

c/o PO BOX 481  
Fareham  
Hampshire  
PO14 9FS

Tel: 02380 478922

Email: [npcc.foi.request@npfdu.police.uk](mailto:npcc.foi.request@npfdu.police.uk)

26/05/2026

**FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST REFERENCE NUMBER: 2868/2026**

Thank you for your request for information regarding Chief Constables' Council, which has now been considered.

**Applicant Question:**

Thank you for your response. Can you please send me the papers related to the following:

Minutes for approval  
National funding position (NPCC hub)  
NPCC Vacancies  
Online abuse of chief officers  
Casey recommendations  
NPCC Strategic risk update  
Consistency of grant treatment  
Connected and automated vehicles  
Suicide data reporting paper  
Misinformation, disinformation and malinformation  
Guidance: police attendance at publicly arranged community events  
Antisemitism commission  
Operations coordination's committee (all three topics)  
National Police Reform (all four topics)  
Peel Inspections HMICFRS  
Crime coordination committee (all five)  
Leadership commission  
Police advisory board for England and Wales  
PRAP update  
College of Policing (both topics)

**NPCC Response:**

The NPCC does hold information captured by your request.

I have identified where redactions have taken place and in doing so have stated the exemption that applies to each redaction.

I have detailed the exemption(s) used below, namely S23(1) Information supplied by or relating to security bodies, S31(1) Law Enforcement and S40(2) Personal Information.

Title	Paper	Exemption(s)
<b>Session 1</b>	Minutes December 2025 (1b) PRRB (1d) <b>Reform (1c)</b>	S40(2), S23(1), S31(1) S43(2) in part. Released in full Withheld in part S31(1)
<b>Parish Notices</b>		
	National funding position (NPCC Hub)	Verbal update
	NPCC Vacancies	Verbal update
	Online Abuse of Chief Officers (1a)	Released in full
<b>Current Operational Demands</b>	Casey Recommendations (1e)	S23(1) withheld in full
<b>Regional Papers</b>		
	NPCC Strategic Risk Update Regional Paper (1f) Appendix A	S40(2), S23(1), S31(1) S31(1) withheld in full
	Consistency of grant treatment (1g)	Minor S40(2)
	Connected & automated Vehicles 1(h)	S23(1) S31(1) in part.
	Suicide data reporting paper (1i)	Released in full
	Misinformation, disinformation and malinformation (1j)	Minor S31(1) S40(2)
	Guidance: police attendance at publicly arranged community events (1k)	Minor S40(2)
<b>Session 2</b>		
	Antisemitism commission	Released in full
<b>Session 3 Operations CC</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Information Disorder – concept of operations</li> </ul>	Presentation only – released in full.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Summer concurrency of 2028 – National Impact Assessment</li> <li>• Specialist Capability Update</li> </ul>	
<b>Session 4 Reform</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PCC Transition</li> <li>• Strategic Training Panel</li> <li>• Review of Force Structures</li> <li>• Delivery of Reform</li> </ul>	Presentation only S31(1) in part.
<b>Session 7</b>	Peel Inspections HMICFRS	Released in full.
<b>Session 8 Crime CC</b>	Angiolini Part 2 Online CSEA National CG – Epstein Response Waste Crime ROCU funding	Objective slides for discussion only. Minor redaction S23(1) S31(1).
<b>Session 9</b>	Leadership Commission	Objective slides for discussion only. Released in full.
<b>Session 10</b>	Police Advisory Board for England & Wales	Objective slides for discussion only. Released in full.
<b>Session 13</b>	PRAP Update	
<b>Session 14 College of Policing</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Vetting Accreditation</li> <li>• NCHIs</li> </ul>	Objective Slide & Presentation Minor S40(2) Report : S21(1)

Notes for context:

1a Online abuse of Chief Officers – In respect of this paper, CC Swann has confirmed that while she authored the document, the contents reflect **areas identified for possible progression and discussion**, rather than confirmed decisions or agreed actions. There is not objection to disclosure; however, it is important that this context is clearly understood.

1c For completeness, the minutes of the extraordinary Chief Constables' Council (January 2025 – Police Reform) remain subject to a Public Interest Test extension due to ongoing consultation between the NPCC and the Home Office.

