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CHIEF POLICE OFFICERS



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Investigating Burglary:

A Guide to Investigative Options and Good Practice

This has been published as an interim product due to the development of Authorised Professional Practice (APP) and may be published in an alternative format in the future as part of the APP programme.

2011

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by the National Policing Improvement Agency

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Preface

Tackling domestic burglary is a challenge for many agencies. Effective, long-term reductions can only be achieved by working together, sharing and implementing good practice, and developing new tactical options that keep pace with the changes in this type of criminality.

This document details good practice that has been developed in recent years by the agencies involved in fighting domestic burglary. It identifies local and national approaches, and provides a menu of tactical options that have been applied effectively. It is relevant to all police leaders responsible for burglary prevention, reduction and investigation.

Offenders try to exploit every weakness in investigative methods. They test the latest preventive measures and work tirelessly to undermine efforts to reduce domestic burglary. Many will learn from their mistakes, alter their tactics and use new ways to combat security devices. They will share their experience and work in partnership with other criminals and those who handle stolen goods. To reduce domestic burglary, the police must react as quickly as the offenders do, develop innovative methods of investigation and work in partnership with those agencies that share the responsibility for tackling domestic burglary. By disseminating examples of the operational tactics developed by many agencies, the Police Service can benefit from the experience of sharing this information and will be better placed to meet the challenges associated with reducing domestic burglary.

Paul Broadbent

ACC (Crime) Nottinghamshire Police

Introduction

This document provides tactical options for the investigation, detection and reduction of domestic burglary. It has been compiled as a result of extensive consultation with a number of police forces, the Home Office and those partner agencies that share the responsibility for tackling domestic burglary. All of the tactical options featured have been applied somewhere in the UK and have been successful. Not all of the tactical options will be applicable to each force because of the differences between forces in terms of geography, demographics, the nature of the crime problem, policing problems and current tactics employed. Each force will need to determine what is relevant and applicable to its circumstances, but it is important that this is based on a proper analysis of the nature and causes of the burglary problem.

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Intelligence

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1.1 The National Intelligence Model

The National Intelligence Model (NIM) process begins with strategic ownership at ACPO level. The principles of the model should drive each process within burglary investigation. In order to achieve the full business benefits of NIM, the tasking and co-ordination process needs to be effectively managed. The business activity is driven by four intelligence products:

- Strategic Intelligence Assessment;
- Tactical Intelligence Assessment;
- Problem Profile;
- Target Profile.

1.1.1 Strategic Intelligence Assessment

The Strategic Intelligence Assessment gives an overview of the problems facing a basic command unit (BCU) or the force or region. The assessment is based on research and analysis of a wide range of information sources and is not restricted to police information on criminal activity or criminals. It should include material from a range of sources including:

- Public perception;
- Public satisfaction surveys and health;
- Welfare and education data;
- Local arrangements to capture the effect of crime and disorder.

1.1.2 Tactical Intelligence Assessment

This provides the overall picture of crime and incidents in accordance with the Control Strategy priorities. It also:

- Helps to provide a picture of crime trends, crime series, emerging hot spots and selection of targets;
- Enables Tactical Tasking and Co-ordinating Groups to make resource allocation decisions balanced against priorities by reviewing intelligence, prevention and enforcement plans.

1.1.3 Problem Profile

The Problem Profile is a report produced after a detailed examination of a problem faced. It should:

- Provide a clear intelligence profile of crime/incident series, hot spots, disorder problems or a priority theme identified within the control strategy;
- Identify intelligence gaps and make recommendations for intelligence collection, enforcement and prevention plans.

1.1.4 Target Profile

The Target Profile is a document which:

- Provides a clear picture of the intelligence assembled on a subject(s) within an operation, or provides intelligence on a subject that needs further development;
- Should be as complete as possible in light of the available intelligence, and identify intelligence gaps;
- Makes recommendations for intelligence collection, enforcement and prevention plans;
- Should contain sufficient information to enable operational managers to make resourcing decisions and prioritise subjects.

Further information on NIM and Tasking and Co-ordination can be found at

<https://polka.pnn.police.uk/GPDocuments/38/Practice%20Improvement%20Publications/Guidance/NIM.pdf> and

<https://polka.pnn.police.uk/GPDocuments/38/Practice%20Improvement%20Publications/Practice%20Advice/Tasking%20and%20Coordination.pdf>

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Call Management and Deployment Centre

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2.1 Call Management

The initial contact between victims and witnesses with the police is a key component of the crime management process and should be regarded as the start of the investigation. Call Management Centres, therefore, have a significant part to play in any burglary investigation. The fast-time response to burglary investigations, accurate assessment of the police response required and debriefing callers reporting incidents of domestic burglary are of considerable importance.

To assist this process, forces should:

- Consider providing call takers with a list of questions to ask victims so that relevant information of a consistent standard is obtained;
- Ensure that call centre staff give basic crime scene preservation advice to victims prior to the arrival of Crime Scene Investigators (CSI)/Scenes of Crime Officers (SOCO) and/or Forensic Scene Investigators (FSI), who should be deployed at an early stage.

