would be defined by a solution that meets the above objectives.

This would not be a quick process given the number of staff that would need to be brought through initially and would need to ensure the solution has longevity to meet future demand through the natural cycle of staff changes within organisations.

### Who is the target audience?

The target audience for this specific request relates to staff in role typically described as Intelligence or Crime Analysts within Forces and ROCUs who undertake the use of cell-site analysis and may also utilise the results of RF surveys as part of their number duties to support investigative activity.

Recent data collections in terms of the number of Analysts employed within policing in Forces, ROCUs or other specialist units are circ. 1,500 as a minimum. Depending on the approach taken by individual organisations all of this number may require completion of the Competency Framework and Expert Witness training, but some may choose to only submit a proportion of them. Based on experience of the way this work is undertaken it is highly unlikely that this figure would fall below 1,000 to complete the competency framework and expert witness training, but further polls can be undertaken to assess this more accurately.

Attendance at any taught elements of the competency framework would need to be managed to ensure that by the deadline of implementation all Forces and ROCUs have some capability who could deal with any pressing matters that are required for Court. Consideration would also need to be given to the impact on capacity within Forces and ROCUs with abstraction of staff to attend any taught elements where analysts continue to be in high demand but short supply.

It should be noted that some of the learning for the Analysts would be the same as that required by RF Survey Technicians whose work is also captured under Section 83 of the Code so meaning that ideally there would be consistency of approach between the two role-based areas.

## 83. FSA – DIG 200 – Cell site analysis for geolocation

### 83.1 Definition

83.1.1 Radio frequency (RF) survey, mapping and/or cell site analysis for geolocation of a device related to criminal activity.

### 83.2 Required compliance

83.2.1 Compliance with the Code, including section 110 (Cell site analysis) for geolocation, is required within 24 months from when the Code comes into force (see page 3). Compliance is demonstrated by having accreditation to ISO/IEC 17025, with the Code and this FSA or the sub-activities of this FSA that the organisation undertakes, on the schedule of accreditation.

83.2.2 Declaration of compliance or non-compliance is required 24 months from when the Code comes into force.

### 83.3 Sub-activities

83.3.1 The following sub-activities are considered to constitute FSA – DIG 200 – Cell site analysis for geolocation:

- a. Cell site analysis concerning the inference of the possible geolocation of a device of interest in a criminal case. Cell site analysis includes but is not limited to the following:
  - i. RF propagation survey of an area or location guided by case scenario and/or call data/detail records (CDR) as part of determining geolocation of a digital device;
  - ii. processing and normalisation of CDRs or other network provider data for the purposes of cell site analysis and related findings;
  - iii. creating/adopting maps of cell sites and/or cell site coverage for the purpose of reporting to court; and
  - iv. assessment and evaluation of CDRs or other network provider data against survey data.
- b. Evaluation of the significance of propagation survey and/or network information using CDRs.
- c. Any of the above sub-activities (or products of activities, e.g. maps) to determine the geolocation of the suspect device.

## **83.4 Exclusions from this FSA and the Code**

83.4.1 The following do not fall within the definition of 'Cell site analysis for geolocation' and are not covered by Code:

- a. Acquisition of communications data performed in accordance with the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 [117] and related codes of practice.
- b. Acquisition of data utilising the Crime (Overseas Production Order) Act 2019, and the analysis and processing of that data.
- c. Acquisition of data from cloud storage as a result of login/connection data taken from a device under examination, but not via the seized or surrendered device itself.
- d. Acquisition of data from cloud storage using just the seized or surrendered SIM card, but not via the seized or surrendered device itself.

## 110. Cell site analysis for geolocation

### 110.1 Scope

110.1.1 Cell site analysis relies on:

- a. communications data (i.e. CDR);
- b. processing of those data, sometimes in association with data captured during an RF propagation survey; and
- c. presentation of those data in the form of maps and tables with an expert report.

110.1.2 This FSA specific requirement covers the forensic unit's work as applicable to the scope of performing the following (FSA – DIG 200 – Cell site analysis (section 83)):

- a. Identifying data required to progress the analysis.
- b. Normalising CDRs in order to present call data in the form of maps/tables and produce a report required for court or as an expert summary.
- c. Conducting an RF propagation survey to capture all the cell sites that serve, Wi-Fi, if applicable.
- d. Cell site analysis using CDRs and an RF propagation survey information and the presentation of an expert report.

### 110.2 Independence, impartiality and integrity

110.2.1 The forensic unit shall ensure that all of its practitioners adhere to this Code in respect of their independence, impartiality and integrity, and that the

organisational structure of the forensic unit, policies and procedures support this rather than hinder it.

110.2.2 This Code includes various impartiality requirements to be included in policies and procedures, including within the Standards of Conduct (section 12), not only to prevent internal and external influence on the results of their examination/analysis, but also to cover the corrective action (such as formal disclosure) to be taken if there is a possibility of a practitioner's judgement having been, or perceived to have been, compromised.

- 110.2.3 All examinations/analysis shall be conducted in an unbiased manner. For example, consideration of both the prosecution and defence proposition, if available, or attempting to determine the defence proposition.
- 110.2.4 All forensic units are required to demonstrate that they meet these requirements, which shall include the following:
- a. The forensic unit's policies and procedures are compliant with this Code and practitioners adhere to them.
  - b. Consideration of one or more alternative proposition(s). In the absence of a stated or obvious defence position (e.g. home address), a null proposition (e.g. whether there is data in conflict with the prosecution proposition) may be adopted.
  - c. Terminology used in reports shall be clearly defined and imply no bias.
    - i. Phrases in reports such as 'in the vicinity of' may only be used if qualified (i.e. given a specific and consistent indicative value).
    - ii. Phrases such as 'consistent with' should not be used in reports unless all other scenarios the findings would be consistent with are given.
  - d. Cell site analysis may be used to propose investigative avenues (i.e. to help form a proposition). If a proposition has been produced through a different process, cell site evidence should only be used to test whether that proposition is expected given the evidence; it should never be used to test whether the proposition supports the allegations or scenarios being put forward in the case independently of the evidence. Care should be taken not to transpose the conditional aspects of any assertion.
  - e. Use of an independent review of casework including, where appropriate, that this is done independently without prior knowledge of the original outcome.
  - f. Documentation and review of individual specific case assessments and strategies.

### **110.3 Review of requests, tenders and/or contracts**

- 110.3.1 As part of this review the forensic unit shall ensure that the commissioning party is made aware of any limitations, false negative rates or caveats that are already known to apply to the method offered by the forensic unit.
- 110.3.2 For example, analysis of CDRs may demonstrate that the phone was within the area covered/served by a specific cell at the time of the beginning and/or end of the call. The

commissioning party must be made aware that, although locations of interest may be surveyed, pinpointing the phone to a specific location is almost always impossible (there may be rare exceptions with an indoor cell or femtocell, see 110.11.5). Additionally, a location of interest and an alternative location may be so geographically close that the radio survey data obtained at them is the same or substantially similar. In that case the commissioning party shall be informed that there is no reasonable way of inferring at which location the call event was more likely to have occurred.

## **110.4 Setting an examination strategy for cell site analysis**

- 110.4.1 This strategy should focus on ensuring a request is appropriate, material supports the request and there are clear propositions to be addressed, and that an outline plan/strategy exists of how the practitioner plans to evaluate the proposition. It could include an independent review of the proposed survey strategy or justification for not surveying.
- 110.4.2 There shall be a procedure defining the setting of examination strategy. The procedure shall include the following:
- a. Dealing with task-relevant case circumstances (i.e. information that is required for the task and not likely to result in confirmation bias).
  - b. Data available (CDR, cell information, etc.).
  - c. Limitations of the data. For example, where conclusions are solely or largely based on interpretation of General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) billing data, or in situations in which the prosecution and defence scenarios are so similar that cell site techniques will be of little use in attempting to discriminate between them.
  - d. Suspect's personal situation (for example, place of work, home address).
  - e. Known or suspected attribution of phones.
  - f. Survey requirements for:
    - i. location survey (including potential requirements for elevation, e.g. high floors in tower blocks);
    - ii. area survey, to distinguish whether the service between two or more locations can be differentiated; and

- iii. cell mapping, to make measurements in the service area of a given cell where relevant to the case.

- 110.4.3 If the circumstances of the case change or results/information indicate the strategy needs to be amended, the strategy will need updating and independently reviewed/checked.
- 110.4.4 Plotting of locations of interest (scene, mast locations and other specified addresses) may be conducted to provide an overview of the mobile telecommunications aspects of the case. These maps may be used to inform a more detailed surveying strategy or serve as the output in their own right (i.e. a theory-based 'desk exercise'), including identifying the following:
- a. potential survey locations;
  - b. relevant network(s) to the survey; and
  - c. any variations from the scope as detailed in the quote/briefing sheet that may be required following an evaluation of the case scenario and case data.
- 110.4.5 Although the plotting of mast locations and estimated direction of service (e.g. sectors) may be used in the planning process, any estimations or unverified information shall be marked up as such.
- 110.4.6 There are many ways in which analyses may be undertaken; case circumstances vary and so the methods used may also vary. The strategy shall therefore detail the rationale for the approach taken with reference to the survey type (e.g. location, area surveyed, cell mapping) and mode selected (e.g. idle, connected, software defined radio).

## 110.5 Checking and review

### General

- 110.5.1 The forensic unit shall have a procedure for checking (including for critical findings).
- 110.5.2 This section describes the following types of check and their expected application:
- a. Examination strategy check.
  - b. Technical check.
  - c. Critical finding check, including the manner of triggering the check with the correct level of independence, i.e.:
    - i. with full sight of the original practitioner's findings (i.e. open); ii. with no sight of the original practitioner's findings; or iii. with no sight of the

certain aspects of the original practitioner's experience-based findings (section 110.7.4).

- 110.5.3 The procedure shall ensure that check stages are clear and it is clear when the independent check is to be performed blind. The expectation is that decisions to blind any finding are made in the preceding stage(s); the practitioner may have a rule-based escalation route within their procedures to flag and/or separate out checks to be performed blind (see section 110.7.3 for the criteria for triggering blind review). The identification of blind checks is enabled by either:
- a. the expert generating the original report identifying those aspects of opinion that will require blind check;
  - b. the technical checker identifying those aspects that were critical findings but that they could not check via referenceable data or deductive inference.

- 110.5.4 The procedure does not have to specify the checks listed in 110.5.2 to be conducted in that order. Forensic unit's may find that if the expert generating the original report can identify aspects of opinion that will require blind check (i.e. 110.5.3a) and can present these separately for checking as in 110.5.2c.iii then this check may be performed first. Checking the aspects identified here before the technical check may allow for the same practitioner to then perform the other checks. The procedure may include other alternative workflows; the intention is however for the practitioner performing the blind check to not be sighted on the original practitioner's experience-based findings.

## **110.6 Examination strategy check**

- 110.6.1 The procedure for carrying out checks shall establish if work carried out conformed to the following:
- a. Has the question presented been addressed?
  - b. Is the process adopted to answer the question legitimate and have the limitations been declared?
  - c. Is the method used applicable to the purpose? For example, a limited survey may demonstrate service of a cell at a given location at the time of that survey. If the cell does serve an area including the scene, an indication as to whether that cell is a particularly large cell (and therefore a less discriminating finding than otherwise might be the case) may be appropriate in the absence of a testable alternative proposition; this opinion may or may not be informed by survey data.
  - d. If a conclusion has been reached, is the question presented within the expertise of the practitioner? Is the evidence expected given the conclusion drawn (i.e. is the supporting

summary of findings correct and relevant)? For example, it is normally not possible to address legitimately whether it is likely that a person used a phone (rather than whether the data for a phone would be expected, given that a specific person used it).

## 110.7 Technical check

- 110.7.1 A technical check of the evidential product is made with reference to the report, supporting exhibits and data on which the examination/analysis has relied. It is therefore an 'open' check, with awareness of the conclusions reached and with full access to the material relied on. The technical check is to ensure the following:
- a. Factual information (e.g. times, dates, locations, cell IDs) are correctly presented both in the report and supporting items/exhibits.
  - b. Opinions on technical matters, such as whether a given cell serves an area including a specific location are overt, based on verifiable information (e.g. survey data) and are supportable.
  - c. Appropriate methods have been used and followed.
  - d. Data relied upon has been converted/presented/referenced correctly.
  - e. Survey data (if used) is appropriate and presented correctly.
  - f. Caveats concerning the findings are presented.
  - g. There is sufficient data to draw the conclusion offered.
  - h. The method used to draw the conclusion offered is appropriate.
  - i. The work is fully documented in the case notes.
  - j. There are appropriate checks on critical findings, calculations and data transfers.
  - k. Work is produced in compliance with the forensic unit's documented policies and procedures.
  - l. Conclusions are consistent with the broader contents of the report or statement.
- 110.7.2 The forensic unit shall ensure that methods that require calculations (including those embedded in spreadsheets) and/or critical data transfers that do not form part of a validated process include checks carried out by a second practitioner. A policy/procedure shall define the nature of the transfers and the checking procedure that shall consider the accuracy and/or applicability of the following:
- a. CDR:

- i. The CDR are the foundation of cell site analysis. They are supplied in varying formats (according to network) and in a format that usually requires reformatting and/or normalisation, which should be validated (section 110.10.3).
  - ii. Specific call data that have been determined to be unreliable have been correctly excluded (e.g. other party cell site information).
  - iii. Format of data (e.g. call event nomenclature, time, date etc.).
  - iv. Normalisation of data (e.g. conversion of latitude and longitude to British national grid, postcode to a coordinate system).
- b. Mapping:
- i. Presented data (e.g. cell site locations, locations of interest) are correctly positioned and labelled. An indication should be given to how the cell mast locations were derived, e.g. verification through actually visiting the location or as presented by the service provider. Presented data (either digital or paper) shall use a common mapping projection so as to correct any potential distortions, such as in location, area or distance.
  - ii. If a period of call data is illustrated, the map should illustrate all of that data. If presenting only a selection of data, this should be clearly stated.
- c. Survey:
- i. Do the data correspond to the location of interest?
  - ii. If serving cell data (all cells that serve a location or area) are presented, are these data an accurate reflection of the survey data (e.g. correct network and protocol, correct cell ID)?
  - iii. Are there sufficient data to adequately answer the question presented?

110.7.3

Reasoning for clarity of and supporting objective (referenceable) data (e.g.

survey data indicates that the cell serves an area including the location of interest) for opinion on specific technical matters arising must also be checked; this includes when:

- a. cell usage at specific dates and times contradict other events in a similar period, and cannot be easily explained;

- b. a cell was expected to provide service at a location of interest, was on air during the survey, but was not detected there and opinion has been given on whether it would be expected to have served or not;
- c. service of a given cell was detected but not as expected (e.g. the survey results suggest irregularities with the reported azimuths from the CDR as might occur with 'crossed-feeders'); or
- d. cells which are detected serving at more than one of the key locations are highlighted (i.e. that other possible explanations of the data relevant to the propositions are raised, rather than 'cherry picking' data expected given only one of the propositions).

110.7.4 Where all findings reviewed are fully supported by objective (referenceable) data then the critical finding check may proceed as an open check; however, if the finding(s) is based on the experience of the practitioner rather than direct objective (referenceable) data, this shall be considered for a blind check.

110.7.5 The procedure shall detail how casework is identified for checking blind, how individual aspects will be presented for checking, and/or how the full report is to be verified blind. If the forensic unit has correctly implemented phased disclosure with discrete aspects pared off for checking, it may be possible for the same individual to perform both the technical and a blinded critical findings check.

110.7.6 Examples of situations which may trigger a blind check include the following:

- a. Where a cell is used during the incident, the cell has not been measured, and comment is made on its potential service area, including the locations specified in the prosecution and/or defence propositions.
- b. Where a cell is used during the incident, the cell has not been measured, and comment is made on its potential service area, excluding the locations specified in the prosecution and/or defence propositions.

## 110.8 Critical finding check

110.8.1 A critical finding is information (a fact or opinion) which directly and substantively affects the overall conclusions (i.e. whether the data as a whole might be expected given the declared propositions):

- a. For example, if a cell was listed during the period of the offence, opinion on whether the time can be relied upon (e.g. for GPRS events) and whether the cell served an area including the scene and/or alibi locations would be a critical finding (potentially amongst many other, similar findings).

b. Conversely, other parts of the analysis (e.g. a commentary of general cell usage in periods where nothing specific is alleged by either prosecution or defence) would not be a critical finding.

110.8.2 Where a critical finding check is the only substantive quality control procedure for checking that finding, then this check shall be performed without knowledge of the original result (i.e. blind) and this independence shall be identifiable from the records. Findings which have a blind check involves a second expert providing an independent technical opinion in isolation of the original opinion to be checked; this may be those aspects of opinion identified by the expert generating the original report during the technical check or by another rules-based aspect of the procedure.