1k The guidance that was sent to Chief Constables' Council has been amended and for your convenience, have provided in addition, the up to date version, with minor redaction.

14 The NCHI report has been published: [Review of non-crime hate incidents](#)

Yours sincerely  
Freedom of Information Officer & Decision Maker

[www.npcc.police.uk](http://www.npcc.police.uk)

## COMPLAINT RIGHTS

### Internal Review

Any request for an internal review will be acknowledged and responded to, based on the specific wording of your initial request only.

**We ask that any rationale to request an internal review, does not include any requests for new information and ask that these be submitted by separate email. We will acknowledge as a new request and may aggregate to your initial request in compliance with the legislation.**

If you are dissatisfied with the response you have been provided with in compliance with the Freedom of Information legislation, you can lodge a complaint with NPCC to have the decision reviewed within 40 working days of the date of this response.

The handling of your request will be looked at by someone independent of the original decision and a fresh response provided.

It would be helpful, if requesting a review, for you to articulate in detail the reasons you are not satisfied with this reply.

If you would like to request a review, please write or send an email to NPCC Freedom of Information, c/o PO Box 481, Fareham, Hampshire, PO14 9FS.

## Annex A

Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 requires the NPCC, when refusing to provide information by way of exemption in question and (c) states why the exemption applies. In accordance with the Freedom of Information Act 2000 this letter acts as a refusal notice to those aspects of your request.

### **The legislation: Section 21 Information reasonably accessible to the applicant by other means**

- (1) Information which is reasonably accessible to the applicant otherwise than under section 1 is exempt information.
- (2) For the purposes of subsection (1)—
  - a) information may be reasonably accessible to the applicant even though it is accessible only on payment, and
  - 
  - b) information is to be taken to be reasonably accessible to the applicant if it is information which the public authority or any other person is obliged by or under any enactment to communicate (otherwise than by making the information available for inspection) to members of the public on request, whether free of charge or on payment.

S21 is an absolute exemption and there is no requirement to conduct a public interest test.

### **The legislation: Section 23 Information supplied by, or relating to security bodies**

(1) Information held by a public authority is exempt information if it was directly or indirectly supplied to the public authority by, or relates to any of the bodies specified in subsection (3)  
This is an absolute exemption and there is no requirement to consider the public interest test.

### **The legislation: Section 31 Law Enforcement**

(1) Information which is not exempt information by virtue of section 30 is exempt information if its disclosure under this Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice -  
(a) the prevention or detection of crime  
(b) the apprehension or prosecution of offenders

Disclosure of this information would enable those with criminal intent to target specific areas of the UK to conduct their criminal or terrorist activities. This would also enable criminals to take measures to counteract the tactical capabilities of police forces.

Disclosure of this information would have the likelihood of identifying specific vulnerabilities, which would ultimately compromise police tactics, operations and future prosecutions. Any information identifying the focus of policing activity could be used to the advantage of terrorists or criminal organisations. Information that undermines the operational integrity of these activities will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on law enforcement. Public safety would be put at risk if criminals were able to counteract police tactics. The NPCC is committed to demonstrating proportionality and accountability.

Any information that could impact or undermine ongoing investigations or any future investigations would enable targeted individuals / groups to become tactically aware of the police capabilities. This would help subjects and avoid detection, and inhibit the prevention and detection of crime.

The NPCC will not disclose information which may hinder the effective management of law enforcement or place staff or officers at risk. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and in this case providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively managing this area of policing, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the tactical abilities.

The prevention and detection of crime is the foundation upon which policing is built and the police service have a clear responsibility to prevent crime and arrest those responsible for committing crime or those that plan to commit crime. Disclosure of information captured by this request could directly influence the stages of that process, and jeopardise current investigations or prejudice law enforcement

Some information withheld under Section 31 comprises material whose disclosure would be likely to prejudice the effective delivery of law enforcement and public safety functions.

This includes a detailed and itemised list of current strategic risks faced by policing, together with associated contextual narrative, risk ratings, confidence scores, and mitigation assessments, often referred to collectively as a risk matrix. This information reflects internal professional assessments of vulnerability, prioritisation, and assurance across areas such as governance, funding sustainability, public confidence, hostile threats, operational capability, and organisational resilience.