2.2 Deployment Centre Process

The efficient management and allocation of resources is an important element of the burglary investigation process. Some forces have developed a deployment policy that gives clear direction to operators of what is required, and incorporates a minimum standard for burglary investigation.

It is good practice for force deployment centres to have a policy/process in place for responding to trigger plans and prioritising deployment to repeat victims, distraction burglary offences and vulnerable victims.

2.3 Initial Attendance

Gathering evidence as expediently and accurately as possible is essential to the success of a burglary investigation. The most significant contributing factor is the first investigator's report and the quality of the actions taken at the scene.

It is important, therefore, to consider who should be the first attending officer. Initial deployment to domestic burglaries is often undertaken by uniformed officers engaged in initial response policing. These officers are usually the least experienced in terms of crime investigation and are the most likely to be diverted to a further call before they have had time to undertake a proper investigation at the scene.

Forces should set out clearly the minimum standards of investigation required for all those who attend the scene of a burglary, regardless of which unit they work on.

It will assist the investigation if the initial officer attending the scene:

- Identifies the route taken by the offender;
- Identifies the point of entry and exit;
- Records items moved;
- Carries out initial house-to-house enquiries;
- Conducts a peripheral search of the scene and remains at the scene to brief the CSI rather than leaving it to the victim;
- Considers the deployment of a dedicated burglary response officer or officer from a dedicated burglary unit as the initial response.

Where there is doubt about the authenticity of the report, it is entirely correct that forces consider all the facts of the case before finalising the incident as a burglary and recording a crime, which should be completed within seventy-two hours.

Further information on crime recording can be found at <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/science-research/research-statistics/crime/counting-rules/>

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Investigation

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3.1 Attendance Policy

It is recommended that forces review their current crime investigation and scene attendance policy, to determine whether domestic burglary offences are being 'screened out' from further investigation.

Forces should ensure that all burglary crimes, especially attempted burglaries, are not screened out from an investigation, and are brought to the attention of the CSI/SOCO/FSI to ensure 100 per cent attendance.

Consideration should be given to forming dedicated burglary investigation teams. These teams should attend every instance of dwelling burglary and provide a 'one-stop' approach to the investigation of domestic burglary, rather than several officers being involved in the end-to-end process.

If forces are unable to appoint their own dedicated burglary investigation teams, other suitable officers, who have received additional training, should be considered for the role of designated burglary investigation officers. These officers should be given sufficient time to properly investigate the crime before they are allocated further incidents.

The approach adopted by each force will be determined by the availability of resources.

3.1.1 Dedicated Burglary Investigation Teams

There are many advantages to having a dedicated burglary team. They include the following:

- Training can be targeted at a smaller group of officers;
- Regular attendance at burglary scenes allows them to link offences by modus operandi (MO) or description more quickly;
- Evidence from the scene can be responded to immediately, resulting in early arrests often before the offender has disposed of the stolen property;
- Minimum standards of investigation can be set, monitored and achieved;
- Officers can be afforded sufficient time to undertake the investigation effectively;
- False, exaggerated or inaccurate burglary reports can be more easily identified;
- The management and support of victims can be undertaken to a consistent and professional standard;

- The management of offenders can be undertaken to a consistent and professional standard;
- Warrants relating to those suspected of being responsible for burglary offences can be prioritised;
- A single point of contact can be established for all activities relating to burglary investigation and these individuals can attend daily briefing meetings.

Forces that have used dedicated burglary investigation teams have found a significant improvement in performance, particularly in relation to the detection and reduction of burglary. If this level of performance is to be maintained, forces must ensure that dedicated officers are not diverted to other investigative duties.

3.2 Burglary Investigation Packs

In order to ensure a professional and coordinated response to the investigation of a scene, a number of forces have produced a burglary pack that consists of:

- Procedural checklists;
- Generic crime prevention advice;
- Security risk assessment form;
- Victim vulnerability assessment form;
- Stolen property pro forma;
- Crime scene preservation advice;
- Burglary alert cards – these can be left with neighbours;
- Property marking pens and associated warning stickers.

Forces should consider adopting investigation packs even though they may not have dedicated burglary investigation teams. If property marking initiatives are to be successful, the police need to be seen to be taking positive steps to identify and recover such property. Officers could be equipped with the means, for example ultraviolet lights, to examine covert markings at the roadside.

3.3 Burglary Scene Investigation

Forces need to determine their policy in relation to burglary investigation and set appropriate standards. The following is regarded as good practice:

- Immediate preservation of the crime scene in order to maximise forensic opportunities, and the requirement for a CSI/SOCO/FSI to attend promptly;
- Accurate identification of MO including point and method of entry, style of offence, when the offence occurred and the type of property stolen;

- Accurate description of all stolen property, including as far as possible the make, model, serial number and any identifying marks or characteristics;
- House-to-house enquiries in the immediate vicinity in order to identify potential witnesses, alert local residents to the crime and provide timely advice regarding security of property;
- The identification of systems such as closed-circuit television (CCTV), automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) and speed cameras;
- A security risk assessment on behalf of the victim with advice on how a similar offence could be prevented in the future;
- The provision of advice regarding property marking and registration;
- The provision of advice regarding victim support;
- Giving detailed information to the victim regarding crime report numbers and appropriate contact details;
- Advice on the benefits of a neighbourhood watch scheme;
- Linking in with local police community support officers (PCSOs), who can provide reassurance to victims and need to be involved/informed in order to achieve this;
- Putting a strategy in place for repeat victims;
- Recording a victim(s) impact statement and referring them to appropriate partner agencies.