110.8.3 The critical finding check involves the review of the technical findings (with some elements being blind as required and as outlined above) against the proposition, and an independent conclusion is then drawn which, on completion, is compared to the original conclusion by the first practitioner.

110.8.4 This stage can be combined with the technical check (i.e. section 110.7) if considered appropriate, as long as the independent blind checks are completed first if they are to undertaken by the same practitioner.

110.8.5 This check will also review the complete report in context after the check on the conclusion is completed (with some elements being blind as required and as outlined above). Any disagreement is logged, after which a conclusion acceptable to both practitioners is reached, with reasons declared.

110.8.6 The forensic unit shall have a process in place to resolve differing opinions for the circumstance in which no such agreement can be reached, including how the issue is raised in the expert's report, as part of the critical finding check.

## 110.9 Competence

110.9.1 Each role in the examination/analysis shall be defined in the method, including the requirements for knowledge, training, experience and any specific qualifications for the tasks assigned to each role.

110.9.2 For practitioners involved in handling CDRs and producing maps or tables from them, the training records shall define which aspects they are trained in. The competences to be addressed shall include the following:

- a. knowledge of relevant communications data;
- b. normalising data;
- c. quality assurance stages; and
- d. accepted practices for differentiating between estimated coverage plotted for planning purposes and factual plotted data.

- 110.9.3 Practitioners conducting an RF propagation survey shall be assessed to demonstrate the following:
- a. Ability to contribute to the development of a survey strategy or implement given or standardised strategies.
  - b. Competence of the individual to:
    - i. select the survey method:
      - ii. idle mode;
      - iii. connected mode (e.g. dedicated);
      - iv. software defined radio (if validated for use in the forensic unit);
      - v. location survey;
    - vi. select the route and/method of survey:
      - vii. area survey; and
      - viii. cell mapping;
      - ix. apply the survey method; and
      - x. correctly interpret the output of the survey.
  - c. Use of survey equipment in idle and connected modes.
  - d. Understand the limitations of survey types and use of data. This shall be specific to the survey equipment in use as well as the generic types derived from the information collated or produced in the validation study.
  - e. Where part of the practitioner's role, have knowledge of Wi-Fi or other RF communications standards.
  - f. Understand the responsibilities of practitioners conducting the sub activities in the related FSA (i.e. practitioners conducting the RF survey, expert witnesses).
  - g. Preparation of reports.
- 110.9.4 The forensic unit shall demonstrate ongoing competence of all practitioners.
- This may involve the following:
- a. reviewing technical records;

- b. completing a competence test involving a known outcome exercise or a repeatability study; or
  - c. a witnessing procedure to ensure that those conducting RF propagation surveys retain competence (ILAC-G19 3.8).
- 110.9.5 Training programmes shall include legal awareness training to include how the forensic unit's procedures comply with the following:
  - a. Criminal Procedure Rules, specifically Parts 1, 3, 16 and 19 [35]; and
  - b. Criminal Practice Directions V Part 19 [34].
- 110.9.6 Training programmes shall also include legal awareness training to include an overview of the following legislation:
  - a. Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (if relevant to role); and
  - b. Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 [24].
- 110.9.7 Evaluative evidence in cell site analysis includes assessments, for example whether:
  - a. the data might be expected given that the user of the phone was at the scene during the offence (as alleged by the prosecution) or at their home address (as claimed by the defence); and/or
  - b. the call data might be expected if the suspect was the user of the device, or whether there is any data in conflict with that proposition.
- 110.9.8 As well as the skill and competence required for technical activities (e.g. surveys, mapping, CDR normalisation), training programmes for practitioners involved in this activity shall include the following:
  - a. Development of an examination strategy.
  - b. Assessment and interpretation skills including:
    - i. formulating and testing propositions;
    - ii. awareness of the risk of transposing conditionals (prosecutor's fallacy); and
    - iii. use of appropriate terminology (section 110.2.4c).
  - c. Suitable theory training on what inference might be drawn from consideration of:
    - i. survey data (limitations from validation studies);

- ii. network-appropriate knowledge of RF technology (i.e. network design and operation); and/or
  - iii. different types of CDR artefacts (e.g. GPRS or end cells).
- d. Awareness of cognitive bias [23].
- e. Preparation of expert reports and statements.

110.9.9 Where practitioners are expected to give evidence in court, training programmes shall also include training in the roles and responsibilities of the expert, as most findings in the FSA may involve providing opinion or being asked opinion on matters related to the findings. In addition to an understanding of the Criminal Practice Directions V Part 19 [35], training material may include reference to the information document FSR-I-400 on legal obligations [20].

110.9.10 The location of the device is not in the CDRs, but the area in which it was operating may be inferred from the detail within the records. Inference is synonymous with opinion, and therefore should be given by a practitioner who is competent to provide evidence of opinion (i.e. an expert). If the purpose of the analysis is to assess where the phone was, this will require the practitioner reporting the finding to be giving an expert opinion.

110.9.11 Expressing opinions is the role of the expert witness; this includes providing evaluative evidence. Practitioners interpreting results shall have been assessed and deemed competent in interpretation and opinions.

## 110.10 Validation

### Selection of methods

110.10.1 All methods of examination/analysis shall be fit for purpose; in demonstrating this, the forensic unit will need to have supporting validation/verification material compliant with the requirements of this Code (section 30) [41].

110.10.2 The overall method selected shall be validated; tools are tested within the validation. Cell site analysis can comprise sub-methods, selected as required; each of these (e.g. survey) can be validated as separate entities. The most appropriate method should be selected based on the strengths and limitations of those available to answer the needs of the commissioning party and the CJS.

### Validation of methods

110.10.3 The whole process (i.e. from request/receipt of call data through to provision of final opinion) shall be validated for the method to be acceptable. Any noncompliance shall be declared.

110.10.4 Validation is about providing objective evidence that the method is fit for purpose; this is described in the end-user technical requirements and acceptance criteria. Objective evidence to demonstrate aspects of the end-user requirements may be drawn in part from the following:

- a. A literature review.

- b. The practitioner community.
- c. Academic studies.
- d. Collaborative trials.
- e. Data collated by the forensic unit or training establishments (which require verifying by the forensic unit) using defined scenarios.

110.10.5 Where relevant, the validation procedure shall include, but is not limited to, the following:

- a. determining the end-user requirements and specification;
- b. risk assessment of the method;
- c. a review of the end-user requirements and specification;
- d. the acceptance criteria;
- e. the validation plan;
- f. the outcomes of the validation exercise;
- g. assessment of acceptance criteria compliance;
- h. validation report;
- i. statement of validation completion; and
- j. implementation plan.

110.10.6 This Code describes in detail the requirements of all the above in section 30. However, some introductory words on the end-user requirement and further information on risk assessment requirements is given in the following subsections.

### **Determining the end-user requirements and specification**

110.10.7 The end-user requirements include interim-user requirements but should be framed by the end-user being the wider CJS.

110.10.8 This is about the method not the requirements of the specific equipment used. It is not a reiteration of the user manual of survey equipment or phone emulator. The requirements and specification are used to gauge the scale of validation study based upon the acceptance criteria defined.

### **Risk assessment of a method**

110.10.9 A risk assessment is required and is used to determine the hazards of a method. The validation shall test the mitigation strategy to control the identified risks. The test employed may vary according to the method.

110.10.10 Within the CJS, some risks may be defined as:

- a. false positives (e.g. stating that a phone was, or may have been, in an area where it could not); or
- b. false negatives (e.g. stating that a phone could not have been in an area where it could).

110.10.11 The risk assessment is used to develop the validation plan; risks identified should be tested against the overall method. The method is more than the test of survey equipment; e.g. the method may require additional activity to give assurance that the risk of identified types of false negatives are managed in a way that the testing of instrumentation alone would not give (e.g. in section 110.11.6).

110.10.12 The risk analysis shall assess all of the technical stages that may contribute to these risks being realised. Examples include the following:

- a. CDR normalisation:
  - i. transcription errors;
  - ii. inclusion of incorrect information (e.g. 'other party' cell site) without recognising it as such; iii. exclusion of legitimate information (e.g. transcription errors); and
  - iv. use of GPRS without recognising limitations.
- b. Mapping:
  - i. misrepresentation of a cell site in the wrong location, e.g. labelled with an incorrect time of usage and/or cell identification; and
  - ii. inappropriate sector representation.
- c. Survey:
  - i. failing to detect a legitimately serving cell relevant to the case  
(methods that rely solely on a static survey are prone to this); and
  - ii. failing to recognise that there may have been a network change (e.g. not checking that a cell of interest is off air at the time of the survey). d.

Interpretation:

- i. cognitive bias;
- ii. incorrectly identifying reasonable propositions; iii. not assessing and expressing uncertainty in findings in a meaningful way; and/or
- iv. inadequate quality management of any of the risks above.

## Statement of validation completion

110.10.13 This Code requires that a statement of validation completion is prepared. The forensic unit may conduct an RF propagation survey as a separate service (such as for virtual 'scene preservation' in response to an incident to capture serving cell activity) to cell site analysis. In this instance, although aspects of the validation study may be shared, separate statements of validation completion may be appropriate.

## 110.11 Uncertainty of measurement

110.11.1 There is inherent uncertainty of measurement within cell site analysis no matter which methods have been applied. This Code and ISO/IEC 17025 require the forensic unit to identify the contributions to measurement uncertainty, noting that ISO/IEC 17025 accepts that where "the test method precludes rigorous evaluation of measurement uncertainty, an estimation shall be made based on an understanding of the theoretical principles or practical experience of the performance of the method".

110.11.2 Networks can change over time and there may be differences in network operation between the time that the event of interest took place and the time the investigation begins or the FSA is performed. Some aspects may be physical changes (e.g. changes to the built environment, cells being added, removed or reoriented, decommissioning of assets in the 3G network, stacked cells) or organisational (e.g. routing or location area boundaries that may affect cell boundaries). There may also be temporary equipment faults.

110.11.3 Full cell site surveys assist in estimating the area where a mobile device was.

However, further uncertainty within surveys can result from the following:

- a. Any changes to the network in the area considered during the time that has elapsed since the event of interest and that of the survey.
- b. Survey equipment may not directly reflect the operation of the questioned device.
- c. Interpretation of the data (false positives/negatives).
- d. The height at which the survey was undertaken compared with the actual location and the height that the original connection was made to the cell site in question.

110.11.4 Given these uncertainties, cell site analysis will not be able to pinpoint the location of the subject device. The terminology used in reports shall reflect this when referring to specific locations that were assessed. For example, phrases such as "the cell used by the subject phone was detected providing service over a cell service area that includes [the location of interest]" may be appropriate.

110.11.5 For example, a practitioner with the appropriate competence may be able to comment on the general anticipated coverage area of cells of interest and thereby provide some context to their findings. For example, assessing the expected coverage area of a cell from the network information, if it is any of the following:

- a. An indoor cell (in which case usage implies that the user was within the building – a very precise assessment; however, additional work may be necessary to prove that a ‘femtocell’ was actually located at the stated address at the time as such devices can be moved and connected to the network from other locations);
- b. A 3m street works dwarfed by the surrounding buildings (in which case the service area may only be that and possibly a few adjoining streets; again, a relatively precise assessment); or
- c. A large rural macro cell based on the top of a 60m tower (which may provide a service over a large area, perhaps 10 or 20km from the mast and thus provides much lower precision and is potentially of lesser evidential impact).

110.11.6 There shall be a policy or procedure that includes additional activities that are undertaken if it has been concluded that a cell does not serve at a specific location when it is expected to and that is relevant to the case. This shall include one or more of the following:

- a. Assessing antenna point direction (azimuth).
- b. Examining the path profile between mast and location to check for obvious terrain obstructions, etc.
- c. Reviewing survey data to identify if the cell seen in other locations contributes to verifying that it is on air without visiting the cell.
- d. Reviewing neighbour data to see if the frequency that the cell is on is visible or used by a different cell.
- e. Checking the mast location by visiting or even via Google Maps Street View to see if the cell is:
  - i. physically present; and
  - ii. links appear intact and/or if visiting is on air.

**Session 3**

<b>Session</b>	<b>Topics</b>
<b>Session 3</b> <b>11:00 –</b> <b>11:45</b>	<b>Head of HMICFRS Update</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Force Management Statements</b></li><li>• <b>Activism and Impartiality in Policing Inspection</b> – (Letter/background reading in the pack)</li></ul> <p>Discussion item only</p>

Back to Agenda



Promoting improvements  
in policing and fire & rescue  
services to make everyone safer

23 Stephenson Street  
Birmingham B2 4BH  
Email: **\*\*S31\*\***

**Andy Cooke QPM DL**

His Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary  
His Majesty's Chief Inspector of Fire &  
Rescue Services

**Sent by email:**

Chief Constables, England & Wales

11 September 2023

Dear Chief Constable,

## **Inspection of Activism and Impartiality in Policing**

As you will know, from the Home Secretary's letter to you dated 1 September 2023 and associated media coverage, she has commissioned us to conduct an inspection under Section 54(2B) of the Police Act 1996.

The Home Secretary has asked us to brief her on our initial findings by December 2023, and to publish our full report by March 2024.

Given the timescales involved, I would appreciate your prompt action. This letter accompanies our request for you to send us relevant documents and data. Please could you provide these by, at the latest, **1700hrs on 14 September 2023**.

I recognise that it may take a little time to collate certain documents, and to identify and extract some of the material we seek. This should not delay the release of more readily available material, with which we may begin the inspection while other material is being collated. Further document and data requests may follow.

We are still selecting forces we will visit for inspection fieldwork. The visits will be between 2 October and 4 December 2023. If your force is among those selected for fieldwork, I will write to you in the coming days.

Thank you in advance for your cooperation.

Yours sincerely,

**Andy Cooke QPM DL**

His Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary  
His Majesty's Chief Inspector of Fire & Rescue Services

## **Activism and Impartiality in Policing**

### **Document and data request**

Please upload the below documents to Huddle by, at the latest, **1700hrs on 14 September 2023**.

Please provide current versions of policies or guidance. Where a request relates to data, **please restrict to 2 years from the date of this letter**.

When uploading to Huddle, please use the **Activism and Impartiality in Policing folder** within your force workspace. Please also use relevant bullet point number and letter below in your document title to identify to which section the document relates.

#### 1. Policies and processes related to the Equality Act 2010

- a) Force policy, and any supporting guidance, that details how the force complies with the requirements of the Equality Act 2010
- b) Any policies and procedures where the force has gone further than the obligations set out in the Equality Act 2010
- c) Details of any incidents or cases where the force is alleged to have exceeded or contravened the obligations set out in the Equality Act 2010

#### 2. Training

- a) Details of training given in respect of Equality Act obligations
- b) Details of training provider(s), completion rates, course content, course duration, frequency of re-attendance/refresher training in respect of the Equality Act. Include any evaluation of such training, and feedback surveys
- c) Details of costs incurred in respect of training delivered by external providers, other than the College of Policing, that relates to the Equality Act 2010

### 3. Non-crime hate incidents

- a) Details of any complaints made internally or externally, regarding the force's compliance with obligations under the Equality Act 2010, including the outcome of such complaints
- b) Details of complaints specifically related to the recording of, and response to, non-crime hate incidents
- c) Details of how non-crime hate incidents are recorded and any policies or guidance regarding associated operational response
- d) Details of how many non-crime hate incidents have been recorded by the force in the last 3 years (monthly breakdown)

### 4. Advisory groups

- a) Detail the external groups the force engages with for advice, such as independent advisory groups or similar
- b) Any policy that details selection and recruitment for such groups. Include details of selection of chair and tenure
- c) Terms of reference of any advisory groups
- d) Agendas and minutes of advisory group meetings for previous two years
- e) Details of training and guidance provided to advisory group members
- f) Provide details of the demographic make up of advisory group membership (not personal details) including any protected characteristic(s), community group(s) or vulnerable communities represented. Please identify any perceived gaps in terms of diversity or representation
- g) Any documents that detail how the views of unrepresented groups and protected characteristic diversity strands are considered

### 5. Communication with the public

- a) Force policies and guidance relating to communication with the public, including governance arrangements that provide oversight of external communications
- b) Force policies and guidance on use of social media (include on and off-duty use)
- c) Details of authorised force social media accounts – include individual, team and staff network accounts – and any associated data analysis of the use of these accounts
- d) Details and data of incidents where the force has formally or informally dealt with inappropriate use of social media by officers and staff

- e) Details of any visible representation or other initiatives used by the force to indicate support for particular community groups e.g. rainbow livery on police vehicles, flags, websites and customised uniform, including epaulettes
- f) Details of how visible representation or other initiatives are funded

## 6. Workforce policies/procedures

- a) Force strategy and any associated action plan in respect of diversity, equality and inclusion
- b) Policies, procedures, guidance and action plans in respect of positive action in recruitment, career progression and promotion
- c) Details of any assessments or review of positive action undertaken within two years from the date of this letter
- d) Details of any cases or incidents within two years from the date of this letter where the force is alleged to have contravened the Equality Act 2010 e.g. cases of positive discrimination
- e) Details of force staff networks, to include terms of reference, number of staff employed in staff network roles (full time, part time and/or ad hoc positions) and time spent dedicated to such roles;
- f) Details of force contribution and central budgets available to staff networks
- g) Details of force governance of staff networks and expenditure
- h) Details of any guidance issued to staff/officers in respect of visible signs of support e.g. poppies, wristbands, patches etc.
- i) Details of any visible representations provided from force budgets to staff/officers

**Session 4**

<b>Session 4</b> <b>11:45 –</b> <b>13:00</b>	<b>HMICFRS State of Policing Annual Assessment – Survey Responses (Closed Session)</b> <b>Early Warning System HMICFRS Update</b>
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# State of Policing Recommendations: Support from Chief Officers

**\*\*S21\*\***

Session 5

Session	Topics
<b>Session 5</b> <b>14:00 –</b> <b>17:00</b>	<b>Crime Coordination Committee</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Investigations</li><li>• Acquisitive Crime</li><li>• Intelligence</li></ul> <b>- Impact of the Forensic Science Regulator – Code on the Intelligence Analyst Profession</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Intelligence APP<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Serious and Organised Crime</li></ul></li><li>- IPCO<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>**S23**</b></li><li>• Forensics</li></ul></li><li>- Digital Forensics</li><li>- External Forensics Market</li><li>- Forensic Science Regulation</li></ul>



**Forensic Science  
Regulator**

**NPCC Chiefs Council 27<sup>th</sup> September 2023**

**Forensic Science Regulation Update Gary**

**Pugh**

**Forensic Science Regulator**



**Forensic Science  
Regulator**

# Forensic Science Regulation Update

- Statutory Code of Practice for forensic science approved by parliament and published on 1<sup>st</sup> March 2023.
- Statutory Code comes into force 2<sup>nd</sup> October and investigation and enforcement provisions of the FSR Act 2021 will be commenced.
- Statutory Code compliance survey issued on the 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2023 with a completion date of 25<sup>th</sup> July 2023, this will be the basis for accessing compliance and risk in relation to the use of the Regulator's investigation and enforcement powers.