Disclosure of this information would be likely to enable individuals with criminal or hostile intent to identify where policing currently assesses its areas of greatest pressure, uncertainty, or reduced assurance, and the relative weighting attached to those risks. This could reasonably be expected to:

- Inform hostile actors or those seeking to exploit perceived weaknesses in policing capability, coverage, or strategic focus;
- Enable criminals, organised crime groups, or terrorist actors to adapt their behaviour to counteract policing tactics or protections;
- Undermine the effectiveness of measures designed to manage and mitigate identified risks;
- Compromise the operational integrity of policing activity and prejudice future investigations or prosecutions;
- Adversely affect the NPCC's ability to discharge its statutory functions and protect public safety.

The prejudice envisaged is not speculative. Strategic risk assessments and risk matrices are a core component of how policing identifies threat, manages vulnerability, safeguards operational resilience, and allocates limited resources. Disclosure would be likely to reveal specific vulnerabilities and internal confidence judgements which, if exploited, could place the public, officers, staff, and policing outcome at risk.

Any information which identifies the focus, prioritisation, or confidence levels of policing activity may be used to the advantage of criminals or hostile actors. Information that undermines operational capability or reveals how

policing tests and challenges its own resilience would have a direct and negative impact on the prevention and detection of crime.

The NPCC will not disclose information where, by doing so would hinder the effective management of law enforcement, undermine risk management processes, or place officers, staff, or the public at increased risk.

Additionally, some correspondence contains direct staff contact details. Disclosure of such information could enable individuals intent on committing criminal activity to impersonate police or staff, or to seek to elicit sensitive information, further prejudicing law enforcement.

Section 31 is a qualified exemption and I have carefully considered the public interest arguments for and against disclosure.

It is recognised that disclosure would:

Promote transparency and accountability in how national policing identifies and manages strategic risks;  
Contribute to public understanding of the challenges facing policing, including funding pressures, reform, service delivery, and organisational resilience;  
Support informed public debate on the use of public funds and the strategic direction of policing'  
Provide reassurance that risks are being recognised and actively managed.

The NPCC acknowledges that strong public interest in openness, particularly where senior decision-making, governance, and public confidence are concerned.

However, we consider that disclosure would give risk to significant and compelling public interest harm:

- It would reveal the relative prioritisation, weighting, and confidence levels attached to policing risks, which could be exploited to undermine law enforcement capability or public safety.
- As risk registers and matrices represent a snapshot in time, disclosure risks misinterpretation or inappropriate comparison over time, potentially distorting public understanding and adversely affecting confidence.
- Publication would be likely to inhibit the candour, openness, and robustness of internal risk discussions, weakening strategic risk management processes that exist expressly to protect the public.
- Some risks relate to areas of ongoing political, operational or public sensitivity. Disclosure could improperly draw policing leadership into political debate, distracting from operational priorities and prejudicing operational independence.
- Public release of assessed risk-particularly those relating to threats, resilience, or confidence-could heighten public anxiety without delivering a corresponding benefit to safety or effective scrutiny.

Disclosing information which may place the public at risk, assist criminal behaviour, or weaken policing capability cannot be in the public interest. The prevention and detection of crime is fundamental to policing, and disclosure that negatively impacts this objective would undermine public trust and make policing more difficult.

While there is a clear and legitimate interest in transparency, we consider that this is outweighed by the strong public interest in ensuring that the NPCC and the police service can carry out their law enforcement and public

safety functions effectively. The risks associated with disclosure would be likely to prejudice outcomes, compromise strategic risk management, and undermine mechanisms designed to identify and mitigate harm. Maintaining the exemption better serves the overall public interest.

Some of the information contained within the minutes relates to live and evolving work and internal financial discussions that require free, frank, and informed engagement with policing stakeholders. Disclosure at this stage would be likely to inhibit those discussions, risk misunderstanding or misinterpretation of incomplete information, and prejudice the effective development and delivery of law enforcement functions.

There is a strong public interest in ensuring that policing policy and financial planning can be developed robustly and without premature external influence.

On balance, the public interest favours maintain the exemption. While transparency is important, its outweighed in this case by the need to protect ongoing policy development and effective law enforcement decision-making.