3.4 Forensic Investigation at the Scene

There is evidence to indicate that increasing the number of crime scenes examined by CSI/SOCO increases the likelihood of recovering forensic evidence. For this reason, forces should consider the following:

- All domestic burglary scenes should be visited by a CSI/SOCO/FSI in order to maximise forensic opportunities;
- In addition to the traditional forensic recovery, photographing the crime scene, particularly where the offender has caused damage or disruption, has proved successful in bringing the emotional impact that the offence can have on the victim to the attention of a judge and jury, and supports the victim impact evidence;
- Crime scene preservation advice issued to victims is only effective if the CSI/SOCO/FSI can attend the scene shortly after the offence has been reported – priority attendance should be considered;

- The CSI/SOCO/FSI should walk through the crime scene with the victim in order to determine the route taken by the offender;
- In order to improve fast tracking of forensic evidence, all elimination samples should be obtained at the earliest opportunity.

3.4.1 Post-Scene Forensic Management and Intelligence

The investigating officer and the CSI/SOCO/FSI should determine a forensic strategy which could include the following areas:

- Consider the fast tracking of forensic samples/marks recovered from scenes to assist in the early identification of suspects;
- Consider the option of using a courier service to convey exhibits rather than rely on weekly collections, or use officers engaged in driver training to collect forensic exhibits from police stations and deliver them to the Forensic Science Service (FSS);
- Maximise opportunities to gather forensic evidence/intelligence from suspects in custody for relevant offences – consider as a routine and attempt to obtain all footwear impressions from items worn and recovered from suspects' homes;
- Ensure that all appropriate information in terms of forensic preservation is recorded against outstanding vehicles stolen as a result of burglary offences;
- Ensure that property stolen from burglaries is appropriately recorded and identifiable on crime recording systems to enable it to be fast tracked for forensic analysis if and when recovered;
- Consider the need for a forensic intelligence unit, or having dedicated forensic intelligence analysts linking crimes by forensic evidence, in particular footwear and glove marks;
- Co-locating, if feasible, the CSI/SOCO/FSI departments with the investigation teams to promote stronger collaboration.

3.5 Post-Scene Investigation

Irrespective of the evidence acquired, there are a number of generic elements of burglary investigation that can be applied to all cases.

3.5.1 Intelligence System Checks

The following intelligence searches should be considered:

- MO search to identify offender or link offences;
- Recent prison releases;

- Offender descriptions;
- Type of property stolen;
- Local intelligence reports including stop-checks;
- Using PNC, VODS (vehicle online descriptive search) and QUEST (querying using extended search techniques) search facilities if vehicle details or offender descriptions have been provided by witnesses;
- Completing a Routine Activity Analysis, as most offenders operate within a statistically determined distance from a known place of residence, leisure or business;
- Regional and National Intelligence Bulletins.

3.5.2 Covert Human Intelligence Sources – Recruiting, Profiling and Tasking

Forces should consider the proactive recruitment and tasking of covert human intelligence sources (CHIS) in respect of burglary offences, to obtain intelligence against those responsible for burglary and those who dispose of the proceeds of the crime. In addition, analysis of an offender's lifestyle and associates may identify vulnerabilities that can be exploited. This includes cultivating sources. The comprehensive profiling of an individual's life skills is essential for optimum tasking of the CHIS. This process is central to understanding the motivation of the individual and allows the authorising officer to make a measured judgement regarding risk when deciding whether to grant an authority for Use and Conduct.

For further information on the use of sources, investigators should liaise with the force or BCU Dedicated Source Unit.

3.5.3 Crimestoppers

Crimestoppers has proved to be a productive means of obtaining information relating to burglary, and forces should consider promoting the Crimestoppers telephone number during any burglary operation.

Crimestoppers cards can be issued to investigating officers to hand out during house-to-house enquiries as a means of acquiring information from those who may be reluctant to contact the police directly. Further information can be found at <http://www.crimestoppers-uk.org>

3.5.4 Media and Publicity

Proactive use of the media should be considered in order to:

- Seek public help in detecting crime;
- Reassure the public that the police take an active approach to investigating crime;
- Reassure the public about the level of crime and that they are unlikely to become a victim;
- Encourage public vigilance and crime prevention;
- Deter offenders from committing crime.

3.5.5 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002

Financial investigation has the potential to identify assets that may not be immediately evident, including:

- Cars or other vehicles;
- Equity in any housing;
- Savings or other financial products;
- Valuable household items such as Blu-ray, plasma televisions and computers.

Further information regarding the Proceeds of Crime Act can be found at <https://polka.pnn.police.uk/GPDocuments/38/Practice%20Improvement%20Publications/Practice%20Advice/POCL.pdf>

3.5.6 Stolen Property

Burglars need to dispose of the property they steal. Investigators should consider enquiries with second-hand shops and other known outlets of second-hand goods, including the internet.