**Forensic Science  
Regulator**

# Forensic Science Regulation Key Priorities for Senior Accountable Individuals (SAI's)

- understand where your organisation is in terms of compliance and have you got a robust plan to achieve compliance across all forensic science activities undertaken
- ensure your staff particularly those in frontline roles who will be making declarations to the Code understand how they would explain the mitigation to non-compliance with the Code
- reach out to the cjs partners particularly the CPS to ensure there is a common understanding of the impact, benefits and potential risks in the statutory regulation of forensic science



**Forensic Science  
Regulator**

# **FSR Compliance Survey – Assessment of Risk**

- An indicative percentage compliance level has been identified for each of the 34 **Forensic Science Activity's (FSA's)** that will be subject to the Code on 2<sup>nd</sup> Octobertaking in account the volume of cases undertaken by each organisation.
- Data has been extracted for each FSA on whether organisations have validated methods and demonstration of competence by practitioners, these are key elements of the mitigations required where individuals declare non-compliance with the Code.
- Data has been extracted for each FSA on the number of organisations that have indicated that they have not undertaken any preparation to achieve accreditation.



# **FSR Compliance Survey – Forensic Science Activity(FSA) View**

- Overall indicative compliance for the 34 FSA's that will be subject to the statutory Code taking into account volume of cases per FSAs undertaken.

<b>Compliance Level</b>	<b>No of FSA's</b>
90% plus	12
75%-89%	10
50%-74%	5
25%-49%	3
0%-24%	4



# Forensic Science Regulator

Total	34
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## FSR Compliance Survey – FSA with 0 - 24% indicative compliance

FSA	No of org carrying out FSA	Indicative compliance with Code	General volume of cases undertaken
Recovery and processing of footage from closed-circuit television (CCTV)/video surveillance systems (VSS)	44	22%	Very high

- NPCC Framework for Video Based Evidence **and** accreditation are routes to declare compliance with the Code, indicative compliance does NOT include the use of the NPCC Framework for Video Based Evidence, indicative compliance levels with the NPCC framework declared by police forces ranging from 0% to 90% and “unknown”.
- The bulk of this recovery activity should be performed under the NPCC Framework for Video Based Evidence.



# Forensic Science Regulator

- (similar issues in “simple” audio acquisition and conversion for subsequent processing e.g. voicemail messages, non compliance is higher than expected, many police forces have not recognised that ‘self’ created material such as 999 calls, body worn video and video interviews are excluded from theCode, and the NPCC Framework for Video Based Evidence covers audio associated with video)



# FSR Compliance Survey – FSA with 0 - 24% indicative compliance

FSA	No of org carrying out FSA	Indicative compliance with Code	General volume of cases undertaken
Data capture, processing and analysis from digital storage devices	59	19%	Very high

- Non-compliant organisations include public sector and commercial organisations.
- 20% of contracting organisations indicated they were “unsure” as to whether their digital forensics contractors complied with the Codes.
- Digital Forensic Units indicated their intention to comply with the requirements of the Code including accreditation but identified many units or roles based outside of the Digital Forensic Units such as Digital Media Investigators who are either unaware or did not intend to comply with the Code.



## FSR Compliance Survey – FSA with 0 - 24% indicative compliance

FSA	No of org carrying out FSA	Indicative compliance with Code	General volume of cases undertaken
Specialist video multimedia, recovery, processing and analysis	41	2%	high

- This FSA involves highly complex technical processing and scientific analysis which can have a significant bearing on an investigation or criminal proceedings. e.g. was an object a firearm, what speed was a vehicle travelling, what is the height of an individual and can a person's face be compared and an opinion given as to whether it is a known person.
- Very limited method validation and demonstration of practitioner competence.
- Most organisations have no preparation for accreditation and meeting the quality standards in the Code.



**Forensic Science  
Regulator**

# Forwa rd View

- validation of responses to the Compliance Survey to understand compliance levels and risk.
- engagement with SAI's to obtain committed plans for achieving compliance with the statutory Code.
- monitoring the introduction of the statutory Code, declarations of non-compliance and admissibility challenges.
- improving the effectiveness of statutory regulation including the accreditation process.

**NPCC Chiefs Council 27<sup>th</sup> September 2023**

**Forensic Science**

**Regulation**

**Update Gary Pugh**


**Forensic Science Regulator**

**Session 6**

<b>Session</b>	<b>Topics</b>
<b>Session 6</b> <b>08:30 –</b> <b>09:00</b>	<b>Chair of the Police Federation Update</b>  (Discussion only – no papers/slides)

## Session 7

Session	Topics
Session 7 09:00 – 10:00	<b>College of Policing</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Chief Officer Appointments Guidance (regional paper)</li><li>• Code of Ethics</li><li>• Vetting APP</li></ul>



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**Policing**

Working together  
to achieve your potential

# College of Policing Update

## Chief officer appointments guidance

**Jo Noakes**

**Director of Leadership & Workforce Development**

Guidance	Updates and additions
<b>Overall</b>	terminology updated throughout to reflect where an activity is a requirement of regulation of legislation, and where it is guidance (i.e. 'should' and 'musts')
<b>Introduction</b>	reference to City of London Police chief officer ranks included reference to NPCC retire and re-join guidance note included
<b>Roles and responsibilities</b>	reference to City of London chief officer appointment governance roles and responsibilities
<b>Pre-appointment planning</b>	clarified PCC/CC ability to devolve responsibility for appointment process to a suitably qualified person whilst maintaining oversight of the process
<b>Eligibility</b>	clarified timeline expectation for joining executive leaders programme if temporarily appointed to a permanent chief officer role when not on programme is 12 months or next available opportunity  content updated to reference individuals temporarily appointed to a permanent chief officer role who fail to achieve the required standard on the executive leaders programme will withdraw from the programme and revert to their previous substantive rank as soon as practicable  reference to single employer model removed
<b>Conduct</b>	clarified when an applicant's disciplinary record should be considered and terminology updated to reflect applicant's consent to review of their disciplinary record
<b>Executive leaders programme end-programme reports</b>	content updated to reference content of executive leaders programme end-programme and interim-programme reports
<b>Appointment panel</b>	reference to requirement to submit independent member report to PCC for ACC and DCC appointments removed  clarified His Majesty's Inspectors (HMIs) and CC members of NPCC may act as senior policing advisor for CC appointments  content updated to reference recently retired CCs may also act as senior policing advisors and clarify recently retired means within the previous two years unless relevant experience since retirement  clarified that level of requirement for briefing/training appointment panel members will depend on the experience of the individuals involved and will be determined by the PCC/CC

# Chief Constables' Council

## Chief Officer Appointments Guidance September 2023

27 September 23 / Agenda Item: Session 7

<b>Security Classification</b>	
NPCC Policy: Documents <u>cannot</u> be accepted or ratified without a security classification (Protective Marking may assist in assessing whether exemptions to FOIA <u>may</u> apply):	
<b>OFFICIAL</b>	
<b>Freedom of information (FOI)</b>	
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<b>Author:</b>	Helen Slimmon
<b>Force/Organisation:</b>	College of Policing
<b>Date Created:</b>	11 <sup>th</sup> September 2023
<b>Coordination Committee:</b>	Workforce
<b>Portfolio:</b>	Leadership
<b>Attachments @ para</b>	Guidance for appointing chief officers September 2023
<b>Information Governance &amp; Security</b>	
In compliance with the Government's Security Policy Framework's (SPF) mandatory requirements, please ensure any onsite printing is supervised, and storage and security of papers are in compliance with the SPF. Dissemination or further distribution of this paper is strictly on a need to know basis and in compliance with other security controls and legislative obligations. If you require any advice, please contact NPCC FOIA <a href="mailto:npcc.foi.request@npfdu.police.uk">npcc.foi.request@npfdu.police.uk</a>	
<a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management">https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management</a>	

### 1. INTRODUCTION

- 1.1. The guidance for appointing chief officers defines the processes that should be followed when making chief officer appointments. This paper accompanies the updated guidance for appointing chief officers which addresses the regional feedback received.

### 2. BACKGROUND

- 2.1. Recommendation 6 of the independent review of chief officer progression and development (published September 2022) proposed that chief officer appointments should be nationally defined and standardised, and locally delivered.
- 2.2. The College has worked in collaboration with the Chief Officer Review Delivery Group to develop the guidance.
- 2.3. Agreement in principle at Chief Constables' Council in September 2023 will ensure that the required regulatory changes can be progressed in time for the completion of the first cohort of the executive leaders programme in June 2024.



### 3. SUMMARY OF PROPOSAL

- 3.1. The chief officer appointments guidance was submitted (16 August 2023) as part of regional-feedback papers for Chief Constables' Council September 2023.
- 3.2. Regional feedback indicates agreement with the chief officer appointments guidance. 65% of respondents supported the proposal and 35% of respondents provided qualified support.
- 3.3. As a result of regional feedback, the following amendments have been made to the chief officer appointments guidance:
  - Overall, terminology updated to reflect where an activity is a requirement of regulation of legislation, and where it is guidance.
  - Roles and responsibilities updated to make clear police and crime commissioners are responsible for appointing chief constables and chief constables are responsible for appointing all other chief officer. City of London Police rank structure and relevant appointment governance authority incorporated.
  - Pre-appointment planning recognises the operational decision of police and crime commissioners and chief constables to devolve responsibility for delivering their chief officer appointments whilst they maintain overall oversight.
  - Clarifications in relation to who is eligible to apply for chief officer appointments, including those supported to start the executive leaders programme, non-Home office forces and overseas candidates and police and crime commissioners who are operating a single employer model. Also incorporates reference in relation to what happens if an individual appointed to a chief officer role on a temporary basis does not successfully complete the executive leaders programme.
  - Confirmation at what point in the appointment process an applicant's disciplinary record should be considered and update of terminology to reflect applicants' consent to this review. Also, confirmation that chief constables should inform the police and crime commissioner if they appoint a chief officer with a disciplinary record that is live or concluded as part of their risk-based assessment.
  - Executive leaders programme reports will help to provide objective consistent information to inform readiness and areas for development of an applicant for a chief officer role. However, development portfolios should not be requested as part of the appointment process as this could frustrate their intended purpose to function as an honest reflection of an individual's development on the programme and potentially introduce bias into the appointment process. Senior Police National Assessment Centre (Senior PNAC) and Strategic Command Course reports may function as an alternative for executive leaders programme reports in chief officer appointments.
  - Robust assessment for chief officer appointments should be underpinned by the principles of merit, fairness, and openness but clarification that police and crime commissioners and chief constables have the flexibility to determine what that process looks like and the methods used in their chief officer appointments.
  - Clarifications in relation to the membership of chief officer appointment panels and recognition that the level of requirement for briefing/training will depend on the experience of the individuals involved and will be determined by the police and crime commissioner or chief constable. Also, confirmation that independent members for assistant chief constable and deputy chief constable appointments will not be required to submit a written report about the process to the police and crime commissioner.

### 4. DECISIONS REQUIRED

- 4.1. Agree in principle the attached guidance for appointing chief officers.

**Name:** Helen Slimmon  
**Title:** Senior Psychologist  
**Committee:** Workforce Co-ordination Committee  
**Lead Area:** Leadership: Commander Nick John



**To Chief Constables**

By email and Chiefsnet  
06 September 2023

Dear Colleagues,

**Update on the new Code of Ethics**

As you will be aware the College of Policing has rewritten the Code of Ethics and after a public consultation in the Spring we are preparing to launch the new Code later this year.

We have set up a working group on the implementation of the Code, with DCC Sam De Reya and her NPCC ethics committee, as well as representatives from across policing. Alongside this I wanted to provide you with specific information on some of the changes you can expect and reassure you that the College of Policing will provide support for implementation.

**Evidence shows** that the perception of fairness and respect within a whole organisation has a significant positive impact on attitudes and behaviour at work. Creating this environment is proven to exceed the impact delivered using a traditional 'carrot and stick' approach, which runs the risk of fostering unthinking compliance with the rules even when officers think it might be the 'wrong thing' to do.

This is why the new Code of Ethics seeks to positively reinforce the high moral and ethical standards of most officers and staff. It provides a supportive framework to help guide everyone in policing in making the difficult decisions they face daily, explaining the reasoning and reassuring them that they have acted in a fair and ethical way. It encourages personal responsibility and supports professional judgement, rather than a list of things not to do.

**\*\*S22\*\***

The Code of Ethics is supported by the Code of Practice for ethical and professional policing. This will set a statutory requirement for chief officers and includes personal and organisational actions that chief officers can take to support people in their force.


We will launch the new Code later this year and will provide support to help you implement it, including:

- A communications pack including posters, graphics, intranet stories, videos, animations, and a core narrative.
- Our implementation team will work closely with your Code of Ethics lead to identify College products to support your force roll out.
- A briefing event in October to provide more details to key individuals in your organisation such as leads across HR, L&D and PSDs.

I will be back in touch soon with further details and will present more details at the next Chiefs' Council meeting, but in the meantime please do not hesitate to contact my team with any questions at [stakeholders@college.police.uk](mailto:stakeholders@college.police.uk).

I have also sent this update to your force ethics leads but please do forward it on to anyone else in force who will be working on this as it is vital that we provide you and your teams with the necessary support and information to ensure that the Code of Ethics is not only launched successfully but then implemented to build public trust and confidence.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "T. A. Harding". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long, sweeping underline.

**ACC Tom Harding**  
**Director of Public Safety and Risk**  
**College of Policing**  
[Tom.Harding@college.police.uk](mailto:Tom.Harding@college.police.uk)

**Cc Head of Ethics, DCC Sam De Reya**

# Chief Constables' Council

## Title: Ethics Portfolio – Launch of revised Code of Ethics and use of BFEG

28\_09\_2023 / Agenda Item: Session 7

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<b>Author:</b>	DCC Sam de Reya
<b>Force/Organisation:</b>	Hampshire & Isle of Wight Constabulary
<b>Date Created:</b>	16/08/2023
<b>Coordination Committee:</b>	
<b>Portfolio:</b>	Ethics
<b>Attachments:</b>	N/A
<b>Information Governance &amp; Security</b>	
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<a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management">https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management</a>	

### 1. INTRODUCTION/PURPOSE

- 1.1. This paper provides an update on the work undertaken by the ethics portfolio in the past 12 months and the plan for the year ahead. There is specific focus on behalf of NPCC to support the effective launch and embedding of the revised Code of Ethics, including the new Code of Practice as a statutory requirement for Chief Constables to promote an ethical culture and environment.
- 1.2. In addition to a high level progress report, the paper highlights the area of police digital and data ethics and details an opportunity to utilise the Home Office Biometrics and Forensics Ethics Group (BFEG). This offer will support policing with ethical accountability linked to the increased use of technology and digital capabilities across the service.