#### **Additional S31 Public Interest Consideration (Minutes 1b and 1c):**

Some of the information withheld from the Chief Constables' Council minutes at items 1b and 1c relates to ongoing national police reform discussions and live engagement with the Home Office. These discussions reflect evolving positions, early-stage policy considerations, and sensitive assessments of risk, delivery, and implementation.

Disclosure at this stage would be likely to prejudice the effective development of reform activity by inhibiting the free and frank exchange of views between policing and government and could undermine the mutual trust required to progress complex cross-government programmes. There is a strong public interest in ensuring that policing leaders are able to engage candidly and constructively with the Home Office to support the delivery of national reform.

Premature disclosure of partially developed positions or sensitive internal considerations risks misinterpretation, could weaken the ability of policing to represent its position effectively, and may damage working relationships that are essential to the successful delivery of reform. This would, in turn, be likely to impact the effectiveness of law enforcement and public safety functions.

On balance, the public interest favours maintaining the exemption.

#### **The legislation: Section 40 Personal Information**

(1) Any information to which a request for information relates is exempt information if it constitutes personal data of which the applicant is the data subject.

**(2) Any information to which a request for information relates is also exempt information if**  
**(a) it constitutes personal data which does not fall within subsection (1), and**  
**(b) the first, second or third condition below is satisfied.**

(3A) The first condition is that the disclosure of the information to a member of the public otherwise than under this Act—

(a) would contravene any of the data protection principles, or  
(b) would do so if the exemptions in section 24(1) of the Data Protection Act 2018 (manual unstructured data held by public authorities) were disregarded.

(3B) The second condition is that the disclosure of the information to a member of the public otherwise than under this Act would contravene Article 21 of the GDPR (general processing: right to object to processing).

Any information to which a request for information relates is also exempt information if it constitutes personal data which do not fall within subsection (1), and either the first or the second condition is satisfied.

S40(2) applies to third party personal data. Any release would breach the data protection principles contained within the Data Protection Act 2018. S40(2) has been engaged by virtue of S40(3)(a)(i). Any disclosure of withheld information would breach the first data protection principle of fair and lawful processing.

This is an absolute exemption and there is no requirement to apply the public interest test.

#### **The legislation: Section S43 Commercial Interests**

(2) Information is exempt information if its disclosure under this Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice commercial interests of any person (including the public authority holding it).

The disclosure of the exempt information would provide greater transparency on how the police service spends public money. It would provide greater clarity on the propositions made by the UK police service and what resources will be allocated in order to ensure that the proposals are successfully tendered and completed.

There is a public interest in understanding how public bodies manage their finances, including potential charging models and cost-recovery proposals, to ensure accountability for the use of public funds.

However, relationships would undoubtedly be damaged by the disclosure of the redacted information.

The information relates to commercially sensitive proposals that are still under development and subject to discussion with stakeholders. Disclosure at this stage could harm the College's commercial position by wakening its ability to negotiated or implement charging arrangements and could undermine the development of viable and value-for-money outcomes. Protecting the College's commercial interests ultimately supports the efficient and effective use of public resources.

It is important that information is protected which would undermine any such relations as this would not only have an effect on the police service but also any future engagements and proposals the police service may have. The papers concern also the strategic position of the police service in relation to both financial and commercial and operational risk.

Although there is a public interest in understanding how the police service determines whether a service / product is suitable, there is risk of compromise and the trust and confidence between the parties is not in the public interest.

Although there is a public interest and accountability in knowing details of individuals who make decisions on behalf of the police service, the information should not be disclosed where there is a strong possibility that the disclosure would undermine the decision-making process.

There is always a public interest in knowing how the police service allocates finances and the disclosure of this information may undermine the tendering process in securing contracts.

Disclosure of the information would have a negative effect on the relationship of the supplier and individual police forces, as well as the NPCC.

Where public funds are being spent, there is a public interest in accountability and justification. In this case, there is an increase in public interest in how Senior Police Officers come together and debate national issues.

S43 protects information which, if disclosed, may adversely affect someone's business interests.

The NPCC feel it would be inappropriate on our part to release any information that may adversely affect the business interests of an individual and reputation.

#### **Legislation – Section 16**

- (1) It shall be the duty of a public authority to provide advice and assistance, so far as it would be reasonable to expect the authority to do so, to persons who propose to make, or have made, requests for information to it.