Targeting used goods buyers and outlets is considered good practice and supports the preventive measures offered to communities by forces, eg, the National Mobile Phone/Property Register (NMPR).

3.5.7 Arrests Based on Forensic Evidence

Opportunities for early arrests can be enhanced by the rapid notifications of forensic hits to a designated BCU single point of contact and arrest packages allocated. The time limits for actioning forensic hits should be in place and monitored.

3.5.8 Covert Surveillance Equipment

Technical Support Units (TSUs) have access to a wide range of equipment that can be particularly useful when dealing with persistent offenders or repeat offences. TSUs can provide advice on the tactics, deployment and the effectiveness of equipment.

Covert tactics should be considered in accordance with the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and **ACPO/ACPOS/HMRC/SOCA (2010) Guidance on the Use and Management of Specialist Surveillance Techniques [Restricted]**. See https://polka.pnn.police.uk/GPDocuments/38/Practice%20Improvement%20Publications/Guidance/LEUCT%20-%20TSU_2010_locked.pdf

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Distraction Burglary and Doorstep Crime Tactics

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4.1 Introduction

Distraction burglary should not be viewed as separate from other doorstep crimes, such as bogus property repairers or dishonest salesmen. In many cases these offenders form part of the same criminal fraternity; indeed, some of them will switch between MOs, depending on the individual circumstances. Enforcement and prevention plans should, therefore, encompass all aspects of doorstep crime and in doing so recognise the role of other enforcement agencies.

A common feature of doorstep crime is that the majority of victims are elderly or vulnerable. Prosecution for such offences is seen as good practice as the impact on these victims is significant and can lead to loss of self-confidence, illness and, on occasions, death.

4.2 Community Awareness

When distraction burglaries have been committed, or bogus offenders have been operating in a particular area, it is essential that the police and their partners raise public awareness to protect other elderly and vulnerable people in the community. This needs to be achieved without unnecessarily raising the fear of crime. The use of early warning systems involving partners such as Meals on Wheels or Age UK should be considered. Where Neighbourhood Watch schemes are in place, distraction burglary alert cards could be delivered.

4.3 Effective Response

The nature of doorstep crime/distraction burglaries means that any enforcement strategy must include the ability to respond immediately to such reports.

To achieve this, forces should consider:

- Aide-memoires for response police officers, outlining Consumer Protection Act 1987 legislation, to deal with rogue traders who call unsolicited at the homes of consumers and undertake substandard work;
- Early liaison with Trading Standards to ensure that the most appropriate offences are investigated;
- Crime prevention strategies, consulting partner agencies and employing tactics such as nominated neighbour schemes, infrared door chain reminders and memo cams to prevent or respond to repeat victimisation.

When responding to this type of crime, the role of Trading Standards should not be underestimated as their powers and ability to enforce a range of legislation is significant.

Examples of Nominated Neighbour Schemes can be found on the following links:

<http://www.avonandsomerset.police.uk/information/documents/Display.aspx?dt=2&d=3150>

<http://www.gmp.police.uk/.../0/.../Nominated%20Neighbourhood%20Scheme.pdf>

http://www.cheshireeast.gov.uk/business/trading_standards/doors_tep_crime/nominated_neighbour_scheme.aspx

4.4 Vulnerable Victims and Witnesses

Dealing with victims of distraction-type offences requires empathy, tact and sensitivity, while still attempting to gain the maximum amount of intelligence from the victim.

Officers should:

- Consider Achieving Best Evidence (ABE) interviews as opposed to obtaining conventional written statements;
- Promptly arrange E-FIT and photo identification processes where appropriate;
- Ensure Victim Support referrals are carried out.

4.5 Operation Liberal

Operation Liberal is the national distraction burglary intelligence unit. It uses dedicated resources to collate and disseminate crime recording and intelligence data from the consortium forces. The key to its success is that the forces share a common crime recording and intelligence database. The database has the facility for searching similar crimes on nominals, vehicles and MO patterns and has up-to-date photographs. The use of a pro forma witness statement or set of questions ensures that the required details are obtained. Notification and contact should be made via the Force Intelligence Bureau (FIB).

4.6 Automatic Number Plate Recognition

Intelligence on all vehicles known to be used by rogue traders and those believed to be responsible for distraction burglary offences should be disseminated to Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) units for retrospective searching and future hits via PNC markers. Further information on the use of ANPR can be found at

<https://polka.pnn.police.uk/GPDocuments/38/Practice%20Improve%20Publications/Practice%20Advice/ANPR%202009.pdf>

5

Burglary-Related Vehicle Theft Tactics

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5.1 Problem Analysis

The Problem Profile enables tasking to be undertaken based on offences linked by location, time, method, property stolen and other similarities. For burglary offences involving stolen vehicles, it is useful to map the locations where they are abandoned or recovered. It is essential that those recovering these vehicles accurately record the recovery site and include the postcode or grid reference.

5.2 Vehicle Online Descriptive Search

If analysis shows that an area is being targeted for a particular type of vehicle, the Vehicle Online Description Search (VODS) facility within the PNC can use postcodes to identify these vehicles. Warning letters can then be forwarded to the registered owners.