### 2. BACKGROUND

- 2.1. The NPCC Ethics portfolio is led by DCC Sam de Reya. It is one of the four sub-groups beneath the overarching NPCC Professional Standards and Ethics Portfolio led by CC Craig Guildford. With the current national scrutiny placed upon culture and behaviours within the police service, the portfolio plays an important role in supporting forces' commitment to ethical behaviours.
- 2.2. The role of the portfolio is to lead work on behalf of NPCC and forces to: promote and develop ethical leadership, practice and behaviours; provide a national and a number of regional ethics committees; generate best practice, research and learning to increase knowledge and understanding; and maintain a network of SPOCs, SME's, academics, practitioners, independent members and interested parties.



- 2.3. The quarterly National Police Ethics Committee (NPEC) provides a mechanism for forces to raise dilemmas and ethical issues for consideration and feedback, and a platform to share learning. The committee comprises representatives from policing, staff associations, the College of Policing, HMICFRS, ethics academics, independent members and community and faith leaders. The NPEC also facilitates the four regional Police Ethics Networks (PEN) who bring together representatives from each force on a quarterly basis<sup>1</sup>.
- 2.4. The portfolio has focused on the following priorities since October 2022, as agreed with regional chief officer leads;
- **To Support the Launch and Implementation of the Revised Code of Ethics**
  - **To Enhance Understanding of Digital and Data Ethics**
  - **To Build an Ethical Framework for Policing**
  - **To Enhance the Use of Ethics Committees**
  - **To Share Best Practice and Knowledge**
  - **To Strengthen the Ethical SPOC's and Networks**

The following updates are offered relevant to each of these priorities.

- 2.5. **Support the Launch and Implementation of the Revised Code of Ethics.**  
The launch of the revised Code of Ethics provides a unique opportunity for policing to promote positive ethical leadership, behaviours and reset expectations at a time of reduced public confidence in policing. The NPCC Ethics portfolio has supported the College of Policing (CoP) to deliver the revised Code of Ethics as an update to the version first published in 2014. This has involved members of the regional and national ethics network providing consultation as part of the process. The revised code has been separated into three distinct sections: **Ethical Policing Principles; Guidance for Ethical Behaviour in Policing;** and **The Code of Practice for Ethical Policing.** The latter aspect (Code of Practice) will place the requirement to implement and embed ethical policing onto a statutory footing for chief officers, and the documents are currently with the Home Secretary for review. The portfolio has worked closely with the College to ensure that ideas, views and issues raised by forces have been addressed during the consultation.
- 2.6. As the timeline moves towards launch and implementation (scheduled for November 2023), a Task and Finish Group, working with CoP, and chaired by Ch Supt Debra Masson (Hampshire & Isle of Wight Constabulary) has been instigated with representatives from forces across the regions. Also represented are HMICFRS, staff associations, the Home Office and the College of Policing. The group has clear terms of reference to support roll out, to ensure that forces are properly engaged and informed to deliver an effective national launch and maximise implementation. In order to optimise the impact of a revised Code this group is the catalyst for force engagement, provides leadership and guidance to develop the approach, suitable products, tools and communications. Early consultation with HMICFRS will continue to capture and prepare for future inspection activity.
- 2.7. Chief Constables are asked to proactively lead the adoption of the Code of Ethics and the new principles by galvanising force activity in preparation for the November launch date. The Task and Finish group is utilising the SPOC network and asks for investment of ethical leadership and resources to provide impetus for the pre-launch/launch and implementation. There will be a requirement to embed new practice, update training and development materials and programmes and promote communications across all aspects of policing business. Representation at centralised launch events, CPD and specialist training sessions for key departments, such as Professional Standards Departments, should also be encouraged. Invites for the pre-launch stakeholder event have been sent for October at Ryton (inperson or virtual).
- 2.8. **Enhance Understanding of Digital and Data Ethics**  
Digital and data ethics covers an ever-increasing proportion of law enforcement activity and includes biometrics, digital forensics, surveillance and investigatory powers, artificial intelligence, digital public contact development, robotic automation, the use of numerous algorithms, and the ethical

procurement of technology. These projects and programmes are scattered across various policing and APCC portfolios with different ownership, governance and legal frameworks. There are excellent pockets of work across the business, however the ethical elements impacting on decision-making and shared learning opportunities are being missed.

- 2.9. A paper was presented to NPCC Chief's Council in 2020 by then DCC David Lewis with various recommendations. These included the creation of an independent ethical advisory group to provide national guidance and consolidation of the ethical issues on digital and data ethics for UK policing. The APCC made a similar recommendation in a paper to the Home Office presented in 2022. Unfortunately funding was an obstacle and as a result the Home Office has proposed an alternative solution by way of the Biometric Forensics Ethics Group (BFEG) to potentially provide this independent scrutiny for NPCC.
- 2.10. The NPCC Ethics portfolio, in conjunction with the APCC, presented a paper to BFEG on 8<sup>th</sup> September which requests the support of BFEG in absorbing this workstream and to provide support for the NPCC and APCC as a central repository for data, digital and technological dilemmas. Approval has been granted and subsequent work will now establish a MOU between the NPCC/APCC and BFEG to agree methods of referral through the NPEC as a gateway and to agree process mapping for ethical dilemmas. Similarly, analytics will be agreed by which effective delivery can be measured and assessed.
- 2.11. **Build an Ethical Framework for Policing**  
Working with regional leads and forces, the portfolio will provide a framework utilising the Code of Practice so forces can consider their own ethical structures to enhance the delivery of an ethical organisation. This work has included engagement with CoP and the ethics networks alongside early consultation with HMICFRS to ensure ethical structures are considered as part of the PEEL inspection regime (likely to be from 2025 onwards).
- 2.12. **Enhance the Use of Ethics Committees**  
Ethics committees are now a tried and tested method of testing organisational leadership, decision-making, policy and practice. Whilst the overwhelming majority of forces have ethics committees to which issues can be referred for consideration, there is great diversity in how they are administered and governed including internal/external groups and chairs, force and OPCC/Mayoral owned models. Membership and training for committee attendees is also varied. The NPCC portfolio has instigated work, led by ACC Osman Khan, to review national practice, research and academic findings completed and formalise some good practice guidance for forces to consider and implement to ensure consistency and future proof the value of police committees.
- 2.13. **Share Best Practice and Knowledge**  
The portfolio continues to work with the CoP to collate the plethora of ethical best practice, learning, leadership and training programmes and materials across the country. This includes collating work across CoP, police forces and law enforcement to develop ethical practice and leadership and the dilemmas raised at the national committee resulting in learning, guidance and recommendations. The NPEC now publishes and tracks the outcome of ethical dilemmas and provides speakers and CPD sessions on current themes and topics. Most recently this included sharing a perspective and learning on the Casey report, a facial recognition pilot and the consideration of Nazir Afzal's report on the London Fire Service. The portfolio has also commenced the creation of an ethical dilemma library where matters discussed at the NPEC are recorded. Work is ongoing with the CoP to develop a repository of dilemmas and guidance to be made nationally accessible. In the short term it is held by the portfolio administration for reference to assist organisational memory.
- 2.14. **Strengthen the Ethical SPOC's and Networks**  
Since 2014 the portfolio has developed and nurtured a long standing network of ethics leads at a force, regional and national level. This includes the regional PEN leads who deliver a quarterly police ethics meeting involving force SPOCs (these contacts have recently been invigorated ready for the launch of the Code), champions at tactical and strategic level and SME's across policing who have a passion for ethics. External supporters, independent members and ethics committee leads also support the portfolio. This network embedded within the NPCC policing infrastructure will be of particular importance and a great asset throughout the implementation of the Code of Ethics.

### **3. PROPOSAL**

**Chief Constables are requested to support the following activity to:**

- 3.1. **Proactively lead the adoption of the revised Code of Ethics** in preparation for the November launch date to maximise the opportunity to actively promote positive ethical behaviours, leadership and practice. This includes lending support to the Task and Finish group, utilising the SPOC network and investing in local force resources to deliver the launch and transition.
- 3.2. **Raise digital and data ethical dilemmas via NPCC National Ethics Committee for submission to BFEG.** Organisations are encouraged to submit digital, data and technological dilemmas to their regional PEN and the NPEC to trial the use of the BFEG pilot. The pilot will provide a coordinated response to review ethical challenges associated with the use of data, digital and other technology, provide NPCC with informed ethical guidance and provide an opportunity to build a body of evidence to support current and future police decision making.
- 3.3. **Continue to make use of the NPCC Ethics portfolio.** Chief Constables are requested to raise ethical dilemmas at a regional and national level, make use of the established network of SPOCs and champions and support and optimise the regional PEN for respective areas. It is through the network that best practice, learning, development tools and training is shared.

### **4 CONCLUSION**

- 4.1 Public trust and confidence in the police is currently very challenging due to well publicised adverse criminal and unethical behaviours by officers. The use of technology is also under scrutiny with publicity detailing possible bias and unethical outcomes. It is of paramount importance that chief officers support the launch and implementation of the revised Code of Ethics to act as a catalyst for placing ethical behaviours at the heart of policing. Similarly, support for the use of BFEG should provide the independent scrutiny that can reassure the public regarding digital and data ethics. This ongoing work will, combined with the work of other portfolios, be fundamental in the drive to restore public trust and confidence.

### **5 DECISIONS REQUIRED**

- 5.1 Chief Constables' Council is asked to support the work described at 3.1 to 3.3 to launch and implement of the revised code, allow the portfolio to pilot the use of BFEG and the NPCC Ethics portfolio can continue to deliver a supportive role to build public trust and confidence in policing.

**Sam de Reya**  
**Deputy Chief Constable**  
**NPCC Lead for Ethics**

USEFUL CONTEXTUAL READING



BFEG\_2023\_09\_08 -  
12 - NPCC APCC prop



APCC Digital Ethics  
and BFEG Update.pdf



Code of Ethics  
Review Cover Paper.p

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<sup>i</sup> Northern PEN Lead – ACC Oz Khan, East and South East PEN Lead – DCC Rob Jones, Midlands PEN Lead - DCC Steve Cooper, South west and London Lead - Supt Jo Arundale

## Session 7


- **College of Policing Update**

# College of Policing

## Working together to keep people safe

ACC Tom Harding – Director: Op Standards,  
Public Safety & Risk Portfolio

# Vetting




## Vetting Update:

- New Vetting Code of Practice – published 20 July
- New Code sets out 18 requirements of Chief Officers to ensure the effective delivery of vetting.
- The College position on dismissal following withdrawal of vetting clearance has been strengthened following recent case law in the decision of Victor v West Mercia.
- The revised Vetting APP is currently moving through the College QA process for public consultation before the end of the year.

## Vetting Update:

- The APP working group (a sub group of the NPCC Vetting working group) reviewed 90 amendment requests that will be addressed in the revised APP, along with addressing the multiple recommendations from the HMICFRS thematic on vetting, corruption and misogyny related to the APP.
- The APP will strengthen the position that maintaining vetting is a continual process and not a one off activity that occurs every few years. It also focuses on supporting improving the quality of decision making.
- The College has appointed a vetting assurance manager who will commence their role soon. This individual will develop an accreditation and assurance process to support forces in delivering vetting.

# Code of Ethics



## Code of Ethics Review:

- Focus on the Standards of Professional Behaviour rather than the ethical principles
- Language of ethical principles not clear to all
- The CoE is seen as punitive; not encouraging learning through openness and reflection
- Perceived focus on police officers rather than police staff
- Confusion between the role and standing of the CoE and that of conduct regulations.
- The CoE is very different from the College's other Codes of Practice
- The CoE has not solved issues around police culture

\*\*S22 for future publication



## 2014 ethical principles – derived from ‘Nolan Principles’ and PJ

### Accountability

You are answerable for your decisions, actions and omissions.

### Selflessness

You act in the public interest.

### Honesty

You are truthful and trustworthy.

### Integrity

You always do the right thing.

### Leadership

You lead by good example.

### Objectivity

You make choices on evidence and your best professional judgement.

### Openness

You are open and transparent in your actions and decisions.

### Respect

You treat everyone with respect.

### Fairness

You treat people fairly



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## Public Service

- Delivering a service to be proud of
- Acting lawfully
- Understanding and responding to community needs
- Reflecting on and applying knowledge and experience
- Improving our self, our peers and profession

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- If people apply the ethical policing principles to their decisions and actions they will be behaving ethically BUT if they are unsure then we give additional guidance



# Implementation

- College of Policing implementation support activity includes:
  - Pre-publication briefing and engagement
  - Promotional materials
  - Leadership, command and specialist training
  - Learning products
  - Staff engagement
- NPCC implementation support
  - NPCC Ethics and other leads coordinating activity and forces helping with communications
- Code of Practice oversight and accountability
  - Stakeholder engagement and roles of APCC and HMICFRS

# **NPCC Ethics Portfolio**

**Promoting & developing ethical leadership,  
behaviours & practice**

**DCC Sam de Reya - NPCC Ethics Lead**



# NPCC Ethics Priorities

**Launch the  
new code**



**Data & Digital  
Ethics**



**Build a  
framework**



**Ethics  
Committees**




**Best practice  
& knowledge**



**Strengthen  
the Network  
& SPOCs**



## The Ask



# ANY QUESTIONS?



Thank you

## Vetting Update:

New Vetting Code of Practice – published 20 July

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## Session 8

Session	Topics
Session 8 10:00 –	<b>Science and Innovation Coordination Committee and AI Concordat – Discussion</b> - (from regional submissions)

## Chief Constables' Council

# Science and Innovation Coordination Committee

### 27 September 2023 / Regional Paper Session 1

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<b>Author:</b>	Paul Taylor
<b>Force/Organisation:</b>	Chief Scientific Adviser NPCC
<b>Date Created:</b>	7 August 2023
<b>Coordination Committee:</b>	N/A
<b>Portfolio:</b>	N/A
<b>Attachments @ para</b>	
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#### 1. DECISION REQUIRED

- 1.1. In March 2023, Chief Constables' Council agreed to progress establishing a Science and Innovation Coordination Committee. Council asked for details on the next steps for the Committee and how it will interrelate with the NPCC's existing Committees. This note answers those questions.
- 1.2. Decision required: Do you approve the proposed direction of travel for the establishment of a Science and Innovation Coordination Committee?

#### 2. BACKGROUND

- 2.1. We should be proud of the breadth and quality of science and Innovation (S&I) within policing. Our S&I drives crime prevention and detection, helps safeguard victims, protects our workforce, and delivers everybody's right to a fair trial. Yet, the pace of innovation means we have much more to gain, and more to do to stay ahead of the crime opportunities created by new technologies. What has got us here, will not suffice in the future. To unlock the efficiencies that S&I can deliver, we need effective coordination and delivery.
- 2.2. An S&I Coordination Committee, working closely with DDaTCC and other Committees, can:



- Take primary responsibility for innovation in all areas of policing, focusing particularly on the ‘future’ and next generation opportunities and threats.
- Provide connectivity across organisations that undertake research and innovation (e.g., CTP, FCN, **\*\*S23\*\*** etc.) and forces (via RILs), ensuring collective effort and the elimination of duplication.
- Provide leadership of S&I opportunities likely to significantly impact policing, but are not fully developed, evaluated and/or accredited as a recognised capability.
- Provide a coordinated voice on S&I that can transmit our priorities to the Home Office’s Commissioning Boards and the Strategic Change and Investment Board.
- Provide a coordination point for all national leads, thus decreasing the demand on them to attend the National Science and Innovation Board (NSIB).
- Provide a coordinated means to engage the Department of Science Innovation and Technology and the Government’s 10-point Science Framework.
- Enable the Chief Scientific Adviser to retain their independence. Arguably, in some areas, the Office for the Chief Scientific Adviser is acting as the Coordination Committee. This creates a conflict as the CSA role is to provide independent advice to Chief Officers, who should have the decision-making authority on these matters.

### 3. POSITIONING A NEW COMMITTEE IN THE NPCC LANDSCAPE

- 3.1. The case for an S&I Coordination Committee (S&ICC) has parallels with the case for a Prevention Coordination Committee. The use of science, innovation and technology is relevant to all Committees, just as prevention is relevant to all. But innovation is not the primary responsibility of any Committee. This has held back progress. Like the Prevention Committee, the S&ICC will focus on key initiatives before they transition into BAU.
- 3.2. We propose to borrow from the Prevention Coordination Committee’s excellent example. The S&ICC will take a focused, future oriented approach that concentrates on delivering innovation into policing. It does so in close collaboration with all Coordination Committees and National Leads, with a view to passing on emerging capabilities when they reach a level of maturity that sees them deployed.
- 3.3. Thus, ‘product ownership’ will exist and be managed naturally across Committees. Leadership of Pillar 4 of the NPCC strategy will be coordinated by S&ICC, held to account for delivery of our science and technology strategy. This will involve ensuring, among other things, science and innovation requirements are clearly articulated; opportunities and threats for future technologies are identified and managed; barriers for effective partner collaborations are identified and removed; and resources are used efficiently to deliver at pace.
- 3.4. A working example of this in practice is Rapid Video Response—a capability that enables officers to rapidly respond to non-P1 domestic violence calls through a secure video chat. Whilst this innovation has close links to the Domestic Abuse Portfolio in the Crime Committee it also impacts on Contact and Response Portfolios in Local Policing. The early trials of RVR were sponsored by the Chief Scientific Adviser and would, in our model, dock into the S&ICC. As the capability becomes deployed, so it finds a natural home within the Local Policing Coordination Committee with links to the NPCC Contact and Response Strategies.