5.3 Prevention

Forces should consider:

- Community awareness via the local media, for example, parish meetings/publications and community messaging;
- Identifying and targeting vulnerable vehicles using VODS and local dealers and then posting crime prevention advice to registered keepers;
- Carrying out awareness campaigns in outlets such as supermarkets, using television, posters, leaflets and/or physical police presence if appropriate.

5.3.1 Prevention Advice

Crime prevention advice could include the following:

- Do not leave car keys in an obvious place;
- Keep car keys from view – do not leave them hanging up in the kitchen or hallway or left on the porch table;
- If you have a garage, park your car in it;
- Consider fitting an electric garage door;
- If cars have to be parked on the driveway, consider fitting substantial gates or security posts;
- Invest in a good-quality home security system;
- Install security lights to the front and rear of your property and consider CCTV cameras;
- Householders need to make sure that they take other, simple crime prevention measures to ensure that they do not become victims of sneak-in-thieves or burglary, such as remembering to lock doors and windows.

6

Suspect/Witness Management and Case Preparation

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6.1 The Interview

The professional management of an offender while in police custody is an important part of the overall process; forces should, therefore, examine the approach they currently use. They must also maximise every opportunity to gather evidence and intelligence.

It is recommended that:

- The investigation is conducted by a CID officer or member of a dedicated burglary unit with up-to-date knowledge of the offender and suspected offending;
- Experienced interviewing officers who are fully briefed in respect of all intelligence relating to the offender, including bad character evidence, interview offenders;
- Suspects named during the interview process are dealt with as live enquiries and all efforts are made to arrest them as soon as possible after their identity becomes known;
- Identification procedures are conducted while the suspect is in custody if possible, rather than bailing them;
- Victims and witnesses are briefed early to enable them to be available for viewing;
- Burglary offenders are considered as potential CHIS and interviewed accordingly after charge, ideally by suitably trained officers from a dedicated source or intelligence unit, as there is huge potential to obtain good-quality actionable intelligence in exchange for a reward such as a court 'text';
- There is early liaison with Evidence Review Officers, who will review all crime case files both pre and post charge, to check that file quality and content is of a standard likely to ensure that cases are brought to justice;
- PACE samples of DNA from persistent burglars are obtained using '96' and above bar-code kits, to reduce the likelihood of having to take evidential samples and then bailing offenders to return because older DNA samples are on the National Database;
- A process is in place to fast track intelligence-led section 18 and section 32 PACE searches promptly, rather than waiting for the investigating unit to progress the search at a later stage. This reinforces the importance of data quality on crime reports to enable an efficient search to be conducted.

Mobile phone evidence is becoming as important as conventional forensic evidence. Early seizure and analysis needs to be considered where relevant, together with checks with the National Mobile Phone Register (NMPR).

In cases where the offenders are known but have not yet been arrested, the appropriate use of covert identification procedures should be considered at an early stage while the victim's memory is fresh. Identification by such means must, however, be used with caution so as not to circumvent PACE. It also relies on the police holding a photograph of the suspect that is of a good and current likeness.

6.2 Remand and Bail

Following charge, officers should consider stringent and appropriate bail conditions or seek a remand in custody.

Consideration should be given to the following:

- The application of secure remands for persistent young offenders;
- The Bail (Amendment) Act 1993, which can be used to appeal to a crown court judge against the decision of a magistrates' court to grant bail to those charged or convicted with an offence punishable by imprisonment, which includes burglary and theft offences;
- If bail is granted, applying for relevant conditions to be set, including curfews, intensive supervision, non-association and tagging;
- Ensuring that any bail conditions are enforced;
- An appropriately briefed police officer attends court on the suspect's first appearance, to reinforce the importance of this individual within the criminal justice system (some forces already do this to great effect);
- Using offender management units to assist in providing previous instances of breaching bail.

6.3 Case Preparation

Once offenders are identified and processed through custody, the compilation of a case file is sometimes seen as a separate exercise. All the processes need to be coordinated so that professional case files are prepared. This can be achieved by:

- Ensuring that there is early liaison, including a case conference, with the CPS lawyer to highlight and discuss any evidential deficiencies in the case;
- Including in case files clear breaches of previous orders, such as Drug Treatment and Testing Orders so that courts can take this into account;
- When handling is the only charge, making full use of section 27 (3) of the Theft Act 1968, which allows for the admissibility of evidence of previous convictions for theft and handling;

- Introducing previous convictions under section 98 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 where a person is being proceeded against for other offences of dishonesty including burglary;
- Completing MG16s (Evidence of Bad Character) where relevant.

Section 103(1)(a) of the CJA 2003 also allows evidence of bad character to be admitted to show that a defendant has a propensity to commit offences of the kind with which they are charged. This can include previous convictions for burglary, and evidence of such convictions will be admissible under the main provisions of the Act provided those convictions are relevant and probative.

For CPS guidance on Bad Character Evidence, see

http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/bad_character_evidence/

The following practices may assist in supporting victims and witnesses through the prosecution process:

- The use of intimidated or vulnerable witness procedures as contained in the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999;
- Regular contact with the victim or witness to update them on the progress of the case;
- Pre-court visits in order to reduce the fears associated with attending court and giving evidence;
- Accompanying the victim or witness to court and remaining with them during the court process;
- Ensuring the investigation teams comply with those guidelines laid out in the Victim Code/Witness Charter and Policing Pledge.