#### 4. STEPS TO BE TAKEN

##### 4.1. If supported by Chiefs, we will:

- Recruit through fair competition the role of Coordination Committee Chair.
- Support them in recruiting a Committee Coordinator/Staff Officer support, equivalent to other Coordination Committees. The funding for this will initially come from OPCS.
- Allow the successful Chair to determine who chairs the National Science and Innovation Board (NSIB). NSIB is a decision making and implementation board for spend on innovation. It comprises the force Research and Innovation Leads and key partners.
- Constitute the Coordination Committee with representation from NSIB, innovation programme leads, and NPCC leads and a cohort of current pre-adopted innovations.
- Undertake a process of identifying portfolios and national leads who have an innovation element in their remit to determine their relationship with S&TCC. This process will follow the excellent example of the Prevention Coordination Committee. In line with the ethos described above, we will not look to Hoover up portfolios. Rather, we seek to ensure that innovation and delivery responsibilities are well understood for each area of policing.

**Paul Taylor**

Chief Scientific Adviser




# Covenant for Using Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Policing

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<b>Author:</b>	Paul Taylor
<b>Force/Organisation:</b>	NPCC
<b>Date Created:</b>	03 August 2023
<b>Coordination Committee:</b>	DDaTCC / Office of the Chief Scientific Adviser
<b>Portfolio:</b>	N/A
<b>Attachments @ para</b>	N/A
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1. Following a presentation on Artificial Intelligence (AI) in 2022, Chief Constables' Council gave me, as Chief Scientific Adviser, an action to develop an AI strategy. I do not believe a strategy is needed now, since AI is part of the our S&T strategy. However, given the increasing interest in, and use of, AI, I do believe it important for us to agree a set of principles for policing's use of AI.
2. I am recommending that you endorse the attached Covenant, which describes six principles designed to ensure that our uses AI in legitimate, effective, and legal ways. If endorsed, we will expect forces to adhere to the principles when developing, trialling, commissioning, and using AI. The Covenant also gives my Office a responsibility to support you achieving this.
3. The Covenant has been reviewed by, and is supported by, DDaTCC, NPTC, and other relevant stakeholders. It is based on the UK Government's AI strategy.
4. **Decision required: That you endorse the attached Covenant for Using Artificial Intelligence and implement in your force the processes needed to meet the Covenant's principles (likely in place already).**

**Paul Taylor**  
Chief Scientific Adviser



Science  
& Technology  
in Policing

**National Police Chiefs' Council**

**Covenant for Using  
Artificial Intelligence  
(AI) in Policing**

**Version 0.2**

# 1 Introduction

The rapid growth of Artificial Intelligence (AI) within policing is unsurprising. The speed and accuracy that AI can bring to police processes make it an attractive way to deliver an effective and efficient service. However, the application of AI can be contentious<sup>1</sup>. Transparency and fairness must be at the heart of what we implement, to ensure a proportionate and responsible use that builds public confidence.

This Covenant outlines a set of principles that forces have agreed will define how it uses AI in its business. They were endorsed by **all members** of the National Police Chiefs' Council on **<DATE>**. All developers and users of AI within policing must give due regard to the Covenant.

## 1.1 What is Artificial Intelligence?

There is no definitive definition of Artificial Intelligence (Alan Turing Institute, 2021), and AI is often used to refer to related applications such as automation, neural networks, and machine learning. To bring clarity for policing, we adopt the following definitions:

**Artificial intelligence (AI)** refers to a machine that learns, generalizes, or infers meaning from input, thereby reproducing or surpassing human performance. An example is using image analysis to determine whether a video contains sexual activity with a child. The term AI can also refer to a machine's ability to perform repetitive tasks without guidance, when this includes an element of reasoning, meaning discovery, or learning from experience.

**Machine learning (ML)** refers to algorithms that leverage new data to improve their ability to make predictions or decisions. ML is a widely used form of AI that has contributed to innovations such as speech recognition and fraud detection.

**Advanced Data Analytics (ADA)** uses subject matter expertise and statistics—typically beyond those of traditional business intelligence—to extract insights and make recommendations from complex data. An example is the use of Risk Terrain Modelling to quantify environmental factors that shape risk mapping and resource deployments. A policy covering the use of ADA in policing is being written, to be owned by the Data & Analytics Board.

## 1.2 Policing's Use of Artificial Intelligence

Policing's use of AI is advancing quickly. All NPCC forces use data analytics and at least 15 forces have 'advanced' data analytics capabilities (NPCC, 2021). Most of our AI applications focus on organisational effectiveness and workforce planning rather than predictive analytics (see the 2021 Home Office Data Analytics Landscape Review for a broad sector analysis). This includes demand management functions such as live triage of incoming 999/111 calls and the automation of data quality assurance tasks. Many of our capabilities also utilise AI in their delivery, such as the identification algorithm in Face Recognition and the safety features within Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.

There are also instances where AI is supporting decision making. For example, Avon and Somerset Constabulary use supervised machine learning to assess factors such as likelihood of reoffending, likelihood of victimisation/vulnerability, and likelihood of committing a range of specific offences. Through an app on their mobile devices, neighbourhood officers can instantly access the risk profiles for each offender registered in the force area, which are recalculated daily.

Our ambition for AI technologies, laid out in the national [Digital](#) and [Science and Technology](#) strategies, recognise: (1) the power of algorithms to achieve a ‘step change’ in policing efficiency; (2) the ‘arms race’ we face with criminals who benefit from new technologies; and (3) the need to maintain public confidence through standards, an ethical framework, and independent oversight. Individual use cases for AI are outlined in capability strategies and the NPCC Areas of Research Interest. For example, the [APCC/NPCC Digital Forensic Science Strategy](#) makes clear the infrastructure, processing, and trust requirements that are needed for effective digital forensics within policing.

The growth of our use of AI depends critically on building a specialist community. We seek to ensure continuous best practice via the Data Analytics Community of Practice, PDS’s Knowledge hub, and community-led initiatives such as Police Rewired. Our communities are also active members of external networks and events, such as DataConnect21, Ordnance Survey Geospatial Hackathon, and the Government Statistical Service Methodology Symposium.

Despite its benefits, there have been concerning examples of the use of AI in policing, where models have been built on data that led them to act disproportionately against a community or race. The 2022 House of Lords Justice and Home Affairs Committee report on new technologies identified similar issues in other countries, concluding that the impact of the long-term use of AI in policing is uncertain, with limited evidence regarding the risk involved. Critically, the fear of unintended consequences and impingement of civil liberties, deservedly or not, is associated with policing’s use of AI. Thus, the NPCC commits to a set of principles for guiding the use of AI in policing.

## 2 Principles of AI in Policing

Policing’s AI principles are founded on three sets of guidance: the FAST Principles<sup>[2]</sup>, the OECD AI Principles<sup>[3]</sup>, and the Data Ethics Framework<sup>[4]</sup>. We apply these to policing with the intent to support an openness to scrutiny, integrity, and public confidence in our use of AI technologies.

**Principle A. Lawful:** All use of AI will comply with applicable laws, standards, and regulations. This includes all users of AI, ML, ADA and related data processing (e.g., where you are using national data sets as defined by the NPCC) ensuring the use is recorded centrally in the National ROPA.

**Principle B. Transparent:** All use of AI will be subject to ‘Maximum Transparency by Default’ (MTbD).

B1. Forces should ensure the public are aware of AI uses. This will typically include publishing an overview of the algorithms used and the known limitations of the training data used. The datasets will be present on the force IAR with allocated Information asset owners.

B2. Where operational or security requirements restrict the ability to share, the AI will undergo scrutiny by appropriate independent assessors (e.g., organised by the Chief Scientific Adviser).

B3. Subject to B2, all AI projects must be able to allow a third-party to: (1) investigate the algorithmic workings, use scenarios, and underlying data from an ‘adversarial perspective’<sup>[5]</sup>; This might require the supplier to provide ‘expert’ witness/evidence of the tools’ operation. All third parties will have appropriate data protection and information security policies in place.

**Principle C. Explainable:** The ability for any AI to provide an ‘explanation’ of its output will be a determining factor in its implementation.

C1. The level of explanation expected will be determined by (1) the function it performs (e.g., is it informing a high-impact decision about an individual); (2) the outputs required of it (i.e., who needs to understand what regarding the output and how was this reached).

**Principle D. Responsible:** All AI that affects the public will have responsible usage policies (i.e., intentions are defined before deployment so that outcomes and impact can be tracked) and procedures to ensure that users do not accept AI outputs uncritically.

D1. The ability of AI to make decisions without a human being part of that decision will be determined by the function that the AI performs.

D2. All AI that effects the public must have a human as the ultimate decision-maker.

D3. All AI will have a human or automatic means of being stopped if it displays unintended or undesired outputs.

D4. Those responsible for AI-enabled systems must proactively mitigate the risk of unintended biases or harms, during initial rollout and as they learn, change, or are redeployed.

**Principle E. Accountable:** All AI will have a clearly identified individual accountable for its operation and outputs.

E1. All Accountable persons and end-users will be suitably trained in the use of the relevant AI.

E2. The use of AI in policing will be subject to proper governance and oversight at the relevant organisational level.

E3. AI enabled data sets and technology systems will be governed and assured under the same frameworks as wider data processing responsibilities, linking what is used and how it is used to the appropriate IAR and ROPA.

**Principle F. Robust:** All data used to train, or that is analysed by, an AI will be robust and reliable enough for its intended purpose. This requires assessing, tracking and reporting on the quality of data, by way of recognising that the quality of data dictates the quality of the analysis.

F1. All AI in policing will be used only for the purpose it was designed, trained and authorised for.

F2. With regards to data usage, all data used in Police AI will be subject to a Framework outlined by a force governance board to guard against issues such as bias, unintended proxies, non-representativeness, unfairness, and untimeliness.

F3. the Government Office for Artificial Intelligence's Guidelines for AI procurement must inform contract implementation and management.

The use of AI in policing must also comply with established codes of practice, most notably the College of Policing's Code of Ethics<sup>6</sup>, which describes the standards of accountability, fairness, honesty, integrity, leadership, objectivity, openness, respect and selflessness that is expected of all in policing. All AI in Policing will also be subject to standard organisational technology, architectural, security and usage principles.

### 3 Governance of AI and the AI Principles

Chief Constables are responsible for the operational deployment of AI technologies to manage threat, harm, and risk. Together with Police and Crime Commissioners (PCC), who are responsible for holding Chief Constables to account, they ensure use is fair and lawful, balancing ethics, right to privacy, unbiased treatment and consent, with the absolute right to a fair trial.

Chief Constables and PCCs receive detailed advice from force ethics committees, with many also using specialist committees for ADA and AI projects. They are supported by the national Data & Analytics Board, which is part of the Digital, Data and Technology Coordination Committee. To embody the Policing AI Principles, these committee should, wherever possible, work in public, be independently chaired, include experts in data ethics and medical ethics, and have community representation. Their remit should include:

- the maintenance of the Covenant
- determining and disseminating the ethical framework that will govern the use of AI
- advising on the ethical impact of a new AI use before its implementation
- promoting non-discriminatory practices in the use of AI
- undertaking regular reviews of the accuracy, reliability, security, safety, performance, evidence-based decision capability and feedback ability of all AI.

A force's use of AI is informed and supported by a system of independent scrutiny, national peer support, and evidence-based guidance. The National Data and Analytics Board provides oversight, governance and support on issues of Data Quality, Data Protection and Freedom of Information, Records Management, information Sharing, Disclosure and Safeguarding, and Geographical Information portfolios. The NPCC Lead for Ethics provides oversight of ethical principles. The College of Policing are seeking to publish Authorised Professional Practice (APP) on the use of new technologies, which will guide force activity.

All forces have access to a national independent panel for assessment of complex cases. This is currently being provided by the Home Office Biometrics and Forensics Ethics Group (BFEG) with work ongoing to determine the uptake of this provision and whether it is sufficient for the needs of Chief Constables, PCCs, and their forces. BFEG provides advice and is not intended to replace the responsibility and authority of forces and PCCs to make decisions on the use of AI in their force.

#### 3.1 Engaging the Broader AI Landscape

Policing recognises the body of work being conducted in AI across Government and commits to contribute to, and adding value to, these efforts. We will work with the:

- **Office for Artificial Intelligence**, to ensure concordance with the UK's national AI strategy.
- **Data Standards Authority (DSA)**, which works to improve how the public sector manages data.
- **Central Digital and Data Office (CDDO)**, whose **Data Ethics Framework (DEF)** gives principles to guide the design of appropriate data use in the public sector.
- **Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation (CDEI)** for support on developing and understanding the Ethical frameworks within which to operate AI.
- **AI Council (AIC)**, whose independent members provide advice to government and high-level leadership of the AI ecosystem, to raise awareness of policing's efforts.

- **Alan Turing Institute (ATI)**, for research opportunities across disciplines and generate impact, both through theoretical development and application to real-world problems.
- **Defence Science and Technology Labs (Dstl)**, via the Police Integration Hub, to identify opportunities and lessons from the use of AI within defence.
- **Industry**, via established routes, to increase their understanding of our requirements of universal AI development, and conversely, to better understand and support their trajectory of travel. Being secure by design and maintaining data sovereignty should not be an excuse for the absence of data sharing and co-working.

It will be duplicative and burdensome for each force to engage directly with such bodies. As such, the Office of the Policing Chief Scientific Adviser will maintain relationships with such bodies and should be contacted first by forces for advice and guidance. The benefit of this approach is it could act as two-way conduit to share policing insight and challenges, as well as emerging standards.

### 3.2 The Role of the CSA on AI

The Office of the Policing Chief Scientific Adviser (OPCSA) provides systems leadership, advice, and assurance on the use of science and technology in policing. With AI expertise sitting across government and within industry and academia, the CSA's challenge function is critical for AI. OPCSA will, *inter alia*,

- (1) ensure that there is effective governance of the development and use of AI in policing, reflecting on the degree to which activity meets the expectations of the AI principles outlined here and in the UK Research Integrity Concordat;
- (2) support an active programme of research examining the fairness of AI applications, using independent testers such as the National Physical Laboratory (e.g., [operational testing of Face Recognition](#));
- (3) providing accurate and up to date information on AI applications, share successful examples of good practice when using AI in policing. Where early opportunities for the responsible use of AI in police forces are identified, OPCSA will seek to support these projects and provide investment to ensure their success and ensure that their findings are shared widely;
- (4) convene academia, industry, and government agencies e.g., the Home Office AI and Data Ethics team on matters related to the use of AI in policing. As part of this activity, consider development of a national data capability that could be accessed by industry and academia to test and train AI tooling in a safe environment;
- (5) support the College of Policing in developing Approved Professional Practice (APP) in this area; and,
- (6) promote, where operationally appropriate, an ethos of transparency and engagement with the public to maintain and promote trust and confidence.

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## 4 References

- <sup>1</sup> Christie (2021). [AI in policing and security](#).
- <sup>2</sup> [Alan Turing Institute](#)
- <sup>3</sup> [The OECD Artificial Intelligence \(AI\) Principles - OECD.AI](#)
- <sup>4</sup> [Data Ethics Framework - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](#)
- <sup>5</sup> [Oswald, Grace, Urwin, & Barnes \(2018\)](#)

**Session 10**

<b>Session</b>	<b>Topics</b>	<b>Lead</b>
<b>Session 10</b> <b>11:45 –</b>	<b>Response Attendance Times</b> - (paper from regional submission)	<b>Rob Carden</b>

# Chief Constables' Council

## Title: Response Attendance Times

27 September 2023 / Agenda Item: Regional – Session 1

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<b>Author:</b>	Supt Sarah Jones on behalf of CC Rob Carden
<b>Force/Organisation:</b>	Cumbria Constabulary
<b>Date Created:</b>	10/08/2023
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<b>Portfolio:</b>	NPCC Response Policing
<b>Attachments @ para</b>	n/a
<b>Information Governance &amp; Security</b>	
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### 1. INTRODUCTION

- 1.1. The public has a valid expectation that when they contact the police, their 'call for help' is answered and the police respond in a timely and professional manner. Forces' ability to respond to the public is at the heart of gaining trust and confidence in policing. HMICFRS (2023) has reported that forces need to improve their response to the public and have a standardised approach to that response. The public call for help and their expectations are met at the point of arrival or action being taken by the police after making contact and seeking help.
- 1.2. In 2023, the NPCC Response Policing portfolio surveyed forces through their National Tactical Working Group and found that all but one force had response attendance target times. Results found that forces are measuring their target times from a variety of starting points during the course of the incident and that actual response attendance times varied significantly.
- 1.3. The following paper makes recommendations for consistency in response attendance time in terms of measurement, definitions in rural urban classification, standardised national response attendance times along with support for national data collection, analysis, and publication.

### 2. BACKGROUND

- 2.1. The HMICFRS 2018/2019 report, [A Call for Help](#) identified that an important consideration in responding to the public call for help was the speed of which forces respond and deploy officers. In 2020, HMICFRS further outlined that consideration should be given to an agreed standard for measuring that speed for forces' response to 999 calls.



- 2.2. HMICFRS's 2023 report, Police Performance: Getting a Grip is explicit about improvements in response attendance and strongly recommends agreed national standards for response times along with consistent measurement metrics. HMICFRS further recommends that the National Police Chiefs' Council and the Home Office develop standardised data collection principles, analysis, and publication of attendance times for all forces. This is reinforced in the State of Policing: The Annual Assessment of Policing in England and Wales 2022 report which describes the variations in forces' response as a 'post code lottery', noting the variation to service delivery.
- 2.3. Despite varying models of digital deployment or attendance through forces' aspiration to modernise, there is a requirement and need for the traditional approach to incident deployment. There is still the expectation and need for the police to physically respond to emergency incidents, aspects of vulnerability and priority offences in person, and when forces do, it is expected that they respond in a timely and professional manner. The Graded Response Policy is effectively a promise made by police forces to attend, act, and help them. There is clear-cut expectation from the public that forces uphold this commitment and deliver accordingly.
- 2.4. HMICFRS PEEL 2021/22 inspection programme found that responding to the public was the poorest performing area in policing and that most forces needed to improve. Notably, HMICFRS did not grade any force as outstanding in this area during their inspection programme.

### **3. KEY STRANDS OF THE STRATEGIC APPROACH**

#### **3.1 Measurement of Response Attendance Times**

- 3.1.1. Graded response policies were developed in forces nationally in circa 1993, with the intention of managing public expectation of police attendance at reported incidents.
- 3.1.2. The NPCC Response Policing survey found inconsistency in the way forces measure attendance times principally of the start point of such measurements. There were four reported measurement points: from call answered (13 forces), from creation of an incident log (28 forces), from grading of the incident (1 force) and from transferring the incident to the despatch function (1 force).
- 3.1.3. The implications of such disparity in starting points presents challenges for consistent national analysis and publication of any response attendance figures. More crucially however, such divergence does not aid the public in understanding the policing response they receive, nor allow them to understand that service delivery in comparison to their neighbouring areas.
- 3.1.4. Work under Digital, Data and Technology (DDaT), Police Digital Service (PDS) and NPCC Contact Management, is focussing on the receipt of emergency and non-emergency contact. Performance in this area is measured at the point a call handler (not auto-attender, IVR or Switchboard operator) answers the call with that person being able to actively deal. 999 call performance data is published with further consideration being given to 101 and digital channel data.
- 3.1.5. The public do not differentiate between the 'handoffs' of defined areas of business including contact management, despatch, and response functions. Response attendance performance should dovetail with emergency and non-emergency performance, with the responsibility for deploying to demand in a timely manner. The public 'call for help' and their expectations are met at the point of arrival or action being taken by the police. Considering the 999 and 101 performance measures up to the point of call answered, any measurement of response attendance times needs to be part of the whole victim journey and therefore, should be from the point of call answered. Any other 'start point' for measurement purposes would create ambiguity in the 'call for help' and the victim journey data.
- 3.1.6. There are seven different command and control systems (last reported June 2023) currently in use in UK policing to service the call and incident needs of the public. Each comes with their own capability, specifications, and nuances, all of which have the potential to provide ambiguity in the measurement process. The measurement of response performance at the point of call, would provide national consistency and is a measurement point which is unaffected by command and control system configuration.
- 3.1.7. HMICFRS (2023) recommends forces have an agreed metric in place by January 2024.

- 3.1.8. **This paper recommends consistent measurement of national graded response attendance times and that this measurement starts at the point a call from the public is answered.**

### 3.2 Definition of Rural Urban Classification

- 3.2.1 In achieving consistency of response attendance times, cognisance is given to the demography and geography of each force. The autonomy of forces to develop graded response policies with their PCC, and the promises they make to the public, based around the complexities of responding in rural and challenging geographic areas, however, should not be overlooked.
- 3.2.2 HMICFRS recommend forces have an agreed national standard for response attendance times. The definition of rural urban classification forms part of the national standards and the challenge of creating that consistency. NPCC Response Policing recognises the need for these intricacies to be factored into graded response capabilities.
- 3.2.3 The NPCC Response Policing survey found that 16 forces had rural urban classification for their Grade 1 response. In respect of the forces who use a rural urban classification, urban response times were set at 15 minutes and rural response times at 20 minutes. There does, however, need to be consistency of that definition for uniformity of measurement, analysis, and publication of response attendance data. Without such, policing nationally is unable to consistently manage public expectations in responding to their needs.
- 3.2.4 It was clear from the survey results that forces have a variety of approaches and methodology for defining an urban or rural area. Many reported that their definitions are based on the geographical area, beat codes, population/census data, policing areas, electoral areas or even distance from a police station. The latter of which is greatly impacted upon by the rationalisation and closure of stations through efficiency savings. It was also not clear if, following such changes, a rural urban classification review took place.
- 3.2.5 HM Government provides Rural Urban Classification definitions to be used in the public sector, to aid possible and distinguish between rural and urban areas. The Classification defines areas as rural if they fall outside of settlements with more than 10,000 resident population. For the smallest geographical areas, the classification assigns them to one of four urban or six rural categories which include villages, hamlets, isolated areas, sparse settings, as well as major conurbation, towns, and fringe areas.
- 3.2.6 The HM Government definition refers to 2011 census data; HM Government recognises the fact this is dated and has therefore updated the Rural Urban Classifications in August 2021 with additional lookup tables. This additionality relates specifically to rural classification for both small area geographies, local authority districts and other higher geographies.
- 3.2.7 NPCC Response Policing recognise there may be ICT challenges and costs associated with reconfiguration of rural urban classifications within forces' command and control systems. 16 forces are currently already operating with rural urban classification capability. These 16 forces work with the following five command and control systems: namely Storm, SAAB Safe, Control Works, Guardian CAD, and Microsoft Contact Management platform. The two forces that do not operate under these systems still have the capability to differentiate between urban and rural should they wish to do so.
- 3.2.8 **It is recommended that forces adopt a consistent rural urban classification process that is based on the HM Government classification.**

### 3.3 National Standard for Response Attendance Times

- 3.3.1 Even with clarity of measurement points and agreed rural urban definitions, forces have greatly varied Grade 1 and Grade 2 response times. The absence of national response attendance times and analysis, hinders the opportunity to publish meaningful data. This impacts the public's ability to compare and recognise quality service across the forces if definitions and response levels vary so much.

- 3.3.2 The NPCC Response Policing Survey found that there was considerable variation in Grade 1 response attendance target times, with rates ranging from 10 minutes (1 force), 15 minutes (18 forces), Urban and Rural (16 forces) to 20 minutes (7 forces) nationally. What was clear is that in the main, forces are responding between 15 and/or 20 minutes for Grade 1 incidents.
- 3.3.3 In considering Grade 1 response times specifically, the NPCC Response Policing Portfolio has examined the Policing Pledge (2009) which contains a mix of commitments to the public on accessibility, availability, and importantly response. Pertinent to this is point 5 of the Policing Pledge which states that forces should aim to deploy to emergencies immediately, giving an estimated time of arrival that takes into account the need for speed and getting to the incident safely. In urban areas, the police will aim to arrive within 15 minutes and in rural areas within 20 minutes.
- 3.3.4 In support of the response times recommended by the Policing Pledge, there is also an evidence base (Blane I Vidal and Kirchmaier, 2015) to suggest that the potential to detect crime is enhanced by shorter response times.
- 3.3.5 Grade 2 attendance rates varied far more widely however, from 1 hour to 4 hours. Of note, one force has no response times in place for Grade 1 or Grade 2 incidents. There were no variations reported under the rural urban classification for Grade 2 incidents, although it is difficult to surmise whether the variation between 1 and 4 hours is factored in such geographical dynamics. The NPCC Response Policing portfolio notes that obtaining consistency on Grade 2 response times will be more challenging than grade 1 consistency for example.
- 3.3.6 Force terminology nationally for graded responses has developed over time in forces as operating models and technology has evolved. NPCC Response Policing recognises the need for consistency of language around graded responses to provide clarity when response attendance times are brought to the attention of the public. The effect of varied data means that the public are unable to compare attendance times clearly and easily across forces. Therefore, the public are unable to ascertain if the service they receive is acceptable or optimal in comparison to their neighbouring policing areas.
- 3.3.7 Forces' graded incident response policies vary, and whilst there is an acceptance that a Grade 1 incident is an emergency incident, the portfolio found evidence of varying definitions of Grade 1 and Grade 2 incidents nationally. The NPCC Response Policing portfolio refers therefore to the National Call Handling Standards definitions of contact, whether emergency or non-emergency and outlines the expected police response:
- 3.3.7.1 *In summary an emergency contact will result in immediate emergency police response. This is commonly referred to as a Grade 1 incident.*
- 3.3.7.2 *Emergency contact encompasses circumstances where an incident is reported to the police which is taking place and in which there is or is likely to be a risk of the following: danger to life, use, or immediate threat of use, of violence, serious injury to a person and/or, serious damage to property.*
- 3.3.7.3 *The definition also refers to contact relating to an allegation of criminal conduct, traffic collisions or where a call handler has strong and objective reasons for the believing the incident to be an emergency.*
- 3.3.7.4 *In summary a non-emergency contact means only that the police response may not be immediate and may encompass a range of solutions; of significance here is reference to priority incident response. This is commonly referred to as a Grade 2 incident.*
- 3.3.7.5 *Priority response encompasses circumstances where the call handler acknowledges that there is a degree of importance or urgency associated with the initial police action, but an emergency response is not required. These typically arise where there is a genuine concern for somebody's safety, the offender is detained, evidence may be lost, road collision with serious injury or obstruction, people in extreme distress or vulnerability, hate crime along with local force policy mandates.*

**National Call Handling Standards 2005**

**3.3.8 It is recommended that Grade 1 (Emergency) and Grade 2 (Priority) incidents are defined as per the National Call Handling Standards definitions. This is to create consistency in incident graded policies and subsequent publication of data, providing clarity to the public.**

**3.3.9 National approval to establish Grade 1 response attendance times at 15 minutes for urban classification and 20 minutes for rural classification.**

**3.3.10 NPCC Response Policing convene a working group to scope the Grade 2 response rate consistency.**

#### **3.4 Collection and publication of data post standardisation**

3.4.1 To effectively manage response attendance time performance, NPCC Response Policing recognises the essential need to develop an accurate and consistent data set to provide clarity to all forces, HMICFRS and most importantly, the public.

3.4.2 Through the NPCC Response Policing survey, it was found that there was a variety of formats for response time publication and an assortment of methodology to do so. A total of 15 forces reported they do not externally publicise their response targets. Of the 28 forces that do publish, 10 used their force website, 6 utilised OPCC platforms and scrutiny panels and 20 forces provided information via Freedom of Information requests.

3.4.3 HMICFRS recommend that such principles are developed by January 2024 and a pilot of data collection and analysis is established by July 2024. Publication of such data nationally is recommended by January 2025.

3.4.4 With consistency of measurement, rural and urban classification, and agreed national response attendance times, NPCC Response Policing would be able to commence engagement with the Home Office around timely collection of data and the development of a set of principles for the analysis and publication of the force data. The portfolio would use the learning and experience of the development of 999 and subsequently 101 performance management through DDaT and PDS.

**3.4.5 It is recommended that NPCC Response Policing commences the development of a standardised performance metric, supported by an analytical digital platform, in conjunction with relevant National Police Chiefs' Council portfolios, PMCC and the Home Office, through a defined working group.**

#### **4 APPROVAL OF THE LOCAL POLICING COORDINATION COMMITTEE (LPCC)**

4.1 Consultation to date includes the survey results and scoping via the NPCC Response Policing National Tactical Working Group with all response policing commanders represented. There was unanimous support for consistent measurement. Further consultation has commenced the national DDAT project for 101 call data analysis and publication, and Performance Management Coordination Committee (PMCC).

4.2 Following endorsement at LPCC and National Police Chiefs' Council, NPCC Response Policing will communicate the agreed standardised approach and will look to develop a set of principles for data collection, analysis, and publication with the Home Office along with other outlined working groups.

4.3 NPCC Response Policing will look to engage with HMICFRS to appraise of action and progress.

4.4 The details of the work to date including consultation in relation to the development of the proposal and recommendations outlined, was presented by CC Carden, reviewed and endorsed by the Local Policing Coordination Committee, on 10<sup>th</sup> August 2023.

**5. RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS**

Whilst there are no specific funding stream requirements associated with the delivery of the recommendations outlined in this paper, it should be noted that there may be some resource or financial implications at a force level to address recommendations and align command and control systems, ICT, or management information development. In addition, the abstraction of officers and staff should be considered for those taking part in any future working groups.

**5.1 Funding and Financial Implications (NPCC/Forces):**

	Yes	No
<i>Is there a Financial Implication for Police Force and/or Policing Bodies</i>	X	
<i>If yes has this been costed</i>		X
<i>who has verified these financial implications / fig (Title, Organisation, Role)</i>		

	2023/24 (£)	2024/2025 (£)	2025/26 (£)	2026/27 (£)
<b><u>Funding Required</u></b>				
<i>Revenue Expenditure</i>				
<i>Capital Expenditure</i>				
<b>Total</b>				
<b><u>Benefits</u></b>				
<i>Revenue Benefits</i>				
<i>Capital Benefits</i>				
<b>Total</b>				
<i>Reserves Held</i>				
<b>Total Net</b>				

<i>Is there a closure/exit plan in place?</i>	
	Yes      No
<i>Is there a financial liability to the NPCC at the end of programme of work? e.g. Redundancy / Pension Strain Costs</i>	X

**Please provide details of financial liability, alternative funding streams, Home Office, Reserves etc relevant to the above:**  
 There are no know financial liabilities or source of funding to support the recommendations set out in this paper.

**Finance Coordination Committee Commentary: n/a**

<b>Signed off by Finance Committee Chair?</b>	
<b>Date</b>	

## **6. STRATEGY, DELIVERY AND BUSINESS PLANNING**

### **6.1 Strategy**

The development and delivery of the associated recommendations outlined in this paper will be considered for inclusion in the NPCC Response Policing Strategy that may return to National Police Chiefs' Council for consideration, at a future date.

### **6.2 Delivery Plan**

The work outlined aligns to the Response Policing strategic objectives set out in the LPCC 2022-2024 delivery plan, which aim to ensure that response policing achieves operational, procedural and policy influence through continuous professional development frameworks.

## **7. OPPORTUNITIES AND RISK**

### **7.1 Opportunities**

- 7.1.1 This work builds on that of the NPCC Contact Management, DDaT and DPC to understand emergency and non-emergency call performance, to further develop an understanding of the available technological opportunities, in terms of 'responding to the public'.
- 7.1.2 It is an opportune way for forces to understand performance within their region or most similar group and address assumptions of geographical variations observed by HMICFRS.

### **7.2 Benefits**

- 7.2.1 The principal aim of the recommended policy change is for improvements to public service relating to response to calls. This work positively contributes to building trust and confidence in policing.
- 7.2.2 Recommendations within the HMICFRS report, 'Performance; Getting a Grip' would be addressed.

### **7.3 Risks**

- 7.3.1 Without an agreed measurement point and consistent definition of rural urban classifications in particular, response attendance times cannot be collated, analysed, and published nationally.
- 7.3.2 Recommendations within the HMICFRS report, 'Performance; Getting a Grip' would not be addressed.
- 7.3.3 The inability to standardise response times and targets adversely impacts on police forces' ability to pursue continuous improvements in the interest of improved service delivery to the public.

## **8. RECOMMENDATIONS**

The public has a valid expectation when they contact the police, that their 'call for help' is answered and that the police respond in a timely and professional manner. NPCC Response Policing has surveyed all forces and found there to be limited consistency in measurement, reporting and graded response times nationally. HMICFRS recommend that response attendance times are standardised and published nationally to support the public in interpreting and understanding service delivery.

NPCC Response Policing set out a number of recommendations to National Police Chiefs' Council which seek to gain agreement in terms of consistent measurement points, agree definitions of rural urban classifications, graded

response terminology and national grade 1 response times. Further working groups are proposed for the matters of grade 2 response times and analysis opportunities.