6.4 Victim and Witness Management

6.5 Post-Sentence Investigation and Offender Management

It is good practice for all court decision files to be thoroughly checked on conviction of an offender to ensure that all offences have been recorded correctly and all offences admitted are marked as detected. This is particularly important for future applications for bad character evidence.

6.5.1 Prison Visits

Forces should assess the value of:

- The production of offenders on remand, or prison visits to offenders charged but not yet convicted so that further offences that may be taken into consideration can be highlighted;
- Promptly visiting all offenders sentenced to custody following conviction in order to gain information relating to other offenders, offences, lifestyle details and methods of property disposal;

- Periodically deploying appropriate staff to attend prison establishments to debrief all prisoners for intelligence purposes;
- Developing target packages where a non-custodial sentence is imposed following conviction. These will allow an effective response if the offender is suspected of committing further crime.

6.5.2 Offender Debriefing

Debriefing can be used to evaluate an offender's usefulness in providing evidence against other criminals and/or intelligence about criminal activity or MO. The benefits of this are shown in **C2 (n.d)**

Choices and Consequences – C2 available at

<https://polka.pnn.police.uk/GPDocuments/38/Acquisitive%20Crime/Burglary/C2%20Presentation%20for%20ACPO%20Burg%20Group.ppt>

6.5.3 Prison Releases

Prison Liaison Officers are a prime source of intelligence. They have knowledge of prisoners about to be released and their communications and associations with other inmates and prisoners at other establishments. Forces should ensure that the FIB notifies local intelligence units promptly of impending End of Custody Licence releases and the release of persistent offenders. Target packages can then be developed which will allow an effective response should the offender be suspected of committing further crime on release from prison.



Crime Reduction Initiatives

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7.1 Problem Solving Models

There is a need to apply problem solving methods to crime reduction-based interventions. The four-stage SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment) approach has been used for some time in problem-orientated policing (POP) as a methodical process for problem solving. Crime reduction practitioners applying the process can ensure that a crime problem is effectively identified and tackled thereby avoiding wasting time and resources. SARA is commonly used in the Police Service and so an understanding of the process may assist partner agencies to work with the police to tackle local problems. Formally trained crime prevention practitioners are proficient in problem solving and can assist in applying the four stages of the SARA model, which are:

- Scanning (spotting problems using knowledge, basic data and electronic maps);
- Analysis (using hunches and information technology to dig deeper into problem characteristics and underlying causes);
- Response (devising a solution, working with the community wherever possible);
- Assessment (looking back to see if the solution worked and what lessons can be learned).

7.2 Offender Disruption

An important aspect of targeting offenders is their arrest and conviction for burglary offences, but evidential limitations mean that this is not always possible. The police should, therefore, employ the following disruption tactics on those suspected of committing offences:

- Monitor persons and associates linked by intelligence to burglary offences, who should be the subjects of daily tasking activity with a view to arresting them, or should be the subjects of intelligence gathering activities;
- Seek justifiable arrests for any offences, including minor offences and warrants for outstanding fines;
- Enforce bail and curfew conditions daily, and use of stop and search whenever the grounds exist;
- In the case of juvenile offenders, make visits to parents or guardians to increase the offender's awareness of police activity and discourage them from further offending;
- Consider sending persistent offenders Christmas or birthday cards as a reminder of police attention;
- In order to restrict the movement of offenders, target motoring offences such as disqualified driving, no insurance and licence offences, making full use of ANPR to achieve this;

- Ensure there are intensive supervision programmes/projects for the management of persistent offenders who are also likely to be prolific drug users;
- Consider the use of Anti-Social Behaviour Orders or Criminal Anti-Social Behaviour Orders to restrict the movement of offenders by curfew and prohibit them from entering certain areas or to stop them engaging in activity to support their offending;
- Under the appropriate conditions/circumstances, use the media to assist in 'naming and shaming' convicted offenders;
- Ensure that forfeiture order applications are considered in order to allow the courts to forfeit a convicted person's lawful property, where that property has been used to commit or facilitate the commission of the offence.

7.3 Market Disruption

Before considering the allocation of resources to market disruption tactics, it is necessary to analyse the stolen goods markets that are active in the area. This should be done using problem solving techniques such as SARA and ERASOR (Extra Routine and Systematic Opportunistic Research).

One market disruption approach to reducing domestic burglary could be to instil among thieves that selling, transporting and storing goods has become at least as risky as it is to steal the goods in the first place. Another is to make buying, dealing and consuming stolen goods appreciably more risky for all those involved.

Publicity campaigns can be used to encourage members of the public not to buy stolen property as to do so assists the development of the theft and drug markets. In addition, the public can be encouraged to contact the police with any information regarding stolen property.

Partnerships can be developed with local trading standards offices with a view to using legislation to regulate the trade in second-hand goods and to make it more difficult for criminals to dispose of stolen property. Dealers in second-hand goods can be required to be registered, and to keep records of all transactions. Legitimate traders benefit from this both in trade and reputation, while dishonest traders are forced out of the market. The legislation also affects occasional sales such as boot fairs, markets and one-day sales.