The recommendations to be endorsed to enable the implementation of national response attendance time data collection, analysis and publication are:

1. Consistent measurement of national graded response attendance times and measurement taken from the point a call from the public is answered.
2. Forces adopt a consistent rural urban classification process that is based on the HM Government classification.
3. Grade 1 (Emergency) and Grade 2 (Priority) incidents to be defined as per the National Call Handling Standards definitions. This is to create consistency in incident graded policies and subsequent publication of data, providing clarity to the public.
4. A national standard for response attendance times is agreed for Grade 1 incidents, with an urban and rural classification, of response times of 15 minutes and 20 minutes respectively.
5. NPCC Response Policing to create a working group to commence scoping around Grade 2 response rate consistency.
6. NPCC Response Policing to commence the development of standardised performance metrics supported by an analytical digital platform in conjunction with relevant National Police Chiefs' Council portfolios, PMCC and the Home Office through a defined working group.

The recommendations are submitted for discussion and consideration.

**Rob Carden**  
**Chief Constable**  
**NPCC Lead for Response Policing**  
**Local Policing Coordination Committee**

**Session 11**

<b>Session</b>	<b>Topics</b>
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# Chief Constables' Council

## Title: NPCC National Operating Budget Financial Review

28\_09\_2023 / Agenda Item: Session 11

<b>Security Classification</b>	
NPCC Policy: Documents <u>cannot</u> be accepted or ratified without a security classification (Protective Marking may assist in assessing whether exemptions to FOIA <u>may</u> apply):	
OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE – FINANCIAL	
<b>Freedom of information (FOI)</b>	
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<b>Author:</b>	CC Gavin Stephens / CC Paul Sanford
<b>Force/Organisation:</b>	NPCC
<b>Date Created:</b>	11/09/23
<b>Coordination Committee:</b>	NPCC Strategic Hub and Finance Coordination Committee
<b>Portfolio:</b>	
<b>Attachments @ para</b>	
<b>Information Governance &amp; Security</b>	
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<a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management">https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management</a>	

### 1. INTRODUCTION

- 1.1. This paper outlines the findings from the initial Future Financial Planning Review work and the recommended next steps to enable decisions to be made by Chiefs' Council on the 2024/25 funding bids for the NPCC Operating Budget. Based on the bids received, there is currently a funding gap of circa £6.6m.
- 1.2. Following phase 1 of the work the review team shared the preliminary findings and key recommendations from the Review with the Strategic Planning and Coordination Board (SPCB, 06/09/2023). From SPCB four key proposals were proposed for agreement at Council:

#### Proposal 1

Force contributions will be capped at no greater than 0.13% of their Net Revenue Budget (NRE) based on 23/24 costs. Functions no longer funded by the operating budget will need to secure alternative funding from other sources or scale back their operations.

#### Proposal 2

There are six critical programme/functions in the 2024/25 bids; these are accepted and will be funded from the National Operating Budget for 2024/25 (maximum cost £9,504,952) as



they are deemed critical on the basis of legal, critical or essential requirements. For these six areas, efficiencies will still be considered as per proposal 3.

### **Proposal 3**

The future financial planning review work will continue with a second phase of work, reporting into December's Chiefs' Council. Subject to Proposal 2 being agreed; there will be a maximum of £9.7m allocated to other function/programmes. Given the size of the spend, the review team does not feel able to make recommendations to council without further scrutiny of the funding request.

### **Proposal 4**

Recipients of funding for the year 2023/24 will not be permitted to utilise any in-year underspend on activity not covered by their original funding proposal. All underspend will be carried forward to fund activity in year 24/25.

## **2. BACKGROUND**

- 2.1. The NPCC National Operating Budget was implemented for the 2022/23 financial year. It was agreed that forces would contribute no more than 0.13% of their Net Revenue Budget towards the Operating Budget. The National Operating Budget was established to give police forces certainty on financial planning as part of their medium-term financial plans and reduce the frequency of ad-hoc funding requests, which would add in-year pressure on force budgets. Also, this would give Chiefs' Council the capability to invest in in-year priorities that arise within policing and from activity within the NPCC coordination committee structure.
- 2.2. Chiefs' Council had previously agreed that NPCC functions should hold a maximum of 5% in general reserves and reserves should only be held where there is a clear and agreed intended purpose. All functions were therefore instructed to review their 2023-24 funding submissions in line with the agreed reserves policy. By reducing levels of reserves, the year 23/24 operating budget remained within the 0.13% limit.
- 2.3. At the start of Q2 of 2023/24 the Finance Coordination Committee commenced a process to receive funding requirements for the NPCC Operating Budget for 2024/25. They have received several new requests for funding in addition to continued funding requests for those activities already being funded, many experiencing inflationary cost pressures. Therefore, without an increase in the percentage contribution made by forces to the Operating Budget a process for reviewing and assuring the future funding requirements was needed to remain in the funding envelope. At Chief Constables' Council in March 2023 it was clear that there was little appetite to increase the current force contribution of 0.13% recognising the budget pressures locally, therefore the review has commenced with the assumption that there will be no growth.
- 2.4. CC Paul Sanford sponsored the Future Financial Planning Review, which was endorsed by CC Gavin Stephens, and a small team from the Strategic Hub were aligned to progress the work and to report back to Chiefs' Council in September 2023.

## **3. FUTURE FINANCIAL PLANNING WORK (PHASE 1)**

- 3.1. The Future Financial Planning Review work was commissioned in March 2023, its purpose was to review the existing funded functions from the NPCC Operating Budget to assess delivery of strategic objectives and to ensure effective and efficient use of available funding

streams in delivering the required business and operational functions across the NPCC network.

3.2. The review team adopted the following methods for each Programme/Function: Initial information gathering survey, desk top review and structured interviews. The work focussed on the following five areas:

- **Purpose and Background** – the background and rationale for the establishment and lifecycle of the function, including any changes in purpose, evolution or development to date.
- **Resource and Capability** – the current staffing levels, skills/capabilities and FTE, and roles within the function, including, where applicable, future requirements.
- **Performance and Delivery** – the strategic and delivery objectives of the function, performance, delivery and outcomes (including delivery to date and future objectives).
- **Governance and Management** – governance and management of the function, reporting and decision making etc.
- **Budget and Funding (inc VFM)** – cost/benefit, risks and opportunities, funding/cost vs delivery and prioritisation.

3.3. Phase one of the review has confirmed the value that the funded activity brings to policing. However, the review has identified the need to change how funds are awarded, governed and assessed. The following summarises the main observations arising from Phase 1 of the work:

#### 3.3.1. Inconsistency in Establishment

- Funding routes – funding routes vary significantly between functions; often complicated funding arrangements drawing on multiple funding streams (stakeholders, partners etc).
- Establishment routes and rationale – there is significant variation in the format and approach of original business cases for each function. This inconsistency makes comparison of business benefits challenging.
- Constitution – Whilst it is known that the funded activity provides important capabilities for policing, the inconsistent use of Terms of Reference and MOUs, along with sometimes limited oversight, has resulted in some functions moving beyond their original scope.
- Resources – capabilities, resource, job titles/role profiles are not consistent, often taken from other business areas/forces, often legacy and not reviewed (some role profiles are still badged, reference and based on ACPO).

#### 3.3.2. Governance

- ‘Functions’ often set up additional governance groups or forums within their area of interest. This can result in different approaches to decision making and how funds are used.
- Where good governance practice is observed, the links to wider NPCC are still sometimes limited.

#### 3.3.3. Visibility and Engagement with Wider NPCC network

- Functions are often not fully engaged with the wider NPCC including the Hub, other functions, policing groups and opportunities (e.g. National Technology Roadshows, OCSA).
- Opportunities to centralise resource, maximise resilience, support consistency, better visibility etc could be explored (e.g. HR support, analysis, business planning, change implementation, advice/guidance etc).

### 3.3.4. Positives

- The most comprehensive phase one returns demonstrated the following:
  - structured and organised activity in key areas for delivery, improvement and development; supporting VfM and effective use of resource and increasingly challenged finances,
  - a staged approach to delivery, focusing on primary objectives which in turn facilitate delivery of other priorities,
  - supported consistent processes of management, governance and delivery ,
  - visibility and clarity of activity, delivery and benefits (focused priorities and clearer reporting/governance, increased attention and targeted resource to delivery)
  - maximised available budget, focusing on areas of highest impact, public interest/safety, VfM etc.

### Summary

- 3.4. The scope of the 'Future Financial Planning Review Phase 1' has been limited to 'programmes/functions' drawing from the National Operating Budget and has attempted to review as many of these functions as possible (in an initial, high level assurance space), to provide context. These functions present inconsistent approaches to one another (encompassing a variety of delivery mechanisms), many of which have evolved over time or have been established at various points in the NPCC's own development. Funded activity requires a clear and consistent means of monitoring so that delivery or value for money can be assessed.
- 3.5. A holistic mapping and review exercise would provide a 'big picture' understanding as well as a consistent benchmark/baseline for financial and operational decisions going forward (as well as supporting potential prioritisation of activity for the NPCC).

## 4. 2024/25 FUNDING BIDS

- 4.1. To balance the budget for 2023/24 with no uplift in contributions from forces, a 5% reserve limit for programmes and functions was set and agreed by Council which resulted in achieving no increase on the £18,531,081 in funding from forces. This was a one-off option to utilise the use of those reserves.
- 4.2. The Finance Committee have received 31 funding requests for funding from the NPCC Operating Budget for 2024/25. This totals £25,820,814 which equates to a £7,289,732 increase in the NPCC Operating Budget and would require Net Revenue Expenditure (NRE) contribution from forces to increase from 0.13% to 0.17%.
- 4.3. Six of the 31 requests are new requests for funding (26 to 31 on the table below. The six new bids total £4,121,524. Of the existing programmes/function (1 to 25 in the table below) £3,671,794 in additional funding is required for 2024/25.

The below table show the funding request received for 2024/25.

		Function / Programme	2024/25 £	2023/24 £	+/- £
1	Legal	NPCC COVID	557,949	210,571	347,378
2	Legal	UCPI	1,195,100	1,195,100	0
3	Operational	NPoCC Op	3,091,781	2,753,706	338,075
4	Operational	NPoCC SIB	1,776,566	1,324,478	452,088
5	Essential	Pensions	500,000	500,000	0
6	Essential	NPCC Central Office	2,383,556	2,413,760	-30,204
7		Internal Stakeholder Engagement	30,000	50,000	-20,000
8		NPFDU	638,146	450,609	187,537
9		ACRO	4,000,000	3,000,000	1,000,000
10		Less Lethal Weapons	281,582	206,320	75,262
11		National VPC Safeguarding and Standards Management	197,700	160,000	37,700
12		Dynamic Decision and Case Management System (DDaCS)	531,938	480,428	51,510
13		PRAP	2,308,109	2,085,466	222,643
14		National Reward Team	530,500	314,000	216,500
15		FCIN	3,123,829	2,763,623	360,206
16		NWCU	280,000	232,585	47,415
17		Operation Bridges	110,000	110,000	0
18		MAPPA	46,000	46,000	0
19		OPAL	756,687	333,853	422,834
20		National Police Estates Group – Custody Review Panel Lead	44,000	44,000	0
21		Chaplaincy	110,000	57,950	52,050
22		Upper Heyford PPE Store for COVID	37,000	37,000	0
23		UK Casualty Bureau Co-ordinator	108,700	101,527	7,173
24		National Personal Safety Training	119,541	212,937	-93,396
25		Taser Assurance - Delivery of Taser Training	150,000	152,977	-2,977
26	New	NPCC Independent Medical Advisor	18,000	0	18,000
27	New	Manchester Arena	30,000	0	30,000
28	New	Forensic Capability Network (FCN)	3,200,000	0	3,200,000
29	New	Right Care Right Person	333,577	0	333,577
30	New	OP Bridger	206,000	0	206,000
31	New	Workforce data capacity	333,947	0	333,947
			<b>25,820,814</b>		<b>7,793,318</b>

4.4. The table below outlines 0.13% Net Revenue Expenditure NRE contribution per force towards the NPCC Operating Budget for 2024-25 based on 2023/24 NRE figures.

Police Force	22/23 Based on 21/22 NRE 0.13%	2023/24 NRE 0.13%	Variance
Avon & Somerset	£457,307	£480,315	£23,007
Bedfordshire	£170,324	£181,920	£11,596
Cambridgeshire	£218,537	£230,924	£12,387
Cheshire	£292,540	£307,971	£15,431
City of London	£113,396	£127,578	£14,182
Cleveland	£211,768	£204,394	-£7,374
Cumbria	£161,409	£168,724	£7,315
Derbyshire	£270,875	£284,936	£14,061
Devon & Cornwall	£470,565	£499,694	£29,129
Dorset	£199,612	£211,737	£12,125
Durham	£198,136	£193,691	-£4,446
Dyfed-Powys	£161,237	£173,439	£12,202
Essex	£444,433	£472,793	£28,361
Gloucestershire	£176,546	£185,236	£8,690
Greater Manchester	£928,022	£935,472	£7,450
Gwent	£198,535	£210,063	£11,528
Hampshire	£513,291	£541,875	£28,584
Hertfordshire	£309,534	£329,551	£20,017
Humberside	£283,825	£294,385	£10,560
Kent	£472,204	£501,254	£29,050
Lancashire	£436,755	£451,787	£15,033
Leicestershire	£284,270	£298,973	£14,703
Lincolnshire	£184,198	£193,981	£9,783
Merseyside	£544,407	£521,708	-£22,699
MOPAC	£4,016,548	£4,266,024	£249,476
Norfolk	£246,302	£259,810	£13,508
North Wales	£233,262	£245,647	£12,385
North Yorkshire	£228,799	£239,353	£10,554
Northamptonshire	£202,280	£214,117	£11,837
Northumbria	£504,813	£447,336	-£57,477
Nottinghamshire	£313,950	£329,510	£15,560
South Wales	£441,170	£466,308	£25,138
South Yorkshire	£426,834	£412,752	-£14,082
Staffordshire	£292,482	£308,071	£15,588
Suffolk	£187,749	£200,863	£13,114
Surrey	£345,383	£367,775	£22,392
Sussex	£433,639	£460,283	£26,644
Thames Valley	£640,312	£684,199	£43,886
Warwickshire	£153,701	£162,743	£9,043
West Mercia	£329,699	£354,949	£25,250
West Midlands	£957,166	£907,884	-£49,282
West Yorkshire	£696,511	£708,816	£12,305
Wiltshire	£178,755	£189,866	£11,112
	<b>£18,531,081</b>	<b>£19,228,707</b>	<b>£697,626</b>

- 4.5. Based on the above force contributions at 0.13% NRE, the funding gap in the NPCC Operating Budget 2024/25 if all bids were supported would be £6,592,106.
- 4.6. Partner organisation and other policing bodies which contributed toward specific NPCC function and programmes will continue to contribute 0.13% of their NRE budget.
- 4.7. Through discussions with the Finance Coordination Committee and SPCB, it is proposed that budget for six key functions/programmes are agreed for 2024/25. This is in recognition that these is either a legal requirement, operational necessity and/or essential requirement for policing for these six areas. However, this does not negate them from further scrutiny or efficiency savings and in some cases, for example NPCC Covid public inquiry, it may be that the budget bid can be reduced dependent on the NPCCs status in future modules.
- 4.8. It is therefore proposed (Proposal 1) that Council commits to fund: Undercover Policing Inquiry, COVID Inquiry, NPoCC Operation and Strategic Intelligence and Briefing, NPCC Central Office and Pensions for 2024/25, as these have either essential, legal or operational requirements. If agreed £9,504,952 of the £19,228,707 is committed spend for 2024/25 which leaves an amount of £9,723,755 to allocated to function/programmes 7 to 31 in the table show in 3.2.
- 4.9. In section 5 we will outline the process in determining how we propose to prioritise the remaining £9,723,755 of the NPCC Operating Budget.

## 5. PHASE 2 – PROPOSED WORK

- 5.1. **Future Financial Planning Phase 2:** Following the findings from Phase 1 of the work and the excess funding bids received, it is proposed that a more detailed and wider assurance piece of work of the programmes and functions requesting funds from the NPCC Operating Budget is undertaken, which would include a second round of consultation and targeted questions to each of the areas requesting funding. The Finance Coordination Committee have identified representatives to sit on a 'panel' to support this work, assisting in providing challenge and scrutiny.
- 5.2. **Phase 2 Scope:** It is proposed that Phase 2 of the review focusses on:
  - 5.2.1. **Resource and Requirements:** Staff, estates, IT, efficiencies, capabilities, FTE and vacancies, duplication, opportunities for 'centralised' resource, priority-based budgeting exercise, opportunities for reduction and consolidation of posts or alternative resource.
  - 5.2.2. **Funding streams:** including alternative existing funding streams, alternative funding opportunities, reserve and underspend levels forecast at end of 2023/24 to offset 2024/25, contingency planning.
  - 5.2.3. **Savings:** how each function would propose to make savings/ reduce their funding bid.
  - 5.2.4. **Rationalisation:** duplication, interdependencies, consolidation, value for money and efficiencies. Linking in with Office of Scientific Advisor for consideration of alternative delivery methods.
  - 5.2.5. **Opportunities and risks:** maximising benefits, foundations for delivery, current approach to risk management, benefits mapping, and future planning.

5.2.6. **Prioritisation:** apply prioritisation matrix, align to NPCC strategic objectives and scheduling of ongoing/paused work.

5.2.7. **Impact and Change requirements:** impact assessment on workforce, cost, transition options, systems and processes.

5.3. **Phase 2 Approach:** will include further review and scrutiny of each functions/programme and their funding request, through interview and challenge panels, with a representative from the Finance Coordination Committee supporting the Review Team. The review team will report progress into the Finance Coordination Committee Chair, NPCC Chair and Hub Lead; and to Committee Chairs via SPCB. Information will be collated and reported back into Chiefs' Council in December and the Review Team will look to make a recommendation on whether or not functions/programmes should remain as part of the operating budget, or be accepted as a permanent requirement, and if so where the most appropriate 'home' would be.

## 6. OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS

6.1. The below detail the opportunities and risks that have been identified following Phase 1 of the review and provide support to carry out further work (Proposal 3) as detailed in Section 5 above:

### 6.2. Opportunities/Benefits

- Alignment to NPCC Strategy/prioritised approach to activity and spend
- Efficiencies, saving and value for money
- More consistent processes, more robust bid processes, easier management, scrutiny and monitoring of bids/spend,
- Better control of budgets, resources, priorities and delivery,
- Enhanced delivery/strategic planning (e.g. funding enabling activity/foundation work that will enhance or facilitate delivery of other functions at the optimal time)

### 6.3. Risks

- Clear risk and impact to operational/strategic delivery and/or force budgets if an alternative approach (to funding all bids) isn't agreed.
- Funding bids without further scrutiny, prioritisation or rationalisation would significantly challenge value for money principles.
- Recommendations/requirements for change/transition will likely require change implementation, costing, impact assessment etc and may impact on staff.
- Any changes will take time and therefore are likely to impact into financial year 2025/26.
- There will be an increased demand on the Hub team to deliver the work by December CCC and may impact BAU/planned activity.
- The Hub team will have to produce a detailed plan with a clear timeline, which will need more resource capacity and therefore additional support will be drawn from colleagues to meet the timeline.
- Functions will no longer see this as a supportive assurance review as further scrutiny is required, this may impact engagement from functions with the team.

## **7. PROPOSALS**

Agreement is sought from Chiefs' Council for the following proposals:

### **Proposal 1**

Force contributions will be capped at no greater than 0.13% of their Net Revenue Budget (NRE) based on 23/24 costs. Functions no longer funded by the operating budget will need to secure alternative funding from other sources or scale back their operations.

### **Proposal 2**

There are six critical programme/functions in the 2024/25 bids; these are accepted and will be funded from the National Operating Budget for 2024/25 (maximum cost £9,504,952) as they are deemed critical on the basis of legal, critical or essential requirements. For these six areas, efficiencies will still be considered as per proposal 3.

### **Proposal 3**

The future financial planning review work will continue with a second phase of work, reporting into December's Chiefs' Council. Subject to Proposal 2 being agreed; there will be a maximum of £9.7m allocated to other function/programmes. Given the size of the spend, the review team does not feel able to make recommendations to council without further scrutiny of the funding request.

### **Proposal 4**

Recipients of funding for the year 2023/24 will not be permitted to utilise any in-year underspend on activity not covered by their original funding proposal. All underspend will be carried forward to fund activity in year 24/25.

**Gavin Stephens**  
**Chief Constable**  
**NPCC Chair**

**Paul Sanford**  
**Chief Constable, Norfolk Constabulary**  
**NPCC Finance Coordination Committee**

Back to Agenda

**Session 12**

Session	Topics
<b>Session 12</b> <b>13:30 –</b> <b>14:15</b>	<b>Diversity, Equality and Inclusion (DEI) and Operational Effectiveness</b>  (Discussion item only – no paper or slides)



# Chief Constables' Council

## Title: Police Race Action Plan - Improving Policing for Black People – Session 12

<p><b>Security Classification</b></p> <p>Documents <u>cannot</u> be accepted or ratified without a security classification in compliance with the Government Security Classification (GSC) Policy (Protective Marking has no relevance to FOI):</p> <p><b>OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE</b></p>	
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<b>Author:</b>	CC Gavin Stephens, T/DAC Alison Heydari (Programme Director)
<b>Force/Organisation:</b>	NPCC
<b>Date Created:</b>	14/09/2023
<b>Coordination Committee:</b>	N/A
<b>Portfolio:</b>	Police Race Action Plan
<b>Attachments @ para</b>	
<p><b>Information Governance &amp; Security</b></p> <p>In compliance with the Government's Security Policy Framework's (SPF) mandatory requirements, please ensure any onsite printing is supervised, and storage and security of papers are in compliance with the SPF. Dissemination or further distribution of this paper is strictly on a need to know basis and in compliance with other security controls and legislative obligations. If you require any advice, please contact <a href="mailto:npcc.foi.request@npfdu.police.uk">npcc.foi.request@npfdu.police.uk</a></p> <p><a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management">https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management</a></p>	

### 1. Purpose

This paper is to provide an update to council members on the progress of the Race Action Plan.

### 2. Recommendations

2.1 Chief Constables are recommended to:

- a) **Note the update provided**
- b) **Support the application of suitably qualified staff for secondment opportunities to PRAP as summarised within this paper**

### 3. Update on Progress

Chief Constables are advised that:

#### 3.1 **Director of Police Race Action Plan**

T/DAC Dr Alison Heydari was appointed as Programme Director on 21<sup>st</sup> August. The majority of this time has been spent fact finding and completing stakeholder engagement to understand what has worked so far and identifying what areas may require a restructure in order to set the direction. Considerations include:

- Benchmarking
- Phased approach to implementation of the plan
- Reviewing governance structures
- Reiteration of the plan
- Communications strategy

### 3.2 **Recruitment**

It is concerning that there are several vacancies at present for key roles. The programme has continued to progress with planned recruitment outlined previously. The majority of those roles have been advertised. Chief Constables are asked to support the application of suitably qualified staff for secondment opportunities to PRAP.

- Data and Performance Strategic Lead – to be advertised
- Project Manager – working with HR to advertise PM on fixed term contract
- Project Support Officers (x2) – candidates being considered
- Comms Strategic Lead – currently undertaking vetting. Hopefully will be in post Nov 23.
- Comms Manager – to be advertised
- Business Change Manager – drafting vacancy to be advertised as a fixed term contract
- PA to Director – to be advertised
- Delivery Lead – vacancy live

### 4. **Recommendations.**

Chief Constables are recommended to:

- a) Note the update provided**
- b) Support the application of suitably qualified staff for secondment opportunities to PRAP as summarised within this paper**

**Dr Alison Heydari**  
**Programme Director**

**Session 13**

<b>Session</b>	<b>Topics</b>
<b>Session 13</b> <b>14:15 –</b> <b>14:45</b>	<b>Workforce Coordination Committee</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Leavers and Retention Framework</b> – (slides will be presented on the day and circulated after the meeting)</li><li>• <b>Professional Standards and Ethics</b> – (Verbal Update only)</li></ul>



## Police Uplift Programme

# Retention | The National Leavers Framework Progress Report to Chiefs Council 28/09/23

Lucia Leon | Retention Lead, Police Uplift Programme



# Police Uplift | A Focus on Retention


A re-cap on the items previously brought to Chiefs Council from the PUP Retention Workstream




**Attrition  
Trends**



**Data  
Framework**



**Exit  
Interviews**



**Retention  
Interviews**



**National Leavers Framework**

# Attrition Headlines | A 2022/23 Re-Cap

What did our 2022/23 officer leaver data tell us about workforce trends

\*Source: [Home Office](#)



3.3%



85

100

6-12 months



70%



3.3%

## Resignations

Resignation rates have increased to 3.3%\* up from 2.5% in 21/22. The increase is in line with modelling, anticipated due to the increase of new-in-service officers. Resignation rates are now the greatest contributor to officer attrition, with 2022/23 being the first year resignations outweighed

## Student Officers

retirements

## First Year

New in service (under five years' service) account for over 70% of all resignations. However, 85 of 100 new recruits will still be in policing after the first two years.

## Ethnicity

Resignation rates in probation are similar across entry routes. However, between 6 and 12 months is a critical point when the biggest increase in resignations occurs.

## Sex

There is a difference in resignation rates between ethnic minority groups and white officers. The resignation rates were already higher than white officers but have increased by a greater amount over the last two

## Data Gaps

years.

## Retirements

Females are more likely to resign than males. However, females are more likely to stay in probation and it is mid-service where the rate of leaving exceeds that of males, and causes the overall higher resignation rate.


# Attrition Headlines | A 2022/23 Re-Cap

There is still a lack of understanding why officers are leaving, with over 70% of resignation reasons provided as 'Unknown'.

Retirement rates have plateaued and are starting to reduce (retirement rate is 3.3%).

# National Leavers Framework | Alignment to Date

Comparing insights for resigning officers pre and post go-live of the National Leavers Framework



**Have insights improved since the launch of the National Leavers Framework?**

Forces are at varying stages of implementation but data returns are already showing the impact

Percentage of reasons for resignations being categorised by

forces as 'unknown'

# Learning | How forces are using leaver insights

Capturing leaver data can inform both tactical operational decisions and support and medium longer-term strategy. Examples from the focus groups include:



**Small things that become big:** an example here was a leaver conversation where the person was unhappy about overly prescribed break times. It was a quick fix to solve this issue



**Localised issues:** A force experienced elevated attrition in one area where several people resigned in a short period of time. The data trend was noticed and exit interviews done and data analysed. This process elicited an issue with line management/supervision which was addressed through appropriate HR processes



**Elevated attrition in student officers:** when looking at data patterns, a force established that student officers are most likely to leave at the point when they transition to frontline duties. To support this experience, the force has now embedded further mentoring and support processes and is monitoring the data for future improvements





**The early years:** one force noted that over 50% of student leavers do so in the first two years. Detailed analysis of leaver reasons reveals that having to work during bank holidays and not being able to take leave during the first six months are crucial factors



**Understanding data patterns over time:** another force had interrogated data and has established that student leaver data spikes in a particular month. They are now following up to investigate whether this might be linked to academic deadlines, or other influences. “July seems to be a peak in each year, just looking at the visuals and the majority of student leavers do so in the first year – that’s [number] for us. We are now following up”

# National Leavers Framework | Growing Insights

Improving data collection and placing more emphasis on organisational listening is starting to yield improved resignation insights



Total Officer Resignations: 410

Resignations: Reasons Provided

**Aug 2023**


Total Officer Resignations: 469

# National Leavers Framework | Growing Commitment

An increasing number of forces are prioritising retention as a strategic workforce commitment and are aligning to the NLF



Level 2 Resignation Unknowns By Force



During the baselining phase (Dec 22), 19 forces were not able to provide *any* resignation reasons for officers. By August 23, this had reduced to 8 forces although there continues to be disparity on the quality of data coming through.

The National Workforce Data Tracker provides an invaluable tool to access national data on capability, performance, diversity, recruitment trends and attrition, enabling improved workforce planning, organisational development and informing on key people strategies.

# National Leavers Framework | Increasing Accountability

Maximising the opportunities leaver insight provides both at a local and national level, to better understand our workforce motivations depends on executive buy-in and strong accountability

As forces mature in their approach to retention, there is scope for policing to draw together all the learning from leaver insights, attrition data, evidence-led interventions and workforce insights from other sectors to develop a compelling strategy for improving employee experience.

Maximising the learning and retention opportunities from the National Leavers Framework requires your continued support:



## 1. Protecting the Uplift Investment:

As Forces look ahead to maintaining the officer uplift, a key priority must be in retaining new and existing talent. For every new recruit who leaves in early service, a financial loss associated with recruitment and training costs impacts the force. For established officers, every resignation is a loss of experience and skill.



## 2. Aligning the Right Resources:

Now is the time for forces to double down on retention efforts. Improved leaver data is dependent on improved employee engagement.

Embedding a National Leaver's Framework will mean prioritising resources in the updating of HR systems and processes, to conduct retention and exit interviews and to ensure meaningful analysis of insights inform strategy and deliverables.



## 3. Securing Commitment:

A positive step towards a national leavers framework, dignified exits for police leavers and crucially, improved insights into voluntary resignations, will only be possible with local and national executive backing. Investing in improved leaver processes and data insights should be seen as an invest to save initiative, and the right thing to do as the employer.

“

Our exit survey is not the optimum way to gather that data. And we know that but it's all we are able to do right now and we've taken steps to make this form more informative. Our ability, capacity and then sometimes the capability to do what we want to do .....

So it goes back to that aspirational journey, you know, over the over the mid to long term to get to where we want to be.

”

# Appendices

	VOLUNTARY	RETIREMENT	INVOLUNTARY	ADMINISTRATIVE																							
L1	Transfer* Resignation	Retirement	Dismissal/ Death In Service	Invalid/Did not start Re-issued collar number																							
L2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Join as staff</li> <li>Join as PCSO</li> <li>Join as PC</li> </ul> Resourcing & Work Conditions Personal & Professional Development & Training Pay & Remuneration Fairness & Support	Normal Superannuation Retirement Early superannuation Retirement Medical Retirement	Conduct Attendance Performance Compulsory Redundancy Voluntary Redundancy†	*N.B For transferees, destination force should be recorded † ADR counts voluntary redundancy under resignation, and compulsory redundancy BEING MANAGED BY FORMAL STAGE OF POLICY Being managed by formal stage of policy: Performance Being managed by formal stage of policy: Attendance Being managed by formal stage of policy: Conduct																							
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- Pay & Reward
- Pension
- Better paid jobs outside police service
- Cost of commute

Other Known Reason *(to be specified by leaver)*

# Retention | Aligning Local Workforce Priorities

*Where should Forces be focusing retention efforts?*




## WORKFORCE PLANNING

Forces understand the main drivers of attrition and accurately forecast their attrition rate to inform effective workforce planning




## ORGANISATIONAL LISTENING

Forces take pro-active measures to understand their workforce attrition patterns, trends and key contributing factors. Measures include exit interviews and surveys.



## NATIONAL DATA FRAMEWORK

Forces align local data capture and leaver processes to the NPCC National Leaver's Framework to drive meaningful, consistent and comparable reasons for leaving data



## IMPACT OF ATTRITION

Forces understand the financial implications for attrition in early years, and the loss of skill and experience for attrition across the workforce and put in place measures to actively manage this



## RETENTION STRATEGY

Forces have a strategy and plan to address undesirable attrition. The strategy is aligned to insights from leavers about push factors/reasons for leaving



## PERFORMANCE DRIVEN

Retention plans are regularly reviewed and are dynamic and flexible according to learning that comes from retention performance reporting




## EARLY INTERVENTIONS

Forces recognise the value of early interventions in voluntary resignations and take pro-active steps to influence individual decision-making and retain talent



## STUDENT OFFICERS

Forces understand the specific challenges faced by new recruits and ensure wellbeing and development needs are prioritised, monitored and enhanced by the provision of effective and supportive supervisors and tutors



## ADDRESSING BARRIERS

Forces recognise the impact of protected characteristics on attrition rates and identify the specific challenges and needs of it's employees from diverse backgrounds. Forces pro-actively work to address internal barriers and reduce the disparities in employee experience



## SPECIALIST SKILLS

Forces understand the options available to retain specialist skills through interventions such as Targeted Variable Payments and Re-joiner Schemes

# Retention | Uplift Hub

Supporting forces post programme closure



On this portal, we share the assets, tips, insights and research generated through the Uplift programme, alongside real-life examples from forces to inform future activity.

## Attracting people

Running campaigns and events that will inspire too high candidates to apply

More about attracting

## Recruiting candidates

Supporting candidates through the recruitment process to the benefit of them and the force

More about recruiting

## Supporting student officers

Supporting new recruits as they join and settle into their chosen force

More about onboarding

## Retaining your workforce


Keeping your serving workforce motivated and engaged

More about retention

During the three years of the Police Uplift Programme, policing has worked together to attract, recruit, onboard and retain our workforces.

Building momentum to recruit, retain and sustain the additional officers recruited through Uplift, to support all ally and third-party organisations and continue to improve recruitment.

On this portal we share the assets, tips, insights and research generated through the Uplift programme, alongside real-life examples from forces to inform future activity.



**Session 15**

Session	Topics
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**Session 16**

<b>Session</b>	<b>Topics</b>
<b>Session 16 16:45 – 17:15</b>	<b>Review of Productivity in Policing (Closed Session) – Verbal update only</b>