7.4 Crime Reduction Initiatives and Partnerships

The prevention and reduction of domestic burglary is not the sole responsibility of the Police Service and every opportunity should be taken to engage other agencies in burglary reduction and prevention initiatives.

Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 places a statutory responsibility on local authorities to do all that they reasonably can to prevent crime and disorder in their area. Each Community Safety Partnership has a community safety strategy based on a local crime and disorder audit. Advice and support should be available from the local police Crime Prevention Officer and the Local Authority Community Safety officer.

Domestic Burglary Toolkit

The Home Office has produced a Domestic Burglary Toolkit designed to assist those involved in crime reduction to work as effectively as possible. It provides information on the latest developments, research findings and promising approaches to reducing domestic burglary. For more information see

<http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/crime/acquisitive-crime-resources/burglary-toolkit?view=Binary>

Target Hardening

Risk assessments will assist in identifying vulnerable premises, and consideration should be given to improving the security of those that are most at risk. For example, premises which appear to be unoccupied during the hours of darkness can be identified by patrolling officers who can then post a crime prevention leaflet through the door giving advice to the occupant. This advice leaflet could include discount vouchers for DIY stores to enable householders to purchase timer light switches.

‘Secured by Design’

Secured by Design is a registered trademark and ACPO, through their company Crime Prevention Initiatives Limited, have now licensed approximately 400 companies to supply security products that meet the necessary British and European Standards.

Property Marking/Registration

Property marking can be overt, such as engraving or punching, or invisible using ultraviolet sensitive marker pens or DNA type solutions. These are available commercially from Forensic Coding suppliers such as SelectaDNA, SmartWater or Red Web Security. It is good practice and necessary to advertise the use of covert applications at entry points to premises in order to maintain the deterrent effect. Property registers such as **<http://www.immobilise.com>** should be promoted.

CCTV

The increasing use of closed-circuit television (CCTV) in residential areas presents an opportunity for it to be used to reduce domestic burglary offences. CCTV operators should be advised of the occurrence of burglaries in a particular area and be given descriptions of suspected offenders as soon as possible.

Mobile CCTV units are now being used in a number of areas and should be targeted at burglary hot spots as a means of gathering intelligence and deterring offenders. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 needs to be considered, particularly if the cameras are deployed covertly or are used to target individual offenders.

Alley-Gating

Alley-gating interventions, which are properly implemented and maintained, can significantly reduce domestic burglary. They increase the risks and difficulty for the burglar by restricting access to the rear of houses. Alley-gating schemes can also lead to reductions in the fear of crime, environmental improvements and better community relations.

The Highways Act 1980

Section 119B of the Highways Act 1980 allows a council to divert a highway or path where premises adjoining or adjacent to the highway are affected by high levels of crime, and the existence of the highway is facilitating the persistent commission of criminal offences and the diversion of the path or way helps to prevent or reduce crime, which would otherwise disrupt the life of the community.

The path or way may also be diverted where the highway crosses land occupied by a school and it is expedient, for the purpose of protecting the pupils or staff from:

- Violence or the threat of violence;
- Harassment;
- Alarm or distress arising from unlawful activity;
- Any other risk to their health or safety arising from such activity.

Home Security Improvements Service

There are a number of initiatives that provide a prompt and affordable home security improvements service for victims of burglary. Using titles such as 'Handy Van' or 'Bobby Van', these initiatives employ a qualified carpenter to provide a mobile service to improve security to vulnerable houses. The scheme is often sponsored and has been particularly effective where a victim finds home security improvements are

unaffordable. The incidence of repeat victimisation can be reduced by providing timely home security improvements for premises that have been burgled.

Neighbourhood Watch

Properly managed and supported Neighbourhood Watch Schemes can act as a deterrent and provide local intelligence. Successful schemes receive regular information about crime from their local police, and there are opportunities for the members to be tasked with reporting on specific information relating to current intelligence.

Police forces should take every opportunity to encourage victims of burglary to set up or join an existing Neighbourhood Watch Scheme.

Cocoon Watch

There are instances where forming a Neighbourhood Watch Scheme is impractical or where there is the need to raise public awareness of a specific crime or trend. In such circumstances householders can be advised to protect themselves from being victimised by developing a Cocoon Watch, whereby neighbours watch out for one another.

This tactic, when combined with tailored target hardening, can be highly effective in preventing crime. One method of raising awareness of burglary is to deliver burglary alert cards in the Cocoon Watch area.

Other Agencies

Working relationships have been developed with other agencies in some areas to maximise street presence and opportunities for gathering intelligence. An example of this is the Fire Service agreeing to return to their stations via hot spot areas after call-outs. Tangible benefits can also be gained by involving the voluntary sector, particularly in engaging hard-to-reach and vulnerable communities.

Countryside Watch

Some forces use private sector personnel such as game wardens and forestry commission officers to act as 'eyes and ears' in rural areas. These personnel are provided with frequent intelligence bulletins and are encouraged to record and inform the police of any suspicious vehicles or persons they see during their daily duties.

Truancy

Research shows that truanting children can be easily drawn into crime and anti-social behaviour. In an effort to combat this, the local education authority and police should work in partnership to organise coordinated truancy sweeps.

Delivery Organisations

Post Office employees, taxi drivers and those who deliver milk and newspapers are often working at times when burglary offences are committed. They can provide useful intelligence in relation to people acting suspiciously, or premises that are displaying outward signs of being unoccupied. It is recommended that such organisations be encouraged to work closely with the police in providing community-based intelligence.

Students

The current student population in the United Kingdom is about 2.7 million. Home Office research indicates that one third of students become victims of crime while at university, and burglary is a significant problem in most student communities. The reasons for this include:

- Being naïve or unconcerned about crime levels and not taking adequate precautions to protect themselves;
- Students have high rates of ownership of attractive items such as laptops;
- Students usually live in high-risk areas and in private rented accommodation with poor security levels;
- Those who come from low-crime communities have a lack of understanding of local crime trends;
- The student population is transient.

Student burglary occurs in both student halls of residence and in the private rented housing sector (PRHS). Forces should consider the following:

- Burglary risk in the PRHS is higher than in halls;
- Eighty to ninety per cent of burglaries in halls are due to the properties being left insecure;
- Burglary due to insecure properties in the PRHS is more in line with national average figures (approximately thirty per cent);
- Burglary in halls often occurs in the late afternoon/early evening when students have returned from lectures and leave windows/doors open for short periods;
- Burglary in the PRHS often occurs between 2000–0300 when students are out socialising, at weekends and vacation periods if the household is away;
- The point of entry in the PRHS tends to be around the back of the property.

Suggested responses to reducing burglary of student accommodation should take account of seasonality and critical time periods, including:

- Targeting the new intake before and just after Freshers Week;
- Targeting returning students (particularly second year who may be moving out into the housing market for the first time) at the time of return;
- Seasonal peak will run throughout October/November;
- Advising students to take valuables home over vacation periods (there is sometimes an increased level of forced burglary dwelling in vacation periods);
- Informing students who start house hunting for their next academic year accommodation, particularly from January onwards, about specific security information to consider with each house they visit;
- Providing information to students in halls towards the end of the academic year about burglary risks in the PRHS.

It is recommended that forces with student populations assess the level of domestic burglary within these communities and consider adopting the following initiatives.

University Liaison Police Officers

Greater Manchester Police has two University Liaison Police Officers located within the university campus offering a wide range of services to the students in partnership with the university and student unions. These include advice surgeries, property marking, safe storage schemes and crime prevention advice. The officers provide safety awareness advice and visible reassurance to the students.

The Police Association of Higher Education Liaison Officers

The Police Association of Higher Education Liaison Officers (PAHELO) was formed in September 2001 and provides a forum for its members to exchange knowledge and remain up to date on crime trends, legislation and other issues relating to higher education institutions. The Association also works with national partners including the Home Office and the National Union of Students to reduce higher education campus and student-related crime. Membership of PAHELO is aimed at police officers with daily responsibility for a higher education institution. It is recommended that designated university officers become members of this Association in order to learn and share effective practice in reducing student burglary and other crime types. In addition to this NPJA guidance, PAHELO will be producing Tactical Guidance to Reducing Student Burglary in partnership with the National Union of

Students. This Guidance will include practice examples from across the country, covering specifically target hardening and appropriate marketing campaigns. It will be made available to forces and partners through the ACPO Burglary Working Group from autumn 2011. For further information about the Association, see

<http://www.pahelo.org.uk>

Student Property Marking

Even if students mark their property effectively, it can be difficult to trace them as they move frequently. Traditional methods such as the use of a postcode can, if the property is recovered some time later, make tracing the victim difficult. A number of police forces have addressed this problem by advising students to mark their property with the two-letter code for their university plus their student registration number, which is stored for seven years. This is regarded as standard good practice and recommended to all forces with large student populations.

Laptop Protection

A number of protection and recovery software options are commercially available which enable a tracking facility on laptops. West Yorkshire Police has promoted this software to students so that they can protect their laptops with special tracking technology. Arrests for burglary have been made and the stolen property retrieved. A programme is now being rolled out on a wider basis and officers will install special software on around 4,000 student laptops to track, locate and recover stolen devices.

Appendix 1

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACC	Assistant Chief Constable
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ANPR	Automatic Number Plate Recognition
BCU	Basic Command Unit
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
CHIS	Convert Human Intelligence Source
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service
CSI	Crime Scene Investigator
DNA	Deoxyribonucleic Acid
E-FIT™	Electronic Facial Identification Technique
ERASOR	Extra Routine and Systematic Opportunities Research
FIB	Force Intelligence Bureau
FSI	Forensic Science Investigator
FSS	Forensic Science Service
MO	Modus Operandi
NCRS	National Crime Recording Standards
NIM	National Intelligence Model
NMPR	National Mobile Phone Register
NPIA	National Policing Improvement Agency
PACE	Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984
PNC	Police National Computer
PRHS	Private Rented Housing Sector
QUEST	Queries Using Extended Search Technique (on PNC)
SARA	Scanning Analysis Response Assessment
SOCO	Scenes of Crime Officer
TSU	Technical Support Unit
VODS	Vehicle Online Descriptive Search (on PNC)

Appendix 2